On Thursday, August 1, 2019 at 3:51:45 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 31 Jul 2019, at 09:25, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <javascript:>> 
> wrote:
>
>
> If it isn't stuff (at the bottom of it), it it isn't real.
>
> Otherwise, it is idealism, which physics (as today's "popular" physicists 
> present it to the public) has become today.
>
> *In philosophy, idealism is the group of metaphysical philosophies that 
> assert that reality, or reality as humans can know it, is fundamentally 
> mental, mentally constructed, or otherwise immaterial.*
>
>
>
> In a first approximation, this can help. But, at some point,  it might be 
> handy to distinguish between
>
> - human idealism (what you describe by “ that assert that reality, or 
> reality as humans can know it, is fundamentally mental, mentally 
> constructed”)
>
> -universal idealism (the same with “human” replace by digital machine or 
> (intensional) number (I will lake this notion clear in the glossary that I 
> have promised).
>
> - immaterialism (the belief in a Turing universal system and in no more 
> than that for the ontology).
>
> The last case is more a neutral monism than an idealism, as the ideas are 
> not really primitive, they occur in the mind of numbers, which are taken as 
> the “independent ontology” that we assume.
>
> Metter is not “just” an idea in the mind of some numbers: it is a 
> phenomenological reality that *all* universal number encounter. The 
> physical reality is a deep invariant sharable by all machine/number, and 
> which has for them also a non sharable part (the qualia, the immediate 
> consciousness, …).
>
> Bruno
>
>
> *To identify qualia themselves with purely numerical entities* is the 
question.

If qualia are nonnumerical, and assuming they are real (which I do), then 
they must be nonnumerical (or non-"physical") material constituents of 
nature.

@philipthrift

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