On Sun, Jun 14, 2015 at 10:27 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> > On 08 Jun 2015, at 20:50, Terren Suydam wrote: > > > > On Mon, Jun 8, 2015 at 2:20 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > >> >> On 08 Jun 2015, at 15:58, Terren Suydam wrote: >> >> >> >> On Thu, Jun 4, 2015 at 1:59 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: >> >>> >>> On 04 Jun 2015, at 18:01, Terren Suydam wrote: >>> >> >> OK, so given a certain interpretation, some scholars added two hypostases >> to the original three. >> >> >> It is very natural to do. The ennead VI.1 describes the three "initial >> hypostases", and the subject of what is matter, notably the intelligible >> matter and the sensible matter, is the subject of the ennead II.4. >> >> It is a simplification of vocabulary, more than another interpretation. >> >> >> >> Then, it appears that you make a third interpretation by splitting the >> intellect, and the two matters. >> >> What justifies these splits? >> >> >> I am not sure I understand? Plotinus splits them too, as they are >> different subject matter. The "intellect" is the nous, the worlds of idea, >> and here the world of what the machine can prove (seen by her, and by God: >> G and G*). >> But matter is what you can predict with the FPI, and so it is a different >> notion, and likewise, in Plotinus, matter is given by a platonist rereading >> of Aristotle theory of indetermination. This is done in the ennead II-4. >> Why should we not split intellect and matter, which in appearance are >> very different, and the problem is more in consistently relating them. If >> we don't distinguish them, we cannot explain the problem of relating them. >> >> > Sorry, my question was ambiguous. What I mean is that after adding the two > hypostases for the two "matters", you have five hypostases, the initial > three plus the two for matter. > > Then, you arrive at 8 hypostases by splitting the intellect into two, and > you do the same for each of the matter hyspostases. My question is what > plain-language rationale justifies creating these three extra hypostases? > And can we really say we're still talking about Plotinus's hypostases at > this point? > > > We can, as nobody could pretend to have the right intepretation of > Plotinus. In fact that very question has been addressed to Plotinus's > interpretation of Plato. > > Now, it would be necessary to quote large passage of Plotinus to explain > why indeed, even without comp, the "two matters" (the intelligible et the > sensible one) are arguably sort of hypostases, even in the mind of > Plotionus, but as a platonist, he is forced to consider them degenerate and > belonging to the realm where God loses control, making matter a quasi > synonym of evil (!). > > The primary hypostase are the three one on the top right of this diagram > (T, for truth, G* and S4Grz) > > T > > G G* > > S4Grz > > > Z Z* > > X X* > > > Making Z, Z*, X, X* into hypostases homogenizes nicely Plotinus > presentation, and put a lot of pieces of the platonist puzzle into place. > It makes other passage of Plotinus completely natural. > > Note that for getting the material aspect of the (degenerate, secondary) > hypostases, we still need to make comp explicit, by restricting the > arithmetical intepretation of the modal logics on the sigma-& > (UD-accessible) propositions (leading to the logic (below G1 and G1*) > S4Grz1, Z1*, X1*, where the quantum quantization appears. > > The plain language rational is that both in Plotinus, (according to some > passage----this is accepted by many scholars too) and in the universal > machine mind, UDA show that psychology, theology, even biology, are > obtained by intensional (modal) variant of the intellect and the ONE. > > By incompleteness, provability is of the type "belief". We lost > "knowledge" here, we don't have []p -> p in G. > This makes knowledge emulable, and meta-definable, in the language of the > machine, by the Theaetetus method: [1]p = []p & p. > > UDA justifies for matter: []p & <>t (cf the coffee modification of the > step 3: a physical certainty remains true in all consistent continuations > ([]p), and such continuation exist (<>t). It is the Timaeus "bastard > calculus", referred to by Plotinus in his two-matters chapter (ennead II-6). > > Sensible matter is just a reapplication of the theaetetus, on intelligible > matter. > > I hope this helps, ask anything. > > Bruno > > I'm not conversant in modal logic, so a lot of that went over my head. Thus my request for "plain language" justifications. In spite of that language barrier I'd like to understand what I can about this model because it is the basis for your formal argument AUDA and much of what you've created seems to depend on it. I still am not clear on why you invent three "new" hypostases, granting the five from Plotinus (by creating G/G*, X/X*, and Z/Z* instead of just G, X, and Z), except that you say "[it] homogenizes nicely Plotinus presentation, and put a lot of pieces of the platonist puzzle into place." Symmetry isn't an explanation. What I'm looking for would be something along the lines of "It makes sense to split the intellect hypostases into G & G* because ...."), likewise for X, and for Z. It ought to be possible to justify the hypostases in a non-technical way. If not, then it strikes me as a weak spot of the argument, even if the argument is technical. Terren -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. 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