On 9/9/2015 7:10 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:


On Wednesday, September 9, 2015, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:



    On 9/8/2015 8:20 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:


    On 9 September 2015 at 12:44, Bruce Kellett
    <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
    <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','bhkell...@optusnet.com.au');>> wrote:

        On 9/09/2015 12:26 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
        On 9 September 2015 at 10:43, Bruce Kellett
        <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
        <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','bhkell...@optusnet.com.au');>>
        wrote:


            On 9/09/2015 9:30 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
            On 9 September 2015 at 09:23, Bruce Kellett
            <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
            <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','bhkell...@optusnet.com.au');>>
            wrote:

                On 9/09/2015 8:56 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
                On 8 September 2015 at 22:11, Bruce Kellett
                <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
                <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','bhkell...@optusnet.com.au');>>
                wrote:

                    On 8/09/2015 9:14 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
                    On 8 September 2015 at 20:48, Bruce Kellett
                    <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
                    <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','bhkell...@optusnet.com.au');>>
                    wrote:

                        On 8/09/2015 8:40 pm, Stathis Papaioannou
                        wrote:

                        On 8 September 2015 at 17:39, Bruce
                        Kellett <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
                        
<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','bhkell...@optusnet.com.au');>>
                        wrote:

                            On 8/09/2015 4:56 pm, Stathis
                            Papaioannou wrote:
                            I will ask you the same question as
                            I did Brent: do you conclude from
                            the fact that when you toss a coin
                            it comes up either as head or tails
                            that the world does not split into
                            two parallel versions of you, one
                            of which sees heads and the other
                            tails?
                            I would conclude that a coin toss
                            does not provide any evidence for
                            multiple worlds or a split. The only
                            evidence we have from this data is
                            that the outcome of the toss is
                            uncertain. There is no evidence
                            there for any split of anything.


                        It is not evidence FOR a split but is it
                        evidence AGAINST a split?

                        It is evidence that the assumption of a
                        split is not necessary in order to
                        understand everyday happenings. So, by
                        the application of Occam's Razor, no
                        split happens.


                    So you agree that we would still observe the
                    probabilities we do if we lived in a
                    deterministic world in whaich all
                    possibilities are realised?
                    No, because not all possibilities happen in
                    this world. If all possibilities were realized
                    in this world, then there would be no
                    uncertainty, no probabilities. Possibility and
                    actuality would be the same thing. All the
                    horses would win the Melbourne cup; and we
                    don't live in such a world.


                Obviously, not all possibilities happen in this
                world, but they might happen in parallel worlds
                that don't interact with each other. The argument
                is that probabilities emerge from this, since you
                don't know which world you will find yourself in.
                You bet on the favourite in the race because you
                think you are more likely to end up in a world in
                which the favourite wins.
                In other words, probabilities can make perfect
                sense in a single deterministic world. This was
                understood a long time ago with the development of
                statistical mechanics. The idea that "all
                possibilities happen in parallel worlds" does not
                actually make a lot of sense. There is no current
                physical theory that implies this (without the
                addition of a lot of unevidenced assumptions). So
                probabilities do not emerge from this, they come
                from quite simple assumptions of randomness and
                ignorance.

                Probability in the MWI of quantum mechanics is
                problematic. Regardless of claims to be able to
                derive the Born Rule in Everettian models, all
                attempts fail because they are circular -- they
                need the Born rule in order to have non-interacting
                worlds, so you cannot then use these independent
                worlds to derive the Born rule. Gleason's theorem
                is no help -- it suffers from all the same problems
                as the Deutsch-Wallace approach.


            You don't seem to be disputing that we would still
            experience a probabilistic world even if all
            possibilities were actually realised, even though you
            do dispute that we in fact live in such a world.

            I'm not sure if you are disputing that, to give a
            simple model case, if a coin was tossed and the world
            split in two, with one version of you seeing heads and
            the other tails, the probability of each outcome is 1/2.
            Whether or not all possibilities are realized, they are
            not in evidence, so their relevance to the question of
            probabilities is questionable.

            Your simple model case of a coin toss causing a world
            split is just a made-up example to give the result you
            want, so again its relevance is dubious. There is no
            sensible physical theory in which the world splits on
            classical coin tosses.


        If you can't imagine a world split, consider a virtual
        reality in which the program forks every time a coin is
        tossed, one fork seeing heads and the other tails. You are
        an observer in this world and you have this information, so
        you know for certain that "all possibilities are realised"
        when the coin is tossed. What would you say about your
        expectation of seeing heads?
        I presume you mean that the world is duplicated on each toss,
        with one branch showing each outcome. We are back to the
        dreaded "person duplication" problem. My opinion on this is
        that on such a duplication, two new persons are created, so
        the probability that the original person will see either
        heads or tails is precisely zero, because that person no
        longer exists after the duplication.


    After the coin has been tossed a few times, you (or one of the
    entities identifying as you) will say that, despite the opinion
    he expressed on 9th September on the Everything List, it does
    seem that he has survived the duplication and that heads comes up
    about half the time.

    But he would say the same thing if only one fork of the program
    were executed at each branch.   So whether the other branches are
    executed is not related to observations.


You can make a similar comment about any observation: we would draw the same conclusions about the past if the world was created a minute ago with evidence of a false history.

Exactly so.  Do you entertain that as theory?  If not, why not?

Brent

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