Thanks, Quentin, I take it as a reply to my questioning PA and RA. (the "A" in PA meaning axioms, in RA arithmetic?).
None of them satisfies my own take on 'intelligent'. I start from the llinguistic origin (Latin: inter-lego), I *READ between* - the lines and words, that is). To catch a 'meaning' (sense) more widely and accurately than a flat translation from a dictionary. Arithmetic is restricted IMO, I see no straight penetration into the emotional, feelable, artsy, thought-provoking, even freely anticipatory etc. by it's application (maybe, because I am no mathematician). Axioms I consider artificial rules made up to make (scientific?) conclusions valid. Maybe I am all wrong on this list. John Mikes On Tue, Nov 3, 2015 at 3:24 PM, Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com> wrote: > PA = https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peano_axioms > RA = https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robinson_arithmetic > > 2015-11-03 21:17 GMT+01:00 John Mikes <jami...@gmail.com>: > >> I read it all, did not find what PA and RA are standing for. >> Can you explain in brief? >> Thanks >> John M >> >> On Tue, Nov 3, 2015 at 4:06 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: >> >>> >>> On 02 Nov 2015, at 18:30, Brent Meeker wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On 11/1/2015 11:09 PM, Pierz wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Sunday, November 1, 2015 at 6:25:57 PM UTC+11, Brent wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On 10/31/2015 11:47 PM, Pierz wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Sunday, November 1, 2015 at 4:18:05 PM UTC+11, Brent wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 10/31/2015 8:55 PM, Pierz wrote: >>>>> >>>>> OK, a subject title designed to provoke, but here's a thought that has >>>>> intrigued me. Computationalism (and let's not worry for the time being >>>>> about whether one buys Bruno's UDA) states that consciousness supervenes >>>>> on >>>>> computation. This necesssarily implies (by Church thesis) that the >>>>> hardware doesn't matter. This commits us to some unintuitive scenarios in >>>>> which thought is instantiated by means of carrier pigeons delivering >>>>> letters with symbols written on them, or dominoes falling or whatever. >>>>> It's >>>>> assumed that such a computation must reach a certain level of complexity >>>>> in >>>>> order to become conscious, though what level of complexity is not >>>>> specified. According to some views (Brent has expressed this position), it >>>>> is necessary that the computations reference a "world", though I'll admit >>>>> I >>>>> don"t understand the rationale for that exactly. Important though is that >>>>> it is neither necessary that the computations are carried out in some >>>>> localised "device"/brain nor that they are carried out by "wetware". >>>>> >>>>> So my thinking is this: isn't *evolution* precisely such a >>>>> computation? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I take it you mean life is doing a computation which consists of >>>>> finding ways to live and reproduce. Life on Earth is executing THE >>>>> paradigmatic genetic algorithm. >>>>> >>>>> Exactly. >>>> >>>>> It is undoubtedly an extremely complex calculation (more so than any >>>>> human thought has ever been), and it undoubtedly "references a world". >>>>> Bruno mentions "Loebianity" in this context as well, or the capacity for >>>>> self-reference. I'm not so sure about this in relation to an evolutionary >>>>> computation. Certainly it is a highly recursive procedure with a continual >>>>> self-environment feedback loop. I don't understand Loebianity sufficiently >>>>> to say whether genes , or the gene-environment system, might possess it. >>>>> However I'm also not sure if it's required for consciousness, or merely >>>>> *self*- consciousness. I don't see that the possession of qualia >>>>> demands the possession of self-awareness, though I can also see that it is >>>>> at least conceivable that an evolutionary feedback system might possess a >>>>> kind of self-reference. >>>>> >>>>> Anyway it seems that if we're committed to computationalism plus >>>>> Church thesis, then we have to consider the possibility that evolution may >>>>> be a conscious process - indeed the onus should be on us to say why it >>>>> *wouldn't* be conscious. Which does not mean I am suggesting some >>>>> mystical additional ingredient. Evolution would still be described >>>>> objectively in terms of random mutation plus environmental selection, but >>>>> this process may have an interior component, its own "1P". >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Yes, I think that's right in a sense. Life in a sense forms a >>>>> representation of the world. If a alien scientist were told just about >>>>> the living organisms on Earth he could infer a great deal about the >>>>> inorganic aspects of the planet. I don't know if you could say it's >>>>> self-aware, except by inclusion of ourselves. The problem is that it may >>>>> be conscious in such a different way from humans or animals that it >>>>> doesn't >>>>> really add anything to our understanding of it to say it is conscious. >>>>> I've sometimes had a similar idea about the atmosphere and weather. Isn't >>>>> weather a kind of computation performed by the atmosphere and isn't it >>>>> aware of things in its environment like solar heating, ocean currents and >>>>> temperatures, human activities like jet liners and burning