On 5/20/2019 2:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 17 May 2019, at 08:56, Telmo Menezes <te...@telmomenezes.net
<mailto:te...@telmomenezes.net>> wrote:
On Sat, May 11, 2019, at 00:02, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 11:42 PM Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com
<mailto:jasonre...@gmail.com>> wrote:
On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 8:16 AM Bruce Kellett
<bhkellet...@gmail.com <mailto:bhkellet...@gmail.com>> wrote:
Then with mechanism, we get the many-histories from a
simple fact to prove: all computations are realised in
all models of arithmetic.
But arithmetic does not exist independently of the human
mind, and mechanism is manifestly a pipe dream.
You sound certain. What is your evidence?
Jason
The is no evidence for mathematical realism,
There is plenty of evidence, informally known as "the unreasonable
effectiveness of math". Does this mean that mathematical realism is
true? No, but then again the same applies to all promising ideas.
and mechanism is a failed idea because it cannot account for our
experience.
Nothing so far can account for our experience, this is why we keep
having all these discussions.
It seems to me that the mathematics of the first person
self-referential modes of the machine (those with “& p”) does account
of our experience. And up to now, it does account of the “matter
appearances”.
The universal machine can be said to know that she has a soul, and
that she knows that her soul is not a machine, nor even anything third
person describable.
Do you agree that consciousness is what is, from the 1p view of the
machine:
1) true
2) immediately knowable and indubitable
3) non provable
4) non definable (but still meta-definable using “mechanism”)
+
5) invariant for some digital substitution
Then it is a theorem that the Mechanist Universal machine can prove:
"consciousness is true for me”.
First, it is a fallacy to infer from "X has properties P" and "Y has
properties P" to "X is Y".
1) It is not the case that whatever I am conscious of I think is true.
For one, I am generally conscious of many things that are not propositions.
2) I don't think conscious is immediately knowable. One is not
conscious of being conscious immediately. I takes reflection. Your
idea of the 1p view of the machine is what is CT provable by the
machine. Which is certainly not the human view of consciousness. There
are many things provable from PA by me which I will never even consider,
much less be immediately aware of.
3) I don't even know what it would mean for consciousness to be
provable, nor why that is relevant. Proof applies to propositions. The
Moon isn't provable. But we can study the Moon and predict things about
the Moon.
4) Under the plausible hypothesis that one is not unique, consciousness
is ostensively definable: "Did you feel that pinch?" If it were not
definable we wouldn't know what we're talking about when we say it's not
definable. Of course Bertrand Russell once quipped that,"As
mathematicians we never know what we're talking about, or whether what
we say is true."
5) Is just a working hypothesis and since the "level of substitution"
could be anything from one e-neuron to ones past light cone, it's not
very clear what is it's significance.
We get a science, extended into a theology, and in particular, we get
a theory of quanta, extended by a theory of qualia, making this theory
of consciousness testable, by testing its quanta part with nature.
Thanks to QM, it fits.
It fits like my overcoat fits my grandson...nothing is left sticking out.
Brent
I am aware that you don’t seem convince by this, but I am not sure
what it is that you are missing, or what you think the explanation
above is missing.
Of course, all what I say comes from the theorems of Gödel, Löb and
Solovay about the logic of self-reference of the Löbian machines (PA,
ZF, ZFC, …).
Knowing is also defined axiomatically. It is given by the modal logic
S4. With the Theaetetus’ definition applied on Gödel’s beweisbar, we
get an extension of S4, (S4Grz), making sense for the definition of
consciousness.
Bruno
Telmo.
Bruce
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