On 5/12/2015 7:32 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 13 May 2015 at 12:25, Bruce Kellett <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
meekerdb wrote:
On 5/12/2015 6:59 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
Chalmer's fading quailia argument <http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html>
shows that if replacing a biological neuron with a functionally equivalent
silicon neuron changed conscious perception, then it would lead to an
absurdity, either:
1. quaila fade/change as silicon neurons gradually replace the biological
ones, leading to a case where the quaila are being completely out of touch
with the functional state of the brain.
or
2. the replacement eventually leads to a sudden and complete loss of all
quaila, but this suggests a single neuron, or even a few molecules of that
neuron, when substituted, somehow completely determine the presence of
quaila
His argument is convincing, but what happens when we replace neurons not
with functionally identical ones, but with neurons that fire according to a
RNG. In all but 1 case, the random firings of the neurons will result in
completely different behaviors, but what about that 1 (immensely rare) case
where the random neuron firings (by chance) equal the firing patterns of the
substituted neurons.
Same objection I had to the proposed playback of a recording. There is no
longer the causal link between the neurons firing, so the mere succession of
states doesn't constitute a computation nor instantiate consciousness.
Careful Brent! You are introducing a particular magic into the mix --
causality in your case. For Bruno, the magic is a particular type of
computation. Both of these 'escapes' are essentially dualist explanations of
consciousness.
Yes, it's important not to put theory before evidence. The evidence is
that brains lead to consciousness. The fading qualia thought
experiment suggests that reproducing brain behaviour will also
reproduce consciousness. It doesn't matter how the brain behaviour is
reproduced: whether by a computer, a RNG, a recording, or God the
argument still goes through.
But the question is what constitutes "behavior"? I think the idea of "states" has been
borrowed from TM and abstract computation. All real processes have continuity and overlap
in time. "States" are an ideal discretization; and in this case I think it is abstracting
away something important.
Brent
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