On 21/11/2017 8:45 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Tue, 21 Nov 2017 at 12:27 pm, Bruce Kellett
<bhkell...@optusnet.com.au <mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>> wrote:
On 21/11/2017 11:37 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 21 November 2017 at 08:53, Bruce Kellett
<bhkell...@optusnet.com.au <mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>> wrote:
On 20/11/2017 11:42 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Sun, 19 Nov 2017 at 8:35 am, Bruce Kellett
<bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
<mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>> wrote:
On 19/11/2017 12:15 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Sat, 18 Nov 2017 at 9:11 am, Bruce Kellett
<bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
<mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>> wrote:
And exactly what is it that you claim has not been
proved in MW theory? Bell's theorem applies there
too: it has never been proved that it does not.
Bell was no fool: he did not like MWI, but if that
provided an escape from his theorem, he would have
addressed the issue. The fact that he did not
suggests strongly that you do not have a case.
Bell’s theory applies in the sense that the
experimental results would be the same in MWI, but the
FTL weirdness is eliminated. This is because in MWI the
experimenter can’t prepare a random state,
What do you mean by this? Are you claiming that there
are no free variables in MWI? Some form of superdeterminism?
Yes.
As far as I know, the only serious advocate of
superdeterminism as an account of QM is Gerard 't Hooft. Tim
Maudlin analysed 't Hooft's arguments in a long exchange with
him on Facebook:
https://www.facebook.com/tim.maudlin/posts/10155670157528398
Maudlin's arguments was basically that the type of
conspiracies that would be required in the general case would
be such, that if they were generalized, they would render
science and experimental confirmation of theories meaningless.
I think Maudlin is quite right here. Apart from the
implication that superdeterminism says that all our
scientific theories are necessarily incomplete,
superdeterminism is not really an explanation of anything,
since anything you observe can be explained away in this way.
Maudlin also says this about EPR, Bell and MWI:
--quote--
Finally, there is one big idea. Bell showed that measurements
made far apart cannot regularly display correlations that violate
his inequality if the world is local. But this requires that the
measurements have results in order that there be the requisite
correlations. What if no “measurement” ever has a unique result
at all; what if all the “possible outcomes” occur? What would it
even mean to say that in such a situation there is some
correlation among the “outcomes of these measurements”? This is,
of course, the idea of the Many Worlds interpretation. It does
not refute Bell’s analysis, but rather moots it: in this picture,
phenomena in the physical world do not, after all, display
correlations between distant experiments that violate Bell’s
inequality, somehow it just seems that they do. Indeed, the world
does not actually conform to the predictions of quantum theory at
all (in particular, the prediction that these sorts of
experiments have single unique outcomes, which correspond to
eigenvalues), it just seems that way. So Bell’s result cannot get
a grip on this theory.
--endquote--
https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1826.pdf
It is a pity that you did not complete the quotation....
Immediately following the passage you quote above, Maulin says:
"That does not prove that Many Worlds is local: it just shows that
Bell's result does not prove that it isn't local. In order to even
address the question of the locality of Many Worlds a tremendous
amount of interpretive work has to be done. This is not the place
to attempt such a task."
Well yes, it could be that there are other reasons why MWI is not
local, but Maudlin agrees that EPR is not one of them.
That is neither an accurate nor a fair characterization of what Maudlin
says. He repeats some of the suggestions that have been made for
considering that Bell's theorem may not apply to MWI, and more or less
accepts them without analysis. His only comment really is that a lot
more work needs to be done to determine whether or not the criticisms of
Bell and Many Worlds can be justified. Maudlin does not, however,
suggest that EPR experiments do not establish non-locality in MWI,
independent of Bell's theorem. He leaves the question open; for further
investigation. I have shown by means of an explicit counter example that
EPR type measurements on the singlet state of two particles do show
directly that non-locality is inherent even in many worlds
interpretations of QM. I have thus started the further analysis that
Maudlin suggests is necessary.
The real problem, of course, is that several on this list have simply
said that MWI renders QM local, bypassing both EPR and Bell's theorem.
This has been asserted without further proof, and that is totally
unacceptable, even in Maudlin's relaxed interpretation.
Bruce
Thde misrepresentation of Maudlin's position appears to be quite
common in the Many Worlds community. I don't think Maudlin is
completely correct in his idea that Bell' result cannot get a grip
on the theory -- it can if one understands many worlds in terms of
superpositions of possible outcomes. But that is by the way. What
I have presented is a concrete counterexample to the contention
that Many Worlds is local. Maudlin does not consider this
counterexample, so that does rather render his comments on MWI moot!
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