On 01 May 2017, at 01:30, John Clark wrote:
On Sun, Apr 30, 2017 at 10:38 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
>> OK but tell me Bruno, how many correct answers to
the question "which city will BM feel feel to be
personally in after the duplication?" Do you think there
is only one correct answer or are there two? I say two and I can
subpoena W-BM and M-BM as witnesses to bolster my case. If you say
only one then which city did it turn out to be, Moscow or
Washington?
> The whole point is that for both copies, they can be only one
answern given that the question is on the future 1p views,
OK then tell me, what is that one and only one answer? Is it
Moscow or Washington? And if there is only one then why do you call
it " the future 1p views", why is it plural?
Because we are in a duplication thought experiment. We can say that
the one answer will be "Washington and not Moscow" or "Moscow and not
Washington", but in Helsinki we can't predict which one precisely. You
ask me non-sensical or ambiguous question. In that duplication
context, we must be precise if we talk about the 1-views, the 3-views,
sometimes the 3-1 views etc.
> You are again describing the 3-1 view, and dismissing both 1-
view of the copies.
I'm not describing "the 1-p" or "the 3p" or or "the 3-1 view" or
"the future 1p views ", I'm not interested in any of your baby
talk terms,
Then you will keep asking non-sensical question, and claim wrongly
that there is a problem with the argument, when there is none, once we
use the definitions given.
I'm just asking how many correct answers to the question "what
cities will the Helsinki man see?" are there. I say there are 2,
In the 3-1 view, but that is not what is asked.
you say there is only one, you say it is M OR W but not both,
so I want to know which answer turned out to be wrong, was
Washington wrong or was Moscow wrong?
Washington is wrong, given that it fails for the Moscow man, and
Moscow is wrong as it fails for the Washington man. When doing a
prediction, we want it to be correct for the majorities of (here)
first experiences involved after pushing the button.
>> W-BM says I am Bruno Marchal and I see Washington. M-BM
says I am Bruno Marchal and I see Moscow.
> More precisely: W-BM says I am Bruno Marchal and I see only
Washington and I could not have predicted this.
Maybe so,
Good! but it is (as we assume mechanism): certainly so.
but if Helsinki Bruno Marchal could not have predicted that
Washington Bruno Marchal was Bruno Marchal and that Washington
Bruno Marchal would see Washington then Helsinki Bruno
Marchal was mighty damn bad at prediction! I'll tell you one
thing, Helsinki John Clark could have predicted it.
Then Moscow-JC can see he was wrong in Helsinki.
> Indeed if I would have predicted this my fellow in Moscow
would refute it.
Maybe so, if Moscow Bruno Marchal was as clueless as
Helsinki Bruno Marchal. But I'll tell you one thing, Moscow
John Clark would not refute it.
Then he talk about the 3-1 view, and not about his own first person
experience, and this means he does not address the question asked.
Simply.
>> And if it was only one which one did it turn out to be, was
it Washington or Moscow?
> Obviously it was W for the W-BM, and M for the M-BM,
And both the W-BM and the M-BM are the H-BM, therefore the H-BM
will see W and M.
Not at all. H-BM will see W, and H-BM will see M, but none will see "W
and M".
And "H-BM will see W, and H-BM will see M," is a 3-1 description of
the 1p, but it is not the 1p experiences themselves, as nobody will
see the two cities at once.
Either you are dumb, or you are gifted in making people believe that
you are dumb. You continue to systematically ignore the 1p and 3p
views, which is at the heart of the whole mind-body problem
clarification here.
And don't start throwing peas at me, you're the one who said " it
was W for the W-BM, and M for the M-BM" not me.
> but the point is that when BM was unique in Helsinki, he
could not know if he would feel to become the W-BM, or the M-BM in
advance.
In advance? H-BM does not know even after the experiment is over
which city he ended up seeing and neither does anybody else, and
that's why it is not a experiment at all and nothing can be learned
from it.
On the contrary, that is why the H-guy, or anyone else for that
matter, when we assume mechanism, can be sure of not being able to
predict which first person experience the guy in Helsinki will live.
He can be sure it will be "one city", and that such city will be among
{Washington, Moscow}, because that will be true for all the resulting
first person experience.
>> The re-merged Bruno Marchal vividly remembers
writing in his diary It is 17:23:33 Coordinated Universal
Time on 4-28-2017 and I am looking at the White
House " . And the remerged Bruno Marchalalso vividly
remembers writing in his diary " It is 17:23:33
Coordinated Universal Time on 4-28-2017 and I am
looking at the Kremlin “. And I have access to both
diaries so I know Bruno's memory is not faulty.
>Yes, and he remembers vividly getting locally, at that moment,
one bit of
information, and living an asymmetrical situation.
I don't know what "getting locally" means, I don't see
what is asymmetrical, and I don't know which one is
"he".
Do you agree that the guy in Washington lives an asymmetrical
experiences "I feel in W and not in W" ?
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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