Dear John,
On 06 Aug 2016, at 22:03, John Mikes wrote:
Dear Bruno,
in my agnosticism computationalism (as so many other 'concepts' and
'processes') is (are?) figments of the human thinking (logic?
imagination?
or 'views' how we try to explain the mostly unknowable infinite
Entirety) - so I cannot argue about it's (their's?) truth???, or
fantasy-base (convolutedness).
Math etc. is in this ballpark.
But we can't say either if someone "really survived" with an artficial
heart, skin, kidney, ...
Nobody can know the truth, but everybody, including machines
(acceptiong of course some definition) can understand that IF
computationalism is true THEN Plato is correct and Aristotle is false.
All what I say is that computationalism is testable, and so the
Aristotle/Plato divide in theology is testable.
We never can know the truth, in science, but we can count the
evidences, and the evidence ar no so good for the god "Matter".
I have a linguistic version of the Latin origin "to compute":
to put (things) together as by " C O M " and think about them in
such way hard " P U T A R E " which may include quantitative as
well as qualitative thinking.
Well, here computationalism is the doctrine that the brain is emulable
(in the technical sense of Turing, Church, Post) by a computer. The
main evidence is that, except for the wave collapse, we don't know of
any phenomenon not Turing emulable.
You need to imagine that the neuron accuracies depend on actual
infinities to make computationalism false. Of course that proves
nothing, and indeed, that is why I like to explain that we have
already some tests, and that thanks to Gödel, and QM, computationalism
is not (yet) refuted.
Nobody will know for sure if comp is true, even the practitionners,,
who will only believe. But that is the price of science. We just do
not know, and try theories/assumptions/axioms. A scientist claiming
truth is a con, or is joking.
Bruno
John Mikes
On Sat, Aug 6, 2016 at 8:53 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
On 05 Aug 2016, at 22:02, John Clark wrote:
On Fri, Aug 5, 2016 at 12:36 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
> Keep well in mind that I am not arguing for or against
computationalism. I assume it, and study the consequences.
No, you're assuming at the very start that Computationalism is
false and then going on from there.
That contradicts directly what I did.
Computationalism means that every subjective experience about you
can be duplicated by computations made with a physical system.
This is fuzzy, but OK. I see what you intend to mean, and I am OK.
Not almost everything, EVERYTHING. But then you say:
"Nothing can duplicate a first person view from its first person
point of view, with or without computationalism."
Computationalism says intelligent behavior
But behavior is 3p.
can be duplicated by computations performed by a physical system,
and Darwin's Theory demands that consciousness is a byproduct of
intelligence, so your statement contradicts both the meaning of
Computationalism and Evolution.
You forget that we distinguish 3p and 1p.
I think you have not yet understood what is a "first person", and
still less what is the first person as seen by the first person view.
If it was possible to duplicate a first person view in a way such
that the first person view would notice the duplication, then the
guy in M would be able to know, in M, if the doppelganger in W (and
vice versa) has been reconstituted, but again that suppose some
telepathy.
The quantum corresponding statement is Everett's famous: the
observer does not feel the split.
Do you really think that you can distinguish, from an 1p view, the
step 3 WM duplication experience with the experience where you are
told that you will undergo the step 3 protocol, except that now we
lie and we reconstitute you only in M? You need something like that
to affirm that the first person experience can be duplicated *from
its own point of view".
BTW, you have given contradictory answer to the question 1 in the
same week. You are currently inconsistent, so please do the
correction needed, if you intend to continue to claim that there is
no first person indeterminacy. If not, you will bring the exact same
invalid argument again and again. So let us settle this completely,
or let us move to step 4.
Bruno
John K Clark
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