On 23 Oct 2017, at 02:26, David Nyman wrote:
On 22 October 2017 at 15:31, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On 22 Oct 2017, at 09:16, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
Neural networks are not about artificial intelligence, but about
artificial intuition. As you said, AlphaGo -a neural network
application- can not answer the question why you did that move?.
If they could answer, the answer would be ever the same: " I don´t
know, I moved this because if found some patterns that are very
close to this new one, so I did this move that produced a win at
the end within those patterns".
That does not qualify as intelligence. For me, the appropriate name
is intuition.
Perhaps. Usually intuition points on the informal insight, and
intuitionist logic was about informal reasoning starting from the
distinguishability basic insight (notably the distinguishability of
1 and its successors).
That leads to constructive logics, or controllable machines where a
proof of (p v q) always provides a proof of p, or a proof of q,
where in classical logic we allow a proof of (p v q) by showing that
(p v q) leads to an absurdity (without showing us if p, or q is the
one true).
Yet, I think I see what you mean: it is more like associative
learning, deep, with many layers, but still only associative. That
guy would not be immune to the propaganda of the type "gateway
drug", and I agree with you, that might make him not quite
intelligent, locally speaking.
The least to do is a circular net, perhaps with many layers. A brain
is either a couple of universal machine in front of each other, in
that circular relation,
Could you say a bit more about this? For example, does this relate
to the G/G* split?
Not directly, it is an intuition! (and so, technically speaking,
should be related to S4Grz). Of course S4Grz exists because of G/G*
splitting.
The three primary hypostases are presented usually in the order ONE/
truth, Noùs/ideas/formal-proof, and then the Soul, here given (thanks
to incompleteness) by the conjunct of truth and representaion mirror.
I speculate that a "brain" automatically handle the representation and
the truth differently. Indeed the truth will usually be connected to
the senses, the interface with some possible "reality"(*).
So "[]p versus []p&p" would be more a polarity than a duality, from
the brain's constitution.
I am plausibly impressed by some video showing kids suffering from so
highly debilitating epilepsy, or have the Rasmussen syndrome, that
their parents accept the ablation of a whole hemisphere. if I remember
well(**). Typically, they seem cured from the epilepsy, and recovered
"completely" very quickly, and experiences provided evidence that the
one hemisphere remaining quickly re-organize itself into "two brains",
somehow.
A brain is a dynamical mirror, beginning to mirror some truth p,
getting the []p. Our bilaterality makes each half mirroring the other
half, and this probably repeat recursively. Of course the p is itself
only a mirror, a crude one, like the sump up of the sense made by the
cerebral stem, and the high cortex is plausibly the one exploiting the
more the representational ability to emulate itself, getting the sense
from limbic system which manage pleasure and displeasure. But each
part can be seen as two cooperating parts, when not in conflict.
(*) "Reality" (for the person owning that brain) is a a bunch of
universal numbers above the substitution level, and what results from
the first person statistics on infinitely many universal numbers below
that level).
(**) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2MKNsI5CWoU
I speculate (for a change) that any self-referentially correct machine
will
or a couple of brains in front of each others, always in that
circular relation.
Same question.
Same answer, but reapplied recursively on the 2, 4, 8, 16, 32,
sub...sub-brains.
Of course, in the local terrestrial reality it can be said to end on
the cells, but the cells too have the will to duplicate. "nature"
repeat simple ideas. I have discovered that the iteration of the
cosecante(z) in the complex plane gives all the shapes of the
coleopterans (!).
It is the fractal aspect of nature, relying on the importance of the
(deterministic) chaos (which are fractals). If you fuzzifie Gödel
sentence (You cannot prove me with degree 0,98) or Löb sentence (You
can prove me with degree 0,98, say), you get chaotic regime (Marr and
Grimm).
Bruno
David
I would say. Babbage already knew that the beast can eat its own
tail. Of course, such a thing is not controllable and the
intelligent machines will do strike to have the right to choose its
users.
Bruno
2017-10-21 3:46 GMT+02:00 John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com>:
Google reports in the current issue of the journal Nature that it
has a new greatly improved Go program called "AlphaGo Zero" that
is now the most powerful GO program in the world. And the program
isn't good because of brute force, it needs to make less than one
tenth as many calculations as the previous best GO program
"AlphaGo" that defeated the world's top human GO player in 2015 4
games out of 5; and yet AlphaGo Zero just defeated AlphaGo in a 100
game tournament 100 games to zero.
Even more interesting is how AlphaGo Zero got so smart. The older
program AlphaGo had to start by analyzing hundreds of thousands of
championship level games made by human players, but AlphaGo Zero
started with nothing but the simple rules of GO and instructions to
learn to get better. At first the program was terrible but day by
day it got better and after 40 days of thinking about the problem
became the best at it in the world. But of course after 40 days of
constant self modification no human being can say how AlphaGo Zero
works.
https://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v550/n7676/full/
nature24270.html
It seems to me the next logical step would be to switch the
program's interest from getting better at the game of GO to
improving computer code, including its own. I wonder where that
could lead.
John K Clark
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