fossil fuel,... >>>>> >>>>> Yes. But then isn't an orbiting planet carrying out a computation? >>>> Isn't a river? Isn't an atom doing quantum computing? It almost becomes a >>>> matter of perspective whether any given physical process is a computation >>>> or not, e.g., if someone wanted to compute the route that water would take >>>> down a given slope, they could "compute" it analogically with actual water >>>> on an actual slope. Which, combined with computationalism, seems like the >>>> (ahem) slippery slope to panpsychism, which *I* am happy enough with, >>>> but which I suspect to be too mystical for *your* metabolism... >>>> >>>> >>>> I don't see anything mystical about saying all those physical processes >>>> are computations, i.e. they are also information processes. Have you >>>> slipped over from computation to assuming they are conscious? >>>> >>> >>> Computationalism is precisely that assumption (that computation equates >>> to consciousness). >>> >>> >>> No, it's the assumption that some particular computation instantiates >>> consciousness. >>> >>> >>> OK. >>> Computation is a pure 3p notion. >>> Consciousness is a pure 1p notion. >>> Nothing can be more different. >>> A computation just can makes it possible for a person to manifest its >>> consciousness relatively to a universal number/environment. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> However, usually the assumption is also that a certain level of >>> computational complexity must be reached before consciousness "kicks in". >>> If as Bruno suggests, it's "all or nothing", then it's hard to see why the >>> light should suddenly be switched on when a computation reaches some >>> magical complexity threshold. >>> >>> >>> It's my view that consciousness is realized by certain kinds of >>> computation in interaction with an environment (which we call "the physical >>> world"). It's not just a matter of complexity (the internet's plenty >>> complex) or even "integrated information" (c.f. Scott Aaronson's blog on >>> Tononi). I don't think we know exactly what it is, but I suspect it has to >>> do with language and other representations of the world. I think that >>> there are qualitatively different kinds of consciousness, not a continuum >>> and not all-or-nothing. >>> >>> >>> I agree, except that "all or nothing" is for the presence or absence of >>> consciousness, a bit like a point of the complex plane is, or is not, in >>> the Mandelbrot set, even if we can never be sure for a point which is very >>> near the boundary (we zoom, and still don't know after 1 billions years, >>> and have no idea how long it could take for the zoom to decide this). >>> >>> >>> >>> Of course one can argue that the internet is conscious or the weather >>> is conscious or arithmetic is conscious - >>> >>> >>> Only if we can name the entity, but "weather" or even "arithmetic" is >>> fuzzy notion. To say that arithmetic is conscious is different than to say >>> that RA is conscious, or PA is conscious, etc. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> but these depend adding the qualification "but not like my >>> consciousness". >>> >>> >>> >>> RA is conscious like my consciousness after salvia (say) >>> PA is conscious like you and me. Indeed, we are both PA, but >>> reconstituted in different bodies with different memories. >>> >>> >>> >>> I think this is a cheap argument. We only know what consciousness is >>> from introspective experience; so at least until we know how to produce and >>> manipulate that we have no basis for extrapolating to other forms with >>> which we have no experience. The kinds of consciousness I refer to are >>> ones that we do experience at different times, e.g. awareness of without >>> self-awareness. >>> >>> If it's more of a continuum then that does suggest panpsychism, though >>> what the consciousness of simple processes is like is pretty hard to >>> imagine. Panpsychism does still sound to me like a pretty big jump from the >>> materialism we know and (some of us) love. A world of conscious information >>> processes is not quite a world with soul, but perhaps also not so far from >>> it. >>> >>> >>> Now you not only project consciousness onto the world, but hope for >>> immortality. >>> >>> >>> Well, in machine's theology, the proof of the immortality of the soul by >>> Socrates is valid, but is not constructive, and its practical aspect is >>> dependent of you degree of appreciation of not knowing who you (first >>> person are). >>> Then, a priori computationalist immortality seems to be something more >>> to fear than to hope, but both computer science and salvia can be >>> reassuring by allowing possibilities of jumps between type of consciousness >>> state (but *that* is still wishful thinking, as such jump are hard to >>> relate with some type of death. >>> Once a machine is above the Gödel-Löbian treshold, it has at each >>> instant an infinite of futures, and near death or near catastrophes, it >>> continues in the closer world consistent with its memory. If the subject >>> identifies too much with its memory, the experience can be unpleasant. Some >>> training in "let it go" can help, perhaps. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> Brent >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>> >>> >>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> > > > > -- > All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy > Batty/Rutger Hauer) > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
