On 6/9/2015 12:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 08 Jun 2015, at 19:27, meekerdb wrote:
On 6/8/2015 1:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Hence what I've called comp1 is the default materialist hypothesis (also known as the
strong AI thesis, I think)
Comp1 is not comp, even if it is "comp" for a materialist: but that position is proved
to be nonsense.
Comp is just "I am a digitalizable machine".
String AI is the thesis that machine can think (be conscious). It does not logically
entail comp. Machine can think, but does not need to be the only thinking entities.
Gods and goddesses might be able to think too.
But in saying "I am a digitalizable machine" you implicitly assume that machine exists
in the environment that you exist in.
That is not a problem. In arithmetic I will exist in infinities of environments, played
by UMs (with and without oracles). Such existence are relative, and phenomenological.
It is this environment and your potential interaction with it that provides meaning to
the "digital thoughts" of the machine.
I can agree with this. What does it change in the reasoning?
It undermines the MGA because it shows that whether a physical process instantiates a
computation is a wholistic question, one whose answer is relative to the environment and
interaction with that environment. This means that isolating the movie graph and then
showing that it is absurd to regard it as a computation is not a legitimate move.
Brent
The point is that your generalized brain, as long as it is digital, cannot singularize
your soul. If you don't add non Turing emulable magic in matter, the argument shows that
matter has to arise from a statistics on all computations going through the current
state. If not, could you say precisely when the proof go wrong?
Bruno
Brent
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