> On 9 May 2019, at 19:06, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List
> <everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>
>
>
> On 5/9/2019 3:22 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>> On 3 May 2019, at 15:27, Terren Suydam <terren.suy...@gmail.com
>>> <mailto:terren.suy...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>>>
>>> One way to get around this is to hold that consciousness is associated with
>>> the way information is processed.
>>
>>
>> That is mechanism, but then you inherit infinitely many body-representation
>> in arithmetic, and the mind-body problem becomes in part a justification of
>> the appearances from a statistic to all computations going through our
>> brain. Then incompleteness explains what this take the shape of a quantum
>> reality.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>> This is substrate independent - the fact that a brain is physical is beside
>>> the point. You could implement a brain in software, and insofar as the same
>>> kinds of information processing occur, it would be conscious in the same
>>> kind of way.
>
> Only if it exists in the same kind of world.
Why? He needs only the relevant input, which here are given by the most
plausible computations, and the measure one is given by the logic of []p & p,
etc. (p sigma_1).
You cannot assume a world, or a god other that the (sigma_1) arithmetical
reality, or you need to explains how that God manage to perturbate or interfere
with the statistics in arithmetic.
>
>>>
>>> I find this idea compelling because it makes the link between brains and
>>> consciousness without requiring matter, and provides a framework for
>>> understanding consciousnesses of other kinds of machines. All that's
>>> required is to assume there is something it is like for computation to
>>> occur.
>>
>> Yes. Then it is sad that so few people are aware that the notion of
>> computation is a purely arithmetical definition, so that we don’t need to
>> assume more than Robison arithmetic. Worst, we cannot assume more, without
>> exploding the number of aberration histories.
>
> Doesn't this worry you, that you are trimming your theory to get a desired
> outcome? Is it empiricism?
No. That is called doing science. Ig we can explain with less axioms, surely
something,g was wrong with the supplementary axioms. That is why Everett is in
principle better than Everett + collapse (Copenhagen).
And yes, Mechanism is empiricism. Despite the whole universe is in the head of
the universal machine, we must still compare it to see if it match with the
fact. As it does, thanks to QM (without collapse).
If someone find an evidence for a collapse, Mechanism is refuted.
If someone shows a departure between the material hypostases (self-modes, []p &
p, etc.) and Nature, that would be a reason to believe in some magic, like a
wave collapse, or some Aristotelian God.
>
>> This makes mechanism testable, by comparing the physics emerging from the
>> self-referential statistics on all computations with the inferred physics.
>> And it match well, were physics itself miss the relation with the first
>> person perspective, necessarily (assuming mechanism). A materialist has a
>> way out: to invoke infinite to make the link brain-mind one-one, which it
>> cannot be once we do the digital truncation.
>
> That's only because you are assuming the mind is infinite...which seems a
> little arrogant.
On the contrary, I assume the observer finite, and the ontology is finitist. No
infinite object at all in the ontology. Even N = {0, 1, 2, …} does not exist.
I say just the contrary, which is that the physicist have to make both the mind
and the physical reality infinite, and in a very special way, to assure a
mind-body link, preventing him to say yes to the doctor, but protecting him to
derail in the arithmetical reality. It looks like adding many complex axiom to
a theory, to avoid Rover to ever become conscious, just to be able to keep
faith in a primitive physical reality, or to keep physics in the fundamental
science.
Bruno
>
> Brent
>
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