On 16 Apr 2015, at 06:34, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote:
On Thu, Apr 16, 2015 at 5:33 AM, Bruce Kellett <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
> wrote:
LizR wrote:
On 16 April 2015 at 12:53, Bruce Kellett <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au <mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
>> wrote:
LizR wrote:
On 15 April 2015 at 10:15, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com
<mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com> <mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com
<mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com>>> wrote:
Yes but I'm confused, I though you were the one arguing
that
Bruno
had discovered something new under the sun, a new sort of
uncertainty That's hardly what Bruno is claiming.
Step 3 is only a small
step in a logical argument. It shows that if our normal
everyday
consciousness is the result of computation, then it can be
duplicated (in principle - if you have a problem with matter
duplicators, consider an AI programme) and that this leads to
what looks like uncertainty from one person's perspective.
You only get that impression because in Bruno's treatment of the
case -- the two copies are immediately separated by a large
distance
and don't further interact. You might come to a different
conclusion
if you let the copies sit down together and have a chat.
That doesn't make any difference to the argument. "Will I be the
copy sitting in the chair on the left?" is less dramatic than "Will
I be transported to Moscow or Washington?" and hence, I suspect,
might not make the point so clearly. But otherwise the argument goes
through either way.
No, because as I argued elsewhere, the two 'copies' would not agree
that they were the same person.
Separating them geographically was meant to mimic the different
worlds idea from MWI. But I think that is a bit of a cheat.
I don't know where Bruno says he's mimicking the MWI (at this
stage) ? This is a classical result, assuming classical computation
(which according to Max Tegmark is a reasonable assumption for
brains).
In the protracted arguments with John Clark, the point was repeated
made that he accepted FPI for MWI, so why not for Step 3.
Discussion or fruitful argument assume mutual respect. The respect/
civility in the exchange is one-sided however, and has remained so
for years. It's not an argument; closer to an experiment of John to
see how often he can get away with airing personal issues clothed in
sincerity of intellectual debate.
This occupies too much bandwidth and is a turn off from where I'm
sitting. I'd much rather see the comp related discussions go to
address say Telmo's request for clarification in Bruno's use of
phi_i, or G/G* distinctions, or pedagogical demonstrations on "the
work arithmetic existentially actualizes/gets done", clarification
on Russell's use of "robust", physicalist theories that don't
eliminate consciousness etc.
Good and interesting questions indeed.
I, of course would be delighted if people try to really grasp the
phi_i, the G/G* distinction, and the subtle but key point of the fact
that the arithmetical reality simulates computations, as opposed to
merely generates descriptions of them.
I am bit buzy right now. Feel free to tell me which one of those
point seems to you the more interesting, or funky.
My problem is that the difficulties reside here in the logic-branch-of-
math, not really in my work, and attempt to dig in the math on a forum
is difficult.
Bruno
I enjoy when the list gets funky in such direction, and even though
I am invested in environmental sector professionally, perhaps some
of the climate change stuff is a bit out of topic. This as pure
opinion. Nobody gets two cents from me as I'd be poor if
consistent ;-) PGC
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