On Friday, June 21, 2019 at 1:26:05 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote: > > > > On 6/20/2019 11:11 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: > > On Fri, Jun 21, 2019 at 3:38 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < > [email protected] <javascript:>> wrote: > >> On 6/20/2019 10:00 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: >> >> On Fri, Jun 21, 2019 at 2:35 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < >> [email protected] <javascript:>> wrote: >> >>> On 6/20/2019 9:09 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: >>> >>> On Fri, Jun 21, 2019 at 1:19 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < >>> [email protected] <javascript:>> wrote: >>> >>>> On 6/20/2019 5:56 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: >>>> >>>> From: Bruno Marchal <[email protected] <javascript:>> >>>> >>>> >>>> I don’t think your refutation of step 3 has been understood by anyone. >>>> >>>> If someone else want to argue that there is no indeterminacy in the >>>> self duplication experience, he is welcome. >>>> >>>> >>>> I think that some might challenge your interpretation of this >>>> indeterminacy. This might not be exactly JC's objection to step 3, but, to >>>> my mind, it is a serious difficulty in its own right. >>>> >>>> This comes from a recent podcast of a conversation between Sean Carroll >>>> and David Albert: >>>> >>>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AglOFx6eySE >>>> >>>> This is a long discussion, and the relevant parts of Albert's >>>> objections to MWI and self-locating uncertainty come towards the end. >>>> >>>> The essence of Albert's point is that in the duplication case, you ask >>>> "What is the probability that you will find yourself in Moscow (resp. >>>> Washington)?" Putting aside objections to the non-specificity of the >>>> pronoun 'you', I think your answer is that the probabilities are 0.5 for >>>> either city. Albert points out that to reach this conclusion, you use some >>>> principle of indifference, or point to some symmetry between the possible >>>> outcomes. Using this symmetry, you claim that the probabilities must be >>>> equal, hence 0.5 for each city. Now, says Albert, there is another >>>> solution >>>> that also respects all the symmetries involved, viz., "I have not idea >>>> what >>>> the probability is." >>>> >>>> You can then easily argue that this is a better solution. Because the >>>> probability 0.5 is not written in the physics of the situation -- it comes >>>> entirely from the classical principle of indifference. So Albert asks how >>>> you are going to verify this probability experimentally -- as a large N >>>> limit, or something similar. So you repeat the duplication N times on your >>>> participants. i.e. after the original duplication you transport the >>>> subjects back to Helsinki and repeat the duplication to Washington and >>>> Moscow. You end up with 2^N copies, each of which has a record of the N >>>> cities they found themselves in after each duplication. You now ask each >>>> of >>>> them their best estimate of the probabilities for W or M on each >>>> duplication. Of course, you then get all possible answers, from 1/N for M >>>> to 1/N for W. Since, withprobaility one, the will always be someone who >>>> found himself in M each time, and similarly, someone who found himself in >>>> W >>>> each time. Plus all other 2^ possible combinations of results. >>>> >>>> >>>> But most participants will say they were in Washington approximately >>>> N/2 times and Moscow N/2 times, in accordance with a binomial distribution. >>>> >>> >>> But I am not "most participants". I am just me, only one of me. I could >>> easily be the guy who sees 100% Moscow. >>> >>> >>> Not "easily" since seeing only Moscow has probability 1/2^N. And it's >>> not just you I need to convince. I need to write a paper showing that my >>> P(M)=P(W)=0.5 theory is supported and the statistics reported by the >>> participants do exactly that. >>> >> >> As Bruno might say, that is to take the 3p view of things. I am concerned >> about the 1p view, where this survey of all participants is not possible. >> >> The point, of course, is to relate this to the many worlds interpretation >> of QM. There one does not have the option of surveying outcomes over all >> branches in order to reach one's conclusions about probabilities. Put >> another way, if MWI is true, why do we not regularly see substantial >> deviations from the Born Rule probabilities? >> >> >> A good question *if* the premise is true. Are you saying that splitting >> photons by a half-silvered mirror doesn't produce binomial statistics, >> which the variance = Np(1-p)? Are you saying the measured variance is >> greater than expected... or less? >> >> After all, repetitions of the relevant interactions are happening all the >> time: and not just in our controlled experiments. How can there be such >> things as objective probabilities in the MWI scenario? How can we use >> experimental evidence to support theories when we do not know whether our >> observer probabilities are representative or not? >> >> >> The same as in any probabilistic theory. We repeat it so many times that >> we have statistics that we can compare to the theoretical distribution. >> The same way you would test your theory that a coin was fair. >> > > In other words, MWI is experimentally disconfirmed. > > > How so? In repeated experiments I'm aware of (and a lot of photons go > thru Aspect's EPR experiments) the statistics are consistent with the > theory. To disconfirm MWI you'd have to observe statistics far from the > expected value, which is why Tegmark proposed his machine gun suicide > experiment. > > Brent > > >
Interesting ... *Quantum suicide and immortality* - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_suicide_and_immortality In quantum mechanics, quantum suicide is a thought experiment, originally published independently by Hans Moravec in 1987[1][2] and *Bruno Marchal* in 1988[3][4] and independently developed further by Max Tegmark in 1998.[5] It attempts to distinguish between the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics and the Everett many-worlds interpretation by means of a variation of the Schrödinger's cat thought experiment, from the cat's point of view. Quantum immortality refers to the subjective experience of surviving quantum suicide regardless of the odds. ... @philipthrift -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/140d19ab-67cd-4373-a58a-6787f0fc0fdf%40googlegroups.com.
