On 05 Sep 2017, at 00:25, Russell Standish wrote:
On Mon, Sep 04, 2017 at 11:58:29AM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote:
My complaint is that it implicitly assumes more than "Yes doctor".
It assumes that computation exists in a Platonic realm independent
of the physical.
This not really needed. At step 7 of the UDA, whatever is primary can
be anything capable of universal computation, and phenomenal physics
is unchanged. Primary physics then becomes the "invisible horse" of
the horseless carriage. However, I can see the same point can be made
of primary arithmetic. The only really primary thing in
computationalism is (Turing) computation.
I would not say this. I gues I have to do that someday, but we can
prove the existence of the computations from
0 ≠ (x + 1)
((x + 1) = (y + 1)) -> x = y
x = 0 v Ey(x = y + 1)
x + 0 = x
x + (y + 1) = (x + y) + 1
x * 0 = 0
x * (y + 1) = (x * y) + x
(and nothing else, except calssical logic).
We can use less, and use
Kxy = x
Sxyz = xz(yz)
in which case we can use just small identity axioms instead of logic,
but to get the Löbian entities, we have to extend this also with
classical logic, so it is easier to admit it at the base.
Of course this doesn't speak to the "non-robust" or small universe
move that is supposed to be addressed by the MGA. Whilst I'm not
totally convinced by the MGA, I think that ultimately a non-robust
universe will severely constrain the sort of computations possible
with a quantum computer, and that a working 512 qubit quantum computer
will be strong empirical evidence that we live in a robust universe
anyway.
OK. The MGA is really used for a subtle critics à-la Peter Jones. We
can come back on this, someday, but I am not sure it helps people who
usually are not well versed enough in philosophy of mind to see the
difficulty. In fact, some philosophers have convinced me that the move
to a small non-robust reality is already a reification error in
philosophy. It is an ontological commitment, and it violate
computationalism by adding a non explainable role to primary matter
for consciousness. It is adding a metaphysical things to make the
arithmetical being into zombies, and that is a bit like inventing a
soul so that we can say that this or that category of person have no
soul. We could use blessed water instead of robust universe. Of course
the MGA and Maudlin is interesting per se, as it shows how far we need
to go to provide sense to "primary matter". It also rises other
interesting questions, but unrelated to the topic.
Bruno
PS I did read the beginning of your recent draft, but I have
difficulties with it, and notably with your definition of OM. I will
take more time to think about this. I try to avoid "OM" because they
are intensional notions, so it makes sense only by fixing some
universal base (like the axioms above), at least when we assume
Mechanism.
--
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Dr Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Senior Research Fellow hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au
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