On 13 Aug 2017, at 09:30, 'scerir' via Everything List wrote:
First person, second person, and third person are basically
grammatical
categories: first person, I/we, second person, you/you, third
person, him/them.
The third independent person plays a central role in the
interpretation of
perceptual evidence in terms of reliable conceptual models of the
world. What
do you think 3p means?
Bruce
BTW, Shan Gao just published this paper
https://www.academia.
edu/34156349/
Failure_of_psychophysical_supervenience_in_Everetts_theory
'Failure of psychophysical superveniencein Everett’s theory'
(abstract) Psychophysical supervenience requires that the mental
propertiesof
a system cannot change without the change of its physical
properties.For a
system with many minds, the principle requires that the men-tal
properties of
each mind of the system cannot change without thechange of the
physical
properties of the system. In this paper, I arguethat Everett’s
theory seems to
violate this principle of psychophysicalsupervenience. The violation
results
from the three key assumptionsof the theory: (1) the completeness of
the
physical description by thewave function, (2) the linearity of the
dynamics for
the wave func-tion, and (3) multiplicity. For a post-measurement
state with
twodecoherent result branches, multiplicity means that each result
branchcorresponds to a mindful observer, whose mental properties
superveneon
the branch, and in particular, whose mental content contains a def-
inite record
corresponding to the result branch. Under certain unitaryevolution
which swaps
the two result branches, the post-measurementstate does not change,
and the
completeness of the physical descriptionby the wave function then
means that
the physical state of the com-posite system does not change. While the
linearity of the dynamicsfor the wave function requires that each
result branch
changes, andcorrespondingly the mental properties of the observer
which
superveneon the branch also change. Thus the principle of
psychophysical su-
pervenience as defined above is violated by Everett’s theory.
I agree. Everett should take into account the self-referential logic,
which are counter-intuitive.
I might read the paper, but I have not really much time now.
I did not read it but, maybe, it is about "identity" and "x-person"
Notion of "person" does not appear in the abstract. But I agree with
the abstract.
I can say only that the title is correct, but for perhaps a different
(simpler) reason, which does not contradict the possible explanation
sketched in the abstract.
Bruno
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