On 03 Jun 2015, at 23:07, John Clark wrote:
Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>> if randomness doesn't mean an event without a cause what on
earth does it mean?
> A superposition seen from the 1p view, or A self-duplication seen
from the 1p view
That means peepee.
Thanks for reminding us your precious argument against step 3.
Peepee? How could I have missed that wonderful clear argument?
> or a result of measurement wih inomplete information,
That start of randomness is subjective, a function of the observer
not of the thing itself.
> or A string which is not algorithmically compressible,
Yes, that is a very good example of an event without a cause.
"Event" is a physical notion. Algorithmic non compressibility is an
mathematical notion. There is no event notion in mathematics, nor is
there any notion of cause, unless you enlarge the notion of cause to
the notion of (mathematical) reason.
>> nobody has ever seen anything in the physical world that was not
computable.
>>> I can agree with this.
>> Then do you think maybe that fact is trying to tell you something
rather important?
> That computationalism might be false.
What the hell! Computationalism says that intelligent behavior is
caused by physical computation, so how does the fact that nobody has
ever seen a computation that wasn't physical imply that
Computationalism might be false?
Because seeing is physical. So you need first to derive a physical
principle from computationalism, and then show it to violate an
observed/inferred physical principle. That might happen, if someone
find a theorem of Z1* contradicting a quantum tautology.
> But that is not yet proven too, as comp implies there is
something non computable, but it might be just the FPI and the
quantum FPI confirms this.
I don't care, I'm not interested in "comp" or of the Foreign Policy
Institute.
If you don't care, you would abandon the idea of showing that comp1
does not imply comp2 (with Liz terminology).
>> Physicists only deal with things in nature so they have no need
to worry about non computable stuff, and a good thing too because if
a physical theory is non computable there is no way to prove it
wrong and thus it is not science.
> Physics use a lot of non computable things in the background.
Name one.
The set of real numbers.
>> It is intuitively obvious that no computation can be made without
the use of matter that obeys the laws of physics.
> "made" is ambiguous.
Bullshit.
Did you mean "made" in the physical reality, by a physical universal
machine, or did you mean "made" by a immaterial universal machine,
like Robinson Arithmetic?
> You systematically beg the question by defining existence,
"made" ... by physical existence, physically made, etc.
Existence is ambiguous.
Not once we put the cart on the table, and show your starting
assumptions. None of my use of the term "existence" is ambiguous at all.
> No problem with this, except that comp is false,
OK fine, "comp" is false. And now that we both agree that "comp" is
false can you please stop talking about "comp".
I say that computationalism is false, because you use primitive
matter. Why should we abandon computationalism, given that nobody has
ever show the existence of primitive matter?
>> I've said before you can't perform a calculation with a definition.
> I cannot, but that is not the point.
But that is exactly precisely the point! If I said I had a proof of
the Riemann hypothesis but I refuse to show it to you or to anybody
else would you take me seriously?
I said that nobody can run in our physical reality a purely
mathematical computation. But from this you derive that computation
are not run immaterially in arithmetic. That does not follow.
If you say non physical stuff can make a calculation, any
calculation, I'm not going to believe it until you show me some non
physical stuff that is actually calculating something.
Well, any specification of any algorithm compute what it has to
compute in arithmetic. For example K computes the left projection in
arithmetic, when define in arithmetic.
You are the one saying that "compute" means "compute physically", but
that is your own idiosyncrasy, based on your begging the question. To
compute is defined mathematically, not physically.
It might be time you give your definition of computation, as we still
don't know it. Then I will show you that I use a different, standard
definition, which has no relation with physics at all. To be frank,
there is a tun of literature by people who search such a physical
definition, but usually recognize they still have not find it. It
might be interesting, but even if they succeed, that would still not
be a problem for computationalism per se.
> The arithmetical reality does it independently of me,
Then have it do so and end this debate right now, have non-physical
arithmetical reality calculate the solution to a problem from a
first grade arithmetic book!
I gave this as an exercise to Liz, sometime ago. I explained how RA
compute 2+3. No mention at all of physical device was used. Of course,
to verify this, as we live locally in a physical reality, we use
physical tools to describe all this, but those are not part of the
computation done by RA. They are only part of our attempt to talk with
each other about this in the physical reality. Those are not at the
same level. Like the number 45907 does not assume the existence of the
symbols "4" "5" "0" "9" and "7".
>>>> A Turing Machine does assume matter that obeys the laws of
physics,
>>> Not at all.
>> It does if you expect your Turing Machine to actually do anything.
> You mean "do anything relatively to my body",
Obviously I mean that because if it can't do anything relative to my
body then it's invisible, and being invisible and being nonexistent
look rather similar.
So time is inexistent? Again you are back to your Aristotelian
assumption. No problem if you agree that comp1 is false. But then why
cryogenize your brain?
> but as we need to explain the appearance of body from the
computations
You would only need to do that if you assume the very thing you're
trying to prove, that mathematics is more fundamental than physics.
Then you have to show a (genuine) flaw in the reasoning.
>> If Mr. Matyazevic really knows how a Turing Machine can be
emulated by non-physical diophantine polynomial relations then why
doesn't he stop talking about it and just do it?
> because he is a mathematician, studying computation. He is not an
engineer implementing computations relatively to us.
So Mr. Matyazevic is making invisible computations and I have a
invisible proof the Riemann hypothesis. As I've said, being
invisible and being nonexistent look rather similar.
Then the subject of mathematics does not exist.
> Again, the point is that if you agree that 2+2=4 is true
independently of you
I'm certain it's independent of me but I'm not certain it's
independent of the entire physical universe; if 4 things didn't
exist in the entire physical universe, or even two, then I'm not
certain 2+2=4 would have any meaning, and even if it did I'm not
certain who would be around to find it meaningful.
But those are different things. If you agree that 2+2=4 independently
of me and you, you can certainly conceive that "2+2=4" is true
independently of the universe, as "2+2=4" does not presuppose anything
physical a priori.
> then the computations are done,
The 2+2=4 computation has been done but the computation to find the
10^100^100 digit of PI has not been done and it is probably
impossible to compute it in the physical universe, so I don't know
if that digit can be said to exist or not. Maybe yes maybe no.
Then you are ultrafinitist, and in that case, you can still avoid the
comp conclusion ... at step 7. But step 8 will show that this will
still not work, unless you put enough non-Turing emulable, and non FPI-
recoverable properties in matter.
>> Why doesn't Mr. Matyazevic go into the computer hardware business
and start the Diophantine Polynomial Corporation and become the
world's first trillionaire? I think a computer chip company with
zero manufacturing costs would be a wonderful business model. I sure
wish I knew how to do it.
> You continue your joke
I'm not joking, if he really knew how to do what you claimed he
knows how to do, make calculations without matter that obeys the
laws of physics, then he'd revolutionize the world, and become a
trillionaire too.
Thanks to God, there are still no patent for mathematical discovery.
But just read a textbook on computer science to get the point.
Computation is an abstract mathematical notion, quite distinct from
the related notion of implementation of a computation in a physical
world.
> You confuse level. PA does not assume the existence of paper,
I think people of Pennsylvania believe that paper exists.
lol
Bruno
John K Clark
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