> On 29 Oct 2018, at 10:55, Philip Thrift <cloudver...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > > On Monday, October 29, 2018 at 4:44:49 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 28 Oct 2018, at 17:17, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <javascript:>> >> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Sunday, October 28, 2018 at 10:27:56 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 27 Oct 2018, at 22:59, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Saturday, October 27, 2018 at 3:21:33 PM UTC-5, Philip Thrift wrote: >>> >>> >>> On Saturday, October 27, 2018 at 2:52:51 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 10/26/2018 11:50 PM, Philip Thrift wrote: >>>> Logical consistency is a relation between sentences. It's not about >>>> existence. The sentences might be about the existence of something, but >>>> that's different. Or the sentences may have variables quantified by >>>> existential quantifiers, but that's different too. To say logical >>>> consistency is needed for existence would be a category error. >>>> >>>> Brent >>>> >>>> In other words: >>>> >>>> https://www.lrb.co.uk/v08/n07/richard-rorty/the-contingency-of-language >>>> <https://www.lrb.co.uk/v08/n07/richard-rorty/the-contingency-of-language> : >>>> >>>> >>>> As long as we think that there is some relation called ‘fitting the world’ >>>> or ‘expressing the real nature of the human self’ which can be possessed >>>> or lacked by vocabularies-as-wholes, we shall continue the traditional >>>> philosophical search for a criterion which will tell us which vocabularies >>>> have this desirable feature. But if we could ever become reconciled to the >>>> idea that reality is indifferent to our descriptions of it, and that the >>>> human self is created by the use of a vocabulary rather than being >>>> adequately or inadequately expressed in a vocabulary, then we should at >>>> last have assimilated what was true in the romantic idea that truth is >>>> made rather than found. What is true about this claim is just that >>>> languages are made rather than found, and that truth is a property of >>>> linguistic entities, of sentences. >>>> >>>> - pt >>> >>> But what is true about the sentence, "What is true about this claim is just >>> that languages are made rather than found, and that truth is a property of >>> linguistic entities, of sentences."? Is it not correspondence with some >>> physical events, i.e. facts? >>> >>> Brent >>> >>> >>> In the Rortian philosophical world of neopragmatism [ >>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neopragmatism >>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neopragmatism> ], the correspondence concept >>> of truth is wrong: >>> >>> "The thought was that in order for a statement or proposition to be true it >>> must give facts which correspond to what is actually present in reality. >>> This is called the correspondence theory of truth and is to be >>> distinguished from a neopragmatic conception of truth." >>> >>> A "neopragmatic conception of truth"has Rorty, Quine, Wittgenstein, ... >>> spins, but it's basically that language is in a pragmatic relationship with >>> reality. >>> >>> - pt >>> >>> Or a Rortian way to put it: Truth claims are just sentences in reference to >>> other sentences. >> >> Truth claims, yes, and gossip. But we can also bet on a reality making sense >> of the sentences, and if we want to progress build from what we can agree >> on, (even if we interpret it differently). If not, we will fall in >> relativism, which is inconsistent at the start, as it asks us to relativise >> relativism, which needs some absolute. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> Instead of relativism, philosophers talk of perspectivism. > > > Perpectivisme still assume some reality, be it numbers or matter. What you > said above looks more relativism than perspectivism. > > Mechanism is perspectivist, given that the ontology is any Turing complete > theory, and physics, mathematics, psychology theology are explained from > perspective (self-rerefntial different modes imposed by incompleteness). > > > >> >> (Nietzsche is said to be the father of perspectivism. I say, actually, Kant. >> ...) >> >> A Scientist sees a bunch of phenomena (recorded as data) and says, I have >> written a theory θ in a language λ that models the data!. Other Scientists >> say, I have done the same, but mine's "better"! So then there are a bunch of >> θ_λs (perspectives). The odd thing is that each Scientist talks about their >> pet θ_λ as being the world-as-it-is. > > That are not scientist. A genuine scientist will only ask why this or that > theory, and ask for experimental testing and decision about it. > > Bruno > > > > > > Like I've shown, there seems to be little evidence of that. There must be a > lot of un-"genuine" scientists writing articles today. See also Sabine > Hossenfelder's book Lost in Math.
Most scientists are genuine in their own fields, but can lost the scientific attitude in the fields of their colleagues, or in the fundamental science, which has stop 529 years ago. Please, do not give too much links and references. Try to sum up your ideas, and give links only if we want see the technical details. Also beware Wikipedia, if not most dictionaries. They contain mistakes. Better to direct us to original papers instead. Wikipedia is excellent on some articles and bad on others. It is also politically oriented, despite the claim. Bruno > > - pt > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
