On 11 Sep 2017 6:21 p.m., "Brent Meeker" <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
On 9/11/2017 1:22 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 10 Sep 2017, at 22:25, Brent Meeker wrote: > > >> >> On 9/10/2017 10:24 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> So I assume elementary arithmetic; I prove the existence of the >>> universal number(s), then I define a notion of rational belief "scientific >>> belief", (Plotinus discursive reasoner) by Gödel's (sigma_1 arithmetical) >>> beweisbar Bp. That makes sense, due to incompleteness which prevent >>> provability to be a notion of knowledge. >>> >> >> This seems problematic to me. I understand why you do it; because you >> want knowledge to be true belief (not just true provable belief). But this >> does violence to the usual meaning of knowledge (c.f. Getteir for example). >> > > Yes. Incompleteness makes provability into belief instead of knowledge. > Gödel mention this already in 1933. > > > > It means that given some undecidable proposition one of us can assert it >> and the other deny it, and then one of us will know it. ?? >> > > Ih he proves it (correctly or not). > But that is inconsistent with your definition of "know" = "true belief". You are really using "know" = "true and proven". Which is closer to Gettier's "caused true belief". I think you're missing the point I've been attempting to develop in my last couple of posts. Truth, or 'correspondence with a reality', can only be relative to a point of view. It's perfectly possibly that any such idiosyncratic, though unavoidable, commitment may deviate from some more pervasive and general underlying consistency and that this may put its possessor at hazard. That's the ineluctable logic of evolution. Nevertheless if something is true for me, in this primary or undoubtable sense, it will correspond with my (relative) reality, in both its formal or effective aspect (Bp) and its truthful or phenomenal one (and p). Any subsequent interpretation based on such primary givens is of course a separate question. It's interesting to compare this, by the way, with Dennett's claim about the illusory nature of consciousness. He says, in effect, that there is no reality - i.e. one that corresponds with (what he calls) our judgements about the existence of conscious phenomena - that transcends the mere judgements themselves. So his claim is that such judgments are lacking in *truth*. David Brent Knowledge is Bp & p, which is impossible if p is not provable (~Bp). We > just cannot know an undecidable (by us) proposition, by definition, > although we can bet on it, but then it is different kind of knowledge > (closer to Bp & Dt). > That we can know for bad reason is the ultimate lesson of the dream > argument. People like Malcom who dislike Mechanism are forced into > disbelieving the existence of consciousness in dreams, as he did. > > Bruno > > > >> Brent >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
