On 08 May 2017, at 15:18, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 8/05/2017 5:25 pm, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2017-05-08 9:14 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>:
On 8/05/2017 5:01 pm, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Something lie the speed prior... yes the UD has all of them, but
the measure function (which we don't have) must render the
consistency, thing like complexity and size could be a way to
explain why consciousness->white noise have low measure.
Those are just arbitrary assumptions, designed to give you some
handle on what you want. For consistency, the definition of
'consistent continuations' for the measure must come from logic and/
or arithmetic alone.
A measure function would come from arithmetic alone, complexity/
size/... are arithmetical notion... so I don't see your point,
If one insists on 'consistent continuations' of conscious states, it
does not seem that 'size (of what, program length, or what?) can
really do the job.
That is right. But that is why there is a measure problem, which is on
the material appearances.
Now the UDA explains that the material appearance are just the leaves
of UD*, that is all states (hating or not) obtained by the execution
of the UD (in arithmetic, or in combinatory algebra, or in the game of
life, etc.), and the measure 1 is given by []p & <>t, []p says that p
is true in all consistent continuations (by a form of completeness
theorem), and <>t guarantied that it is a probability (as opposed to
belief or knowledge): it is the usual default assumption that is
imperative for any measure of probability, credibility, etc. And we
get a quantum logic exactly there, so Mechanism is not (yet) refuted.
To get the full measure, and the physical laws: it is only a matter of
solving the open problems (finding good axiomatization of the material
hypostases, and semantics, up to get the Hilbert spaces or the von
Neuman algebra. Von Neumann original goal of his quantum logic was
that QM should be derived from the logic, and quantum logicians are
working on that. By getting the quantum logic exactly where Mechanism
imposed the logic of the observable shows that mechanism might not be
so far from explaining the proigin of the physical appearance. Then
the inherited split between provable and true (G/G*) in the material
hypostases makes possible to distinguish the qualia from the quanta,
which was the goal: unifying all "forces" without eliminating
consciousness and qualia, but justifying them integrally.
Invoking a primary material reality to oppose this, like some people
do, is like invoking invisible horse to oppose the physics of
automobile, or invoking a God to oppose to the theory of evolution.
Indeed, mechanism can be seen a kind of "evolution theory", except
that the evolution of the physical laws operates in a logical space of
computations "seen from inside" (that is with some point of view
defined by intentional variant of self-reference). That rejoins the
neoplatonist conception of Reality: just one reality (arithmetical
truth) seen from different angles (the 8 hypostases instantiated by
all particular creatures in arithmetic).
Bruno
it's not because there are everything that everything is equally
probable... the problem is exactly the same with MWI... you have to
have a measure function, I understand you reject even the idea, so
it seems pointless to discuss
What gives you the idea that I reject a measure function for QM in
the MWI interpretation -- the Born rule applied to the wave function
is precisely the measure function one needs, for any interpretation
of QM to accord with experience.
If physics is to come from the UD (computationalism) you need a
measure over conscious states. From what Bruno says, it is not clear
that these conscious states need consistent continuations -- your
next conscious moment might be a computation is some entirely
different program of the UD. However, that notion runs into the
Occam catastrophe that Russell mentions -- the overwhelming majority
of programs that instantiate our conscious moments run from white
noise in the past, to white noise in the future -- Boltzmann brains,
in effect.
... remember, I'm not here to be convinced in any way that your
ontological stance is true or not (or the ones of someone else)
but to discuss the everything ideas and theories.
Presumably you are interested in tests of these ideas? And the
possibility that there may be conceptual problems with their
implementation? I am not making any ontological claims here. I am
simply asking how one can get physics out of computationalist notions.
Bruce
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