Quentin
>> Then under MWI, same thing you're garanteed to see all results, so
>> probability should also be one
Deterministic branching leads to trouble rendering the idea of probability
coherent. Go figure! Who would ever have guessed determinism and chance were
difficult to marry...
Subject: Re: A riddle for John Clark
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
From: meeke...@verizon.net
Date: Wed, 22 Jul 2015 16:25:00 -0700
On 7/22/2015 12:08 AM, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
On 21 Jul 2015, at 19:42, meekerdb wrote:
On 7/21/2015 10:30 AM, Bruno
Marchal wrote:
So maybe
one could see W AND W the same way I can see my
computer screen AND my dog - just by attending to
one or the other.
You will need a long neck to attend a conference in
Moscow, and a party in Washington. You can use a
tele-vision system, and communicate by SMS, but unless
you build a new corpus callosum between the two brains,
and fuse the limbic system, by comp, the two "original"
persons have become two persons, having each its unique
experience. That follows from mechanism, and so P(W xor
M) = 1, and P(W & M) = 0, as no one can open door in
Moscow, and see some other city in the direct way of the
first person experience.
It follows from
physics.
We don't know that.
Then why did you assert the necessity of a physical connection: "You
will need a long neck to attend a conference in Moscow, and a party
in Washington."
We just assume that the physics is rich enough to implement
locally universal machine, so that comp make sense, but then
we arrive at the computationalist difficulties. Physics assume
a brain/mind link which has to be justified, and the UDA shows
the change we have to introduce.
But you have effectively asserted that the duplicate persons at
different locations do not experience both locations - their minds
are separate because their brains are. If that is more than just an
assumption it is because it is relying on the physical basis of
mind. If you reject the physical basis of mind then you might
expect the duplicates to share one mind.
Brent
But does it follow from UD
computations?
It should, (at step 7 and 8) and the point is only that it
is testable.
Up to now, it is working well. But to explain this, we need
to dig deeper in computer science.
Are you OK with the steps 0-6? 0-7? From your other posts,
I think you were OK. So we can perhaps come back on step 8. I
think Bruce Kellet has also some problem there. That can only
be more intersting than the nonsense about step 3 that we can
hear those days.
Bruno
Brent
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