On 21 Aug 2017, at 21:04, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 8/21/2017 4:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
The problem with everythingism is that one doesn't experience
everything.
Indeed. But that is a very general problem, and you could say "the
problem with physicalism is that we don't experience primary
matter, nor the whole physical reality.
But that's not a problem for physicalism.
Then it is not a problem for any "everything theory". Physicalism
included. Or explain better why it would be a problem for
"everythingism".
It doesn't predict that we experience primary matter or the whole of
physical reality.
Nor does any "everything theory".
It models us as localized and limited and reality as a process, not
a totality.
At a price of invoking non Turing emulable physical selection by a
"god" (Primary Matter).
No problem with this, unless you keep this in the mechanist context.
You have a very similar problem with QM. Either QM applies to the
observer, et you have the many-worlds, or QM is just false for some
many-body problem.
====================
On 8/21/2017 4:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Before Gödel, most mathematician, like Hilbert, were hoping that
with the finite and the symbolic we could justify the consistency
of the use of the infinities, but after Gödel we know that even
with the infinities we cannot circumscribe and justify the
consistency of the finite and the symbolic.
All the more reason to classify them as fiction - not part of the
really real.
OK. But then Mechanism has to be assumed false, or you too would
not exist (and I hope you believe that you exist, in a way or
another).
Consistency is a attribute of propositions and logic.
Not really. It is an attribute of theories or "talking" machines, or
"propositions emitter".
Whether there are infinities that cannot be circumscribed has no
relevance to my existence or whether consciousness can be realized
by a computer.
It is the finite behavior of machine that we cannot circumscribed, and
besides, the 1p distribution requires an infinite non computable set
of continuation, so we have to explain why the physical reality seems
so much computable (the white rabbit problem, the measure problem due
to the "global" first person indeterminacy). So let us pursue the
testing and see.
===============
Well, only if you happen to be God, perhaps.
The problem with everythingism is that one doesn't experience
everything.
How would you know?
By direct inexperience...and I'm not God either.
How could we know by inexperience?
Do you know you are not experiencing being in Washington
now?...that's how.
OK, but this is done through the experience of being somewhere else.
Knowledge comes always from some experience.
I think you can *only* believe in something by some experience (of
inexperience) leading you to postulate something different from
yourself, but that is not something you can experience. It can only
be a belief.
That is why "primary matter" is an hypothesis in metaphysics, not
in physics.
So is "primary arithmetic".
Not at all. The whole point of the UD Argument is that arithmetic (or
Turing equivalent) has to be primary. It is a consequence of Digital
Mechanism, which *is* an hypothesis in theology or metaphysics. But
the theology is in the "yes doctor", not in "primary arithmetic". Only
arithmetic is assumed here, (to define computation), not its
primariness, which results from the existence of computations in
arithmetic, and the inability to select the computations in a
different way than by the FPI (when we assume computationalism).
Bruno
Brent
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
