On 12/16/2018 11:02 PM, Jason Resch wrote:


On Mon, Dec 17, 2018 at 12:05 AM Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:



    On 12/16/2018 9:36 PM, Jason Resch wrote:


    On Sun, Dec 16, 2018 at 10:22 PM Brent Meeker
    <meeke...@verizon.net <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:



        On 12/16/2018 4:39 PM, Jason Resch wrote:


        On Sun, Dec 16, 2018 at 5:53 PM Brent Meeker
        <meeke...@verizon.net <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:



            On 12/16/2018 1:56 PM, Jason Resch wrote:


            On Sun, Dec 16, 2018 at 3:28 PM Brent Meeker
            <meeke...@verizon.net <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:



                On 12/15/2018 10:24 PM, Jason Resch wrote:


                On Sat, Dec 15, 2018 at 11:35 PM Brent Meeker
                <meeke...@verizon.net
                <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:



                    On 12/15/2018 6:07 PM, Jason Resch wrote:


                    On Sat, Dec 15, 2018 at 7:57 PM Brent Meeker
                    <meeke...@verizon.net
                    <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:



                        On 12/15/2018 5:42 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

                            hh, but diophantine equations only
                            need integers, addition, and
                            multiplication, and can define any
                            computable function. Therefore the
                            question of whether or not some
                            diophantine equation has a solution
                            can be made equivalent to the
                            question of whether some Turing
                            machine halts.  So you face this
                            problem of getting at all the truth
                            once you can define integers,
                            addition and multiplication.

                            There's no surprise that you can't
                            get at all true statements about a
                            system  that is defined to be infinite.


                        But you can always prove more true
                        statements with a better system of
                        axioms.  So clearly the axioms are not
                        the driving force behind truth.


                        And you can prove more false statements
                        with a "better" system of axioms...which
                        was my original point.  So axioms are not
                        a "force behind truth"; they are a force
                        behind what is provable.


                    There are objectively better systems which
                    prove nothing false, but allow you to prove
                    more things than weaker systems of axioms.

                    By that criterion an inconsistent system is
                    the objectively best of all.


                The problem with an inconsistent system is that it
                does prove things that are false i.e. "not true".

                    However we can never prove that the system
                    doesn't prove anything false (within the
                    theory itself).

                    You're confusing mathematically consistency
                    with not proving something false.


                 They're related. A system that is inconsistent
                can prove a statement as well as its converse.
                Therefore it is proving things that are false.

                But a system that is consistent can also prove a
                statement that is false:

                axiom 1: Trump is a genius.
                axiom 2: Trump is stable.

                theorem: Trump is a stable genius.


            So how is this different from flawed physical theories?

            The difference is that mathematicians can't test their
            theories.


        Sure they can:  A set of axioms predicts a Diophantine
        equation has no solutions.  We happen to find it does have a
        solution.  We can reject that set of axioms.

        Then the axioms must have also included enough to include
        Diophantine equations (e.g. PA) so you have added axioms
        making the system inconsistent and every proposition is a
        theorem.  The only test of the theory was that it is
        inconsistent.


    There is also soundness
    <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soundness> which I think more
    accurately reflects my example above.

    "...a system is sound when all of its theorems are tautologies." 
    Which is to say it is true that the theorem follows from the
    axioms.  Not that it is true simpliciter.


How about this:


          Arithmetic soundness[edit
          
<https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Soundness&action=edit&section=5>]

    If/T/is a theory whose objects of discourse can be interpreted
    asnatural numbers <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Natural_numbers>,
    we say/T/is/arithmetically sound/if all theorems of/T/are actually
    true about the standard mathematical integers. For further
    information, seeω-consistent theory
    <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/%CE%A9-consistent_theory>.


OK.  But note that it assumes the natural numbers exist independently of T and in order to be applied it assumes one can know that every theorem of T is true of the natural numbers.  If the natural numbers exist independently of T then a theorem of T may or may not apply to them.  But in fact the natural numbers are only defined as that which satisfies some theory T'.

Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Reply via email to