Re: Correction to MWI post

[Bruno Marchal]

On 25 Jan 2017, at 21:25, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote:
Sounds like a Lôbian device is a necessity, in this facet of the  
MWI? If they don't form naturally, God sets us in motion so we can  
invent them.


If you agree that 2+2=4 and the like, we don't need to invoke (any)  
God. Referential numbers provably exists, and all those having rich  
cognitive abilities, like belieeing in the induction axioms, are  
provably Löbian. God needs only to create the natural numbers, with  
addition and multiplication. But the numbers themselves can only hope  
to be correct.


Moreover, they imply that we get Everett's and Wheeler's universe to  
function by supplying more observers. I am guessing the mightier the  
observer, the more clout they have to change things, split things  
off, etc. Larry Krauss once joked, that astronomers shouldn't peer  
back in time, because they might cause the universe to collapse.

No worry :)

... because there are no universe, only dreams. But below our  
substitution level, the dreams seems to cohere enough to allow long,  
perhaps infinite, sharable "video games", and we extrapolate them into  
"physical universe" (assuming computationalism if this needs to be  
repeated). We can't collapse that. It belongs to a realm which is "out  
of time", "out of space".

Bruno




-----Original Message-----
From: Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
To: everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
Sent: Wed, Jan 25, 2017 11:09 am
Subject: Re: Correction to MWI post


On 25 Jan 2017, at 13:17, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote:

Wishful thinking gives a sense of direction,

Wishes can do that.

Wishful thinking leads to believe in things which do not exist, and  
eventually to disarrays and difficulties.



science tells how long it may take to get there.

It can also say if "there" is accessible at all.


To be sure, as I explained sometimes, notably in the second part of  
Sane04, there might be a sort of wishful thinking at the bottom of  
reality, in the sense that if you convince rationally a Löbian  
entity that If ever she believes in Santa Klaus, Santa Klaus exist,  
then she will believe in Santa Klaus. That is actually Löb's  
theorem, but the comparison with wishful thinking, or with the  
placebo, is a bit metaphorical. Löb's theorem is still very amazing.  
The machine rational beliefs are close for the rule

[]p -> p
---------
     p

Put in another way: []([]p -> p) -> []p is true about the machine.  
That is Löb's formula (with "[]" put for Gödel's provability  
predicate of the entity). It happens that not only it is true, but  
it is provable too by the Löbian entity (machine or divine being).  
It is the main axiom of the modal logic G (and G*).

Bruno




-----Original Message-----
From: Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
To: everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
Sent: Wed, Jan 25, 2017 5:46 am
Subject: Re: Correction to MWI post


On 25 Jan 2017, at 02:19, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote:

Aristotelean or dull and ant-intellectual, perhaps. I am thinking,  
communication, trade, entertainment, is more enjoyable then platonic  
idealism, don't you?

Yes. I think so.

Now science is enjoyable too, but is not done for enjoyment per se.  
Truth is not always enjoyable, and science is not necessarily  
wishful thinking.

Bruno




-----Original Message-----
From: Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
To: everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
Sent: Mon, Jan 23, 2017 6:08 am
Subject: Re: Correction to MWI post


On 22 Jan 2017, at 00:06, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote:

Unless these universes are somehow, touchable, it's as if, they  
don't exist.

Not at all. Linearitu of QM makes them untouchable, but we have  
still to accept their physical existence because they do interfere  
statistically. If not you need a theory like Bohm, with the known  
difficulties which are insuperable in the relativistic domain, or  
use the collapse of the wave, which leads to a dualism, a god  
playing dice, action at distance, fuzzy notion of observers, etc.

Then with computationalism, we have the many-dreams anyway, already  
in arithmetic, which is already assumed by the physicist.

Then also, are you sure you can touch more easily one universe?  
Again, that leads to an absurd (non Turing emulable) role of matter  
in psychology.



I love the topic, but it's kind of never never land.

This is perhaps due to Aristotelian prejudice. You seem to believe  
in (at least one) universe playing a fundamental role ..


Ya got wormholes, I'm interested.

... or perhaps you are just not interested in fundamental question.  
The whole point is that this question (the number of universe) is  
amenable to empirical refutation. With computationalism, to put it  
bluntly: there are zero universe, only a reality emerging from the  
first person indeterminacy of the distributed subject in infinitely  
may computations, constrained by the theoretical computer science  
constraints imposed on self-observation.

Bruno





-----Original Message-----
From: Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net>
To: EveryThing <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
Sent: Sat, Jan 21, 2017 3:39 pm
Subject: Fwd: Correction to MWI post

Phillip Ball's critique of MWI.

Brent


-------- Forwarded Message --------

Use this MWI  to access the Aeon article. Sorry
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