> On 13 Sep 2019, at 22:57, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List > <everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote: > > > > On 9/13/2019 3:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> On 11 Sep 2019, at 16:51, smitra <smi...@zonnet.nl> wrote: >>> >>> Back to basics. There exists a universal wavefunction that evolves >>> according to the Schrodinger equation. Observers are internal structures in >>> this description. Whether or not one believes that the Born rule can be >>> derived or not, what matters in practice is that you'll end up having to >>> use it, so you have to assign a measure for observations that is given by >>> the summation of the squared modulus of the states that correspond to those >>> observations. The information about personal identity must then also be >>> extracted from the wavefunction, so one cannot insert this in an ad hoc way. >>> >>> Quantum immortality is therefore wrong because the measure of the states >>> that correspond to extremely old observers is small. >> >> The same reasoning would apply to “quantum suicide”, where it is clear that >> we survive all the time; given that we cannot take into account the world >> where we do not. >> >> If in H you are multiplied in W and M, but directly killed in M, you survive >> in W with probability one. That is why we add p or <>t to []p to transform >> the logic of belief ([]p) into a probability logic ([]p & <>t). > > Suppose you live a few seconds in M. Do you then survive in W with > probability 0.5?
Assuming you do die in M, even after some years, the probability in H to be feeling the one in W will be one, assuming you never dies in W. But this assumes mortality, and some transitivity of the probability rules, so the question is very complex. The probability in H to be W or M, for a short time, is one half, but the probability to be in the place where you stay for a long time, will be close to one in a sort of retrospective way. All this comes from a simple fact: absolute-death is not a first person experience. There is no entry in the first person diary which mention “I died today”. The difficulty is that the first person renormalise the probabilities all the time, and that is why making them transitive leads to paradoxes. Let me try to illustrate. You are in H, just before the WM-duplication. You are told in advance that in W you will get a cup of tea, and then be killed. In W you get a cup of coffee, and not killed. What is the probability (in H) that you will get a cup of tea. It is 1/2. But what is the probability, in H, that you will have a long lasting memory of having drink a cup of coffee after that experiments: It is 1. In fact, in Moscow, you could (although it is psychologically very difficult) still bet that “you” will have a memory of having doing coffee, and just an amnesia of M and its cup of tea. This also gives some sense that we survive more in our kids and in the value we transmit to them, than in bodies and personal first person happening. Now, that renormalisation process is not easy, a bit like in QFT, we get infinities which are hard to subtract. Bruno > > Brent > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/76a574e1-dc37-c7eb-33f1-1e12d18ec5a6%40verizon.net. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/5FB6A2DC-B54A-45BE-ADFA-653C21C8FB35%40ulb.ac.be.
