> On 15 Jul 2019, at 15:39, Philip Thrift <cloudver...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > > On Monday, July 15, 2019 at 6:31:51 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 14 Jul 2019, at 11:53, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <javascript:>> >> wrote: >> >> >> If brains (or future biomachines) are standard Turing, then we can make a >> conscious robot out of standard processors. > > OK. > > The expression is a bit fuzzy. I would say that we can make a physical robot > capable of manifesting consciousness relatively to us. > > This is needed to avoid the idea that it is the physical activity in the > brain robot which would “create” consciousness. The consciousness of the > robot is eventually explained by (infinitely many) number relations, which > are independent of time, physics, etc. > >> That is the great leap of faith. > > I can agree, yes. That is why I insist all the time that Mechanism is an > hypothesis, first in the cognitive science, then in metaphysics. > > Anyone asserting that science has proven Mechanism, or that we know that > Mechanism is true is a con scientist. The machine already know this. > >> Panpsychism is the conservative view that only with particular material >> complexes consciousness exits. > > My goal is to figure out what is matter and where it comes from. That is one > of the main reason why I do not assume matter at the start. I don’t know what > it is, and I doubt it exists ontologically, especially once you know that the > tiny very elementary part of arithmetic emulate *all* computations, in a > redundant fashion with a precise mathematical structure (indeed seemingly > rather close to what quantum mechanics already seem to described, but that > will need infinitely many confirmation, like all thesis on some reality. > >> One can simulate thermonuclear fusion in a supercomputer, but it's not real. >> Same with consciousness. > > Assuming non mechanism, and assuming a primary physical reality, you are > right, but out of the scope of my working hypothesis. > > Bruno > > > > > For Galen Strawson (NYTimes op-ed) > > Consciousness Isn’t a Mystery. It’s Matter. > <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/16/opinion/consciousness-isnt-a-mystery-its-matter.html> > > In any case, matter is a mystery. For Kant, it is unexplainable. Perhaps it > will be forever unexplainable (and surprising). > > But arithmetic is also a mystery (Gregory Chaitin) > > The Limits of Reason > <http://www.cs.virginia.edu/~robins/The_Limits_of_Reason_Chaitin_2006.pdf> > > So we may never know anything, we can just be and do.
Yes, but we can derive the numbers (and the partial computable function) from very simple theory, like from the axiom Kxy = x, and Sxyz = xz(yz), and with mechanism this is enough to drive the appearance of matter in a way that we can test. Then, for matter, we have much complex theories, which have nit yet been successfully unify, and which requires much stronger mathematical axioms. Chaitin is not entirely correct on the limit of reason, but he got the biology right. That would be too long and irrelevant to expand here. In science we always need some initial faith in some axiom, but with mechanism, the two axioms above are enough for the ontology (that is for the assumption). From there we get the observers, and physics is derived from the mathematics of what is observable for those observers (that we get by listening to what they already says in arithmetic). If Kxy = x, and Sxyz = xz(yz) seem to strange, you can take the axiom of Robinson Arithmetic instead. No need to assume more than: 1) 0 ≠ s(x) 2) x ≠ y -> s(x) ≠ s(y) 3) x ≠ 0 -> Ey(x = s(y)) 4) x+0 = x 5) x+s(y) = s(x+y) 6) x*0=0 7) x*s(y)=(x*y)+x But here you need to add the full axiomatisation of first order logic (predicate calculus). With the combinator, you need only the following theory (no need of logic!): 1) If A = B and A = C, then B = C 2) If A = B then AC = BC 3) If A = B then CA = CB 4) KAB = A 5) SABC = AC(BC) For quantum physics, you need a much large initial segment of set theory, which is a stringer mathematical theory (much more assumptions). Bruno > > > @philipthrift > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/e14f420c-f084-43b5-a040-aa4788c0cf86%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/e14f420c-f084-43b5-a040-aa4788c0cf86%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/C2F0720C-6828-42F2-A841-69CE85AF16D3%40ulb.ac.be.
