On 6/25/2019 9:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 24 Jun 2019, at 19:26, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everything-list@googlegroups.com <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> wrote:



On 6/24/2019 2:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 24 Jun 2019, at 05:27, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <everything-list@googlegroups.com <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> wrote:



On 6/23/2019 1:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 That sounds a bit observer dependent.

Yes. It is. The physical reality becomes a first person plural view of arithmetic seen by itself from the universal number/machine perspective. An observer is just a (Löbian) machine seen from the material modes of the self ([]p & p with p sigma_1, or []p & <>t, or []p & <>t & p).

Which raises the question of why we each see (from the inside) the same physical world.

It is a symptom that we are not more than universal numbers, given that we get the conclusion that all universal machine/number have the same physics.

How exactly "the same".  Can you show that the observed physics is the only possible physics?


Yes. Compare the physics in the head of the universal machine with the observation. What we see, if it is does not belong to that machine’s internal physics, but is consistent with it,

OK.  Is what's in the head of the universal machine consistent with there being three families of fermions?  Is it consistent with the Standard Model?  Is it consistent with conservation of energy-momentum?  See, the problem is that you have no way saying what is or isn't in the head of the universal machine...so almost anything may be consistent.


can be defined as the local geography-history (indexically contingent, and usually treated with the diamond in the modes.

If there is a contradiction between the machine’s physics and the observation, then mechanism is false, or we are in a malevolent simulation.






Digital Mechanism provides a new powerful invariant for physics: the physical laws are invariant for all observers, and is invariant for the change of the ontology (combinators, numbers, etc.).

Digital mechanism explains why there is an apparent physical universe,

I don't see that explanation?

I might ask what you miss in the UDA, which shows that physics is reduced to an indexical statistics

It doesn't "show" that, it hypothesizes that it must be so.  It's like hypothesizing God.  Is God consistent with human suffering?  He must be, otherwise the hypothesis is false.

on all relative computations ((aka sigma_1 sentences, by a normal form theorem of Kleene, and some subtleties about G* and Z*).

Then what are you missing in AUDA (the arithmetical translation of UDA in arithmetic). The main things have been found by Goödel, Löb, Feferman, Friedman, Boolos, Goldblatt, up to Solvay’s1976 theorem: the discovery of G and G*.

The probability (a credibility or plausibility, actually) one is given, for the observable, by the logic of []p & <>t. I justify this by thought experience, Kripke semantics, and the bastard calculus in Timeaeus and Plotinus (and got evidence that Moderatus got it already from its interpretation of the Parmenides).



Why is not each person is a different universe, as they are in different dreams.

I am not sure I understand the question. Each person is supported by an infinity of computations, and they diverge, a bit like the W vs M divergence in the self-duplication, except that it is a continuous transformation of some sort. The person $are* in different dream/computations, but some type of dream are sharable

But some types are not.  So why are we in a sharable one?  Are you hypothesizing the there are other people who are only in unsharable dreams?  It seems you are invoking the "might theory is consistent with everything" rule.

and long histories develops, in the limit of all first person experience (due to the invariance of consciousness for the arithmetical delays in the stepping of the universal dovetailer).

Finding the propositional modes of self-reference explains why we have bodies, soul and qualia, and why we are conscious, and why we are in front of the … unknown.

Only in some idiosyncratic meaning of "explain".

But to progress, we need to progress also in the quantified modal logic of provability, and to better extracts Quantum Logic, etc.

It might not work. The fact is that it works up to now,

It does no work up to now.  It is just sufficiently expansive that no contradiction is apparent.

Brent

and is the only precise and testable theory addressing the Mind-Body problem, to my knowledge.

Bruno





Brent

and why the laws of physics are really laws, and, and this is better than physics, why the physical reality separates into sharable quanta, and non sharable qualia.

Bruno





Brent

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