On 07 Dec 2017, at 00:35, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:
On Wednesday, December 6, 2017 at 3:58:21 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 05 Dec 2017, at 11:42, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
On Monday, December 4, 2017 at 6:19:01 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 03 Dec 2017, at 18:21, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
On Sunday, December 3, 2017 at 2:07:17 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 01 Dec 2017, at 00:20, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
On Thursday, November 30, 2017 at 11:16:07 PM UTC,
agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
On Thursday, November 30, 2017 at 9:47:37 PM UTC, Bruce wrote:
On 30/11/2017 10:59 pm, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
On Thursday, November 30, 2017 at 11:42:51 AM UTC, Bruce wrote:
On 30/11/2017 10:32 pm, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
On Thursday, November 30, 2017 at 4:08:20 AM UTC-7, Bruce wrote:
On 30/11/2017 9:53 pm, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
On Wednesday, November 29, 2017 at 10:40:36 PM UTC, Bruce wrote:
On 30/11/2017 5:31 am, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Nov 28, 2017 at 10:59 PM, Bruce Kellett
<bhke...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
> I see no reason all the Everett worlds have the same
physics,
> Everettian worlds follow from assuming that the
Schrödinger equation applies everywhere without exception, so that
all physical evolution is unitary. A change in the underlying
physics -- such as a change in the value of fundamental constants,
Planck's constant or Newton's constant for example -- would not be
unitary, so cannot occur in MWI.
Why can't it be unitary?? Show me why
if Newton's constant had
any value other than 6.754* 10^-11 m3 kg^−1 s^
−2 the sum of all quantum probabilities would no longer
add up to exactly 1. If you can really do that then you've just
derived Newton's constant directly from first principles and you
should but a ticket to Stockholm right now because you're
absolutely certain to win the next nobel Prize.
Although unitarity does mean that probabilities always sum to
unity, that is a consequence of unitary evolution, not a definition
of it. A unitary transformation is one that can be reversed: so the
unitary operator U can be written as exp(-iH), for example, and the
complex conjugate (or the adjoint for hermitian operators) is the
inverse transformation.
Considering the evolution of the wf, if there exists a DE that
describes the collapse process, would it necessarily be nonlinear?
Is nonlinear a problem; that is, what is the downside to nonlinear?
How would it effect the issue of hidden variables? TIA, AG
Collapse would be non-linear and non-unitary --
intrinsically non-reversible. This is not necessarily a problem
since there are plenty of non-linearities in physics. It has
nothing to do with hidden variables.
Why would it be non linear? Brent claimed (on page 1)
Page 1 of what?
On Google it's organized as pages, now up to page 15. Go to top of
thread and read second message by Brent. AG
that if the QM could be made deterministic, say by a DE that
described collapse, it would imply awful consequences, such as the
future determining the past.
No, it wouldn't imply that.
Would making QM into a deterministic theory imply an inconsistency
in the postulates of QM? TIA, AG
QM in MWI is deterministic. Bohm's theory is deterministic, though
expressly non-local. Determinism is not really an issue. One world
theories are intrinsically random, not deterministic.
How can MWI be deterministic if it can't tell us what outcome we
will observe in this world, or any other? AG
Because MWI says that all outcomes are realized, each in a separate
world. Apparent randomness comes about because we don't know which
world we will end up in (though we actually end up in all the
worlds, so we, or our duplicates, observe all possible outcomes).
Bruce
OK. I wouldn't use "deterministic" to describe that situation, but
that's neither here nor there.
More important is Brent's reply to my question which started this
discussion thread. He stated that a deterministic ONE WORLD version
of QM would have dire effects, such as the future influencing the
past. His exact words are in the 2nd message in this discussion.
You don't seem to share this view. I know that Bohm developed a
deterministic version of QM which is expressly non-local and not
covariant. I don't think it's what Brent was referring to.
Also, I noticed that Bruno, our resident enthusiast of arithmetic
as the solution to all enigmas,
That is very elegant mathematically, but I am not necessarily
enthusiast about this, and sometimes I call Mechanism terrifying
thinking. At the first sight it entails that agonies are infinite,
as your consciousness survives in the closest environment/
computations logically possible, and there are an infinity of them.
Nothing funny there.
The point is that it is a logical consequence of what is perhaps
the oldest hypothesis in science: that life is a mechanism. Of
course, the infinite agony might end ... because things are more
subtle when doing the math, so no need to despair prematurely of
mechanism either. Computer science suggests some "jumps", which
makes the prediction there very difficult, but all in all,
sometimes I wish death is an end. That is made impossible with
mechanism, as Descartes and many others intuited correctly.
By "mechanism", I see you mean "materialism", the theory that life
and consciousness can be explained by the motion and interaction of
atoms and molecules. I see no evidence that death is not implied by
materialism. I've experienced the passing away of many, and its
permanence is very convincing. Moreover, cut a nerve and sensation
ceases; be injected with an anesthetic and one loses consciousness
in a matter of seconds. All pretty convincing that materialism is
on the right track, as opposed to speculation and fantasies about
mathematics and arithmetic. AG
?
By mechanism I mean the idea that we can survive with an artificial
*digital* brain. Precisely: that it exists a level of granularity
so that I survive, or my first person experience remains unchanged,
through a digital (physical) simulation of my brain at that level.
I accept that within materialist theory as I have stated it, one
could construct a perfect replica of a human brain with the
consciousness implied by such a construction. However, that would
be a clone of someone, not that someone. So I doubt your survival
claim. AG
Do you agree that the cone of you will doubt this? Especially after
what you just say here?
