> On 21 Aug 2019, at 15:47, Lawrence Crowell <goldenfieldquaterni...@gmail.com> > wrote: > > On Wednesday, August 21, 2019 at 4:42:18 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 21 Aug 2019, at 03:42, Lawrence Crowell <goldenfield...@gmail.com >> <javascript:>> wrote: >> >> On Tuesday, August 20, 2019 at 6:12:05 PM UTC-5, Bruce wrote: >> Bruno, >> >> I think it is clear that you have no coherent local causal many-worlds >> account of the EPR correlations. If you did have one, you would have >> produced it by now. Instead you keep changing the subject and propounding >> irrelevant truisms as if they were great insights. >> >> So be it. I must admit that I am somewhat disappointed by this. Many people >> casually claim that many-worlds solves the problem of non-locality, but few >> even attempt to explain how this works. I thought that you might be able to >> shed some light on the matter. If you could have done so, it would have >> given some reason for taking the many-worlds ontology more seriously. >> >> As it stands, there would appear to be no reason for believing in the real >> existence of the other worlds. One can then follow Zurek and use the Everett >> insights into the primacy of unitary evolution of the wave function, and the >> quantum basis for the classical world, to investigate how the preferred >> basis is found (einselection); to investigate the origin of probabilities >> and the Born rule (envariance); and to explain how the objective classical >> world emerges from this unitary quantum substrate (quantum Darwinism). As >> Zurek points out, once you can do this, the real existence of these other >> worlds becomes irrelevant to physics, and one can safely abandon them as >> superfluous mathematical superstructure. >> >> It seems that the last hope of finding a use for these other worlds as a >> substitute for non-locality is now dead, and we are left with physics as it >> always was -- a single classical world emerging from a quantum substrate. >> There are many who will see this development as a relief from metaphysical >> nonsense. >> >> Bruce >> >> I started reading this paper, but things got in the way --- including >> reading papers that are of more relevance to me. But --- but if I can I will >> try to read this before the week is out. This looks like some sort of PR box >> argument. >> >> MWI seems at first blush to be a nice way to avoid the apparent violence to >> QM that occurs with Bohr's CI. However, really it just remolds the problem >> into another shape. Since there appears to be no way to discern if any >> interpretation is empirically supported MWI in the end just might be a "it >> feels good" sort of argument. > > > My point is that with the MWI (by which I mean the QM axiomatics without the > collapse postulate) the violation of Bell’s inequality does not entail Faster > than Light action at a distance (FTLAD), it entails only a local appearance > of such action. > > So Aspect experience proves the disjunction “FTLAD or Many-worlds”. But the > term “world” should be taken with some caution (there are mathematical > phenomenological constructs). > > > I would agree with that. MWI and this curious quantum frame dragging along a > restricted quantum basis is not some causal influence. I doubt any MWI > upholder is saying that. > > >> I wrote the following on Hossenfelder's blog recently: >> >> No matter how you look at it from a phenomenological perspective there is >> still a stochastic quantum jump, or what we call collapse. With Bohr and CI >> the replacement of a quantum state by a quantum basis state corresponding to >> a measured eigenvalue is considered to be axiomatic. With MWI there is this >> idea that on a deep quantum level there is no such violence committed, the >> world simply appears according to a local measurement by an observer who is >> in a sense "quantum frame dragged" along a reduced world based on that >> measured eigenvalue. From an empirical perspective there is no way to >> discern one from the other. They also both involve a sort of stochastic jump. >> >> If I have the time and temerity to jump into this cauldron of trouble, I may >> work out this conjecture I have this ultimately involves quantum states >> encoding quantum states. This runs into some incompleteness of Gödel's >> theorem. > > That is a good insight, and it can be proved when you assume (explicitly) the > Mechanist hypothesis. All computations exist in the arithmetical reality, and > physics emerges from a statistics on all first person experience related to > those computations. Eventually “physical prediction” with “measure one” have > to obey to the logic of []p & <>t, with p partially computable (sigma_1). > That gives already a quantum logic. > > > > It is of course not clear whether this Gödel self-reference is what nature > actually does, or whether this is something we do with our QM theory.
With Mechanism, nature does not exist. The appearance of nature and physical laws must be recovered by the statistics on the (relative) computations (which exists in arithmetic). The logic of the observable becomes the logic of what is invariant in the “sum” of all computations. At first sight, this cannot work, but then the Gödelian limitation just put the right structure (as far as we can judge today) on the consistent computational extensions, so that we an say that … mechanism is not refuted, neither by Gödel (as Penrose or Lucas argued), nor by QM. > Gödel's theorem involves an infinite number of statements or predicates that > act on Gödel numbers of such predicates. For physics this is tantamount to > the assumption the number of qubits N → ∞, which mirrors in some ways > statistical mechanics and how classical thermodynamics is considered to > emerge. Nature may do something approximate to this, and we make the > assumption this is a Gödel loop of sorts. With mechanism, we have no choice than recover the wave appearance (“nature” and the collapse) from a “many-world”, or more simply “many computations” in arithmetic. We just cannot assume a nature, made of something. It is all but a statistics on infinitely many computations (all computations which bring us, from under our substitution level). > > >> The implication is there is no decidable way to determine whether QM is >> ψ-epistemic, say in the sense of Bohr and Copenhagen Interpretation and >> Fuch's QuBism, or if it is ψ-ontic in the sense of MWI and GRW and … . > > The only physics become a subbranch of machine/number psychology/theology, > once we assume Mechanism. There is no problem with physics, but there is a > problem with physicalism, if we make that Mechanist assumption. > > > > Clearly though caution is advised. There is a long history of comparing > nature to our devices, from pumps to clocks and steam engines to now > computers. Searle made a similar critics. But the discovery of the universal machine, Imo, changes this completely. For them first time we get a notion of universality which is close for Cantor’s diagonalisation, and which prevents reductionism. It is something entirely new. Normally, it should have been discovered before incompleteness, which is an easy consequence of the Church-Turing thesis, which recognise that universality has being genuine. After the discovery of the universal machine, and all its computations in arithmetic, it is very natural to doubt about physicalism. The doubt will be more between digital physics (the physical universe result from the execution of a particular programs or set of programs) and Mechanism, which precludes the possibility that the physical universe is Turing computable (as physics emerges from an finite sum on all computations, which is not computable a priori). Digital physics destroys itself, as it entails Mechanism, and Mechanism entails the negation of any entirely computable physics. Of course, caution is advised. Mechanism can be false, and that would entail the consistency of the existence of a primitively physical universe. Yet, Mechanism is the simplest (conceptually) theory in cognitive science, so, strong evidences that mechanism is false is needed to make that move, I would say, especially with quantum mechanics which seems to confirm the most “shocking” consequences of Digital Mechanism. Bruno > > LC > > >> All of these have problems. Bohr and CI posit as fundamental quantum and >> classical domains. However as pointed out by Heisenberg early on there is an >> ambiguous boundary between these two domains. MWI proposes a splitting of >> worlds, but there is no definitive meaning to a spatial surface or set of >> them according to probabilities. Bohm's idea really only has sense in >> nonrelativistic domain, but that could hold for physics on a holographic >> screen, so while this has serious weaknesses I will not throw it completely >> under the bus. There are I read at last count over 50 interpretations. >> Collapses are not the result of unitary evolution and so appear inconsistent >> with the evolution of quantum states. > > Indeed. > > > >> I think this is some sort of incompleteness in the axioms or postulate of QM. > > Eventually QM is related to the intrinsic incompleteness of all theories on > arithmetic. > > > >> It might be compared to the fifth axiom of Euclid in geometry. I think in >> the end, or if I am right, then this is simply a state of affairs that >> exists, there is no causal process behind it and we are best to just accept >> this and press on. Maybe this is Mermin's Shut up and calculate and this >> search for interpretations is a waste of time. > > Things are much simpler if we assume mechanism, like Everett. But Everett > stil assumes some universal wave, which, when we assume mechanism, must be > justify by the mechanist first person indeterminacy in arithmetic. > > To apply physics, “shut up and calculate” is all good, but in Metaphysics, it > is pure authoritative argument to prevent finding and testing possible > solutions of the problem. That is doubly true in the Mechanist frame, > probably because the Mechanist solution is troubling for those who are > physicalist, and believe in an ontological physical universe. > > The mechanist solution is empirically testable, so let us test it. Up to now, > Mechanism is the only theory which explains the appearance without > eliminating consciousness and its mechanist explanation (the theology G* and > its variants). > > With Mechanism, physics is not the fundamental science. Physics is reduced to > a sort of arithmetical probability/credibility machine theory. > > Bruno > > > > > >> >> LC >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everyth...@googlegroups.com <javascript:>. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/15101a72-fb2f-4be0-96ef-dd1a703f70a2%40googlegroups.com >> >> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/15101a72-fb2f-4be0-96ef-dd1a703f70a2%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/19aa479e-a48b-4403-b4a9-a532458620f0%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/19aa479e-a48b-4403-b4a9-a532458620f0%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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