Many Worlds, even with identical replicas of observers, doesn't
imply any form of immortality. It's like any clone or twins;
notwithstanding identical DNA, the copies are separate and distinct
individuals. AG
Then we die almost every day, as we change our material constitution
all the times, or you have a bizarre theory of mind (and which one?).
This is believed indeed by many materialists, but they use
mechanism to hide the mind-body problem. When, actually, Mechanism
can be shown incompatible with very weak form of materialism or
physicalism.
FWIW, I am not necessarily a huge enthusiast of materialism as I
have defined it, but it certainly is persuasive given some of the
evidence I have presented.
The evidence you gave were evidence for mechanism, not for
materialism. I don't think there has been any evidence for
materialism. But many people confuse evidence for matter or for
physics with evidence for materialism, which is an hypothesis in
metaphysics. yet, my papers shows how test materialism versus
mechanism (up to a logical possibility of being defeated by
intelligent but malevolent daemon).
How do you distinguish mechanism, from materialism? I did deny the
existence of any "substance" out there. It's likely the geometry of
space that inhibits motion in certain directions, giving rise to the
appearance of solidity and thus "matter". AG
OK. Nice. But I usually consider the "physical space" as a material
object. The point is that if Mechanism is correct, the whole of
physics must be derived from elementary arithmetic, and this in a
precise way, including time and space.
I don't expect you to believe this, it took me 40 years to provide a
proof, and eventually it relies on a good understanding of what is a
computer, in the original mathematical sense (which is not well known).
Nor am I hiding the mind-body problem. I just have no clue as to
the resolution. AG
With mechanism, you need to reduce the physical laws to arithmetic.
Consciousness becomes more "easy", at least if you agree that
consciousness is true, non doubtable, non provable, and non
expressible, as the logic of machine self-reference
Machine self reference? What the heck is that? AG
A (not well known) sub-branch of mathematical logic and theoretical
computer science. It studies what theories or machines can prove
correctly about themselves.
There are excellent textbooks (asking for some maturity in logic),
like Smorynski "Self-reference and Modal Logic", or Boolos "the logic
of provability" which is quite good, but technically demanding.
A nice venerable treatise is Stephen Cole Kleene's 1952 "Introduction
to Metamathematics".
Raymond Smullyan wrote hundred of books, recreative and technical, on
this subject.
It all go around Gödel's discovery that an important part of
metamathematics (the mathematics of mathematical reasoning) is
embedded in a tiny part of arithmetic.
This led to Recursion Theory, Proof Theory (Herbrand, Gentzen, ...),
Model Theory (with the discoveries of Löwenheim, Skolem,Tarski),
Theoretical Computer Science (Turing, Post, Kleene, Church, ...), etc.
A good book relating Gödel and the possibility for machine to think is
the book by Judson Webb (Mechanism, finitism and metamathematics).
Imo, the best introduction remains the original papers, like with
Davis (now Dover's book) selected papers "The undecidable", and the
thin but magnificent work of Tarski, Robinson and Mostowski
"Undecidable theories".
Hofstadter's "Gödel-Escher-bach" is not bad at all, and shows good
insight in the idea that Gödel's theorem does not prevent machine to
think, unlike Penrose who is invalid on that point.
Like Judson Webb, I think that Gödel's theorem provides the key
argument in favor of Digital Mechanism. Indeed, a slight
generalization of Gödel's second incompleteness theorem (Löb's
theorem) axiomatizes entirely the whole of the (propositional) ideally
correct machine's "theology". Up to a quite possible (and welcome)
refutation, it provides a precise justification why the observable
obey a quantum logic.
explains why allo;;a[smachine are confronted to something obeying
such (semi-axiomatic) definition. The problem of matter appearance
is solved in the same way, leading quickly to the logic of the
observable, and this already justifies a quantum logic. It remains
to compare it more with nature, but up to now it fits rather well
(both intuitively and formally). Everett QM confirms Mechanism, but
if you believe in a collapse, well, you will need a non-mechanist
theory of mind, à-la Penrose perhaps.
"Collapse" is more likely a defacto placeholder for as-yet unknown
dynamics. I don't like jumping to far-fetched conclusions of
cascading metastasizing universes because we haven't resolved the
measurement problem.
That is wise, a priori.
Don't you find Joe the Plumber's power to create universes at will
troubling? AG
Not really, as I know that IF I believe just in elementary arithmetic,
all the digital machines dreams are already realized, with a
sophisticated relative mathematical distribution.
So, Joe the Plumber is only dreaming, and there are zero "primitively
physical universes". There is one consciousness differentiating on a
Moiré effect of infinitely many computations, which are run in virtue
of the truth of very elementary principles.
Basically: logic (classical or intuitionist) principles (like ( a & b)
-> a, a -> (b -> a), etc.) and rules (a; a->b / b; p(x) / for all x
p(x), ...). + the symbols 0, s, + and *, and the basic first order
axiomatic for the natural numbers. s(x) is intended for the successor
function x + 1. Ex... should be read "it exists x such that...
0 ≠ s(x)
s(x) = s(y) -> x = y
x = 0 v Ey(x = s(y))
x+0 = x
x+s(y) = s(x+y)
x*0=0
x*s(y)=(x*y)+x
Amazingly, in that very elementary theory we can prove the existence
of the observer/dreamer, and of all the finite pieces of their dreams.
The dreamers are defined by anyone believing in the principles above +
the all the many induction principles:
(F(0) & Ax(F(x) -> F(s(x))) -> AxF(x),
with Ax... for "for all w we have that...", and F(x) being a formula
in the arithmetical language (with "0, s, +, *), like you can write
prime(x) using only 0, +, *, s, and the logical symbols (exercise!).
Bruno
Bruno
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