> On 24 Sep 2019, at 15:40, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote: > > On Mon, Sep 23, 2019 at 4:22 PM Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com > <mailto:jasonre...@gmail.com>> wrote: > > > This Halloween will mark 6 years since you agreed with Step 3, > > BULLSHIT! > > This is the entire post and even though 6 years has passed I stand by every > word and wouldn't change anything: > > On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 2:12 PM, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com > <mailto:jasonre...@gmail.com>> wrote: > > > A) The test described where the simulation process forks 8 times and 256 > > copies are created and they each see a different pattern of the ball > > changing color > > Duplicating a brain is not enough, the intelligence has NOT forked until > there is something different about them, such as one remembering seeing a red > ball and the other remember seeing a green ball, only then do they fork. It > was the decision made by somebody or something outside the simulation to make > sure all 256 saw a difference sequence of colored balls that created 256 > distinct minds. And to a simulated physicist a decision made outside the > simulation would be indistinguishable from being random, that is to say the > simulated laws of physics could not be used to figure out what that decision > would be. > > > B) A test where the AI is not duplicated but instead a random number > > generator (controlled entirely outside the simulation) determines whether > > the ball changes to red or blue with 50% probability 8 times Then the AI > > (or AIs) could not say whether test A occurred first or test B occurred > > first. > > Both A and B are identical in that the intelligence doesn't know what it is > going to see next; but increasingly convoluted thought experiments are not > needed to demonstrate that everyday fact. The only difference is that in A > lots of copies are made of the intelligence and in B they are not; but as the > intelligence would have no way of knowing if a copy had been made of itself > or not nor would it have any way of knowing if it was the original or the > copy, subjectively it doesn't matter if A or B is true. > > So yes, subjectively the intelligence would have no way of knowing if A was > true or B, or to put it another way subjectively it would make no difference. > > > > I reformulated the UDA in a way that does not use any pronouns at all, and > > it doesn't matter if you consider the question from one view or from all > > the views, the conclusion is the same. > > Yes, the conclusion is the same, and that is the not very profound conclusion > that you never know what you're going to see next,
In a self duplication experience (of course!). > and Bruno's grand discovery of First Person Indeterminacy is just regular old > dull as dishwater indeterminacy first discovered by Og the caveman. No, Og the caveman was not talking on self-duplication. Without a microscope he couldn’t see dividing themselves, and without Kleene’s second recursion theorem, he could not see that this self-duplication is emulated in arithmetic infinity many often. Ad that is not the grand discovery. Just an important, but indeed extremely easy step in a longer reasoning. And Jason is right, after all we don’t need the assessment of the cave man. If you agree, as you agree here, just move on step 4, which is already a bit more subtile, like showing that Parick Closer continuer theory is incompatible with Mechanism (which he indeed criticised if I remember well). Bruno > After the big buildup it's a bit of a letdown actually. > > John K Clark > > >> important it's crystal clear exactly what the correct prediction would > >> have turned out to be. > > > I did a few days ago, but you didn't respond. I'll post it again: > First, consider this experiment: > Imagine there is a conscious AI (or uploaded mind) inside a virtual > environment (an open field) > Inside that virtual environment is a ball, which the AI is looking at and > next to the ball is a note which reads: > "At noon (when the virtual sun is directly overhead) the protocol will begin. > In the protocol, the process containing this simulation will fork (split in > two), after the fork, the color of the ball will change to red for the parent > process and it will change to blue in the child process (forking duplicates a > process into two identical copies, with one called the parent and the other > the child). A second after the color of the ball is set, another fork will > happen. This will happen 8 times leading to 256 processes, after which the > simulation will end." > Now, with the understanding of that experiment, consider the following: > If the AI (or all of them) went through two tests, test A, and test B > A) The test described where the simulation process forks 8 times and 256 > copies are created and they each see a different pattern of the ball changing > color > B) A test where the AI is not duplicated but instead a random number > generator (controlled entirely outside the simulation) determines whether the > ball changes to red or blue with 50% probability 8 times > Then the AI (or AIs) could not say whether test A occurred first or test B > occurred first. > Do you agree that it is impossible for any entity within the simulation to > determine whether test A was executed first, or whether test B was executed > first, with higher than a 50% probability? > > Yes of course I agree with that, but that doesn't mean Bruno's "question > isn't gibberish as is his "proof"! Unlike Bruno's thought experiment you did > not use any personal pronouns and I congratulate you for that, although why > you made it so convoluted is a mystery to me. And unlike Bruno you didn't > demand predictions of events where the veracity of the predictions could > never be judged, not even long after the events in question were over. > Because of Quantum Indeterminacy you can't say for certain if a atom of > Uranium will decay tomorrow but at least the day after tomorrow you'll know, > but with Bruno's "first person indeterminacy" no one and no thing will ever > have any way of knowing or even know what he was suposed to know, and yet he > still talks about probability as if it has meaning in that context. > > You could have used personal pronouns in case B but not for case A because in > that case there is no such thing as THE first person, there are lots of them, > and as a result although your thought experiment didn't teach us anything we > didn't already know at least it didn't produce gibberish. > > There is one other point, for case A, the one that has relevance for Many > Worlds, you say "after the fork, the color of the ball will change" however, > and Carroll specifically mentions this in his book, a mind (not to be > confused with a brain) does not fork until AFTER a change is detected by it. > So in Bruno's thought experiment a mind is not duplicated and then there is > some sort of halfass metaphysical mystery as to how one of them is chosen to > see Washington and the other is chosen to see Moscow, instead the very act of > seeing Washington is what has turned the Helsinki Man into the Washington > Man. So there is no "first person indeterminacy" and the answer to the grand > question "Why am I the Washington Man?" has a mundane answer that is > nevertheless 100% correct, because you saw Washington. > > > All I ask is whether or not any entity at any time has access to > > information that can distinguish between iterated forking or randomized > > switching. > > No, and that is why it's so hard to get experimental proof that Many Worlds > is correct or proof it is incorrect, and the same is true for every other > quantum interpretation. > > >>The difference is in the Many Worlds case, after the universe splits, if I > >>asked you today what the correct answer you should have given yesterday was: > > 1) It would be obvious who the question was directed to. > 2) It would obvious what would have been the correct answer. > > Neither of these things is true for Bruno's "question". > > > What's so special about duplicating universes? > > Well, for one thing in your thought exparament there is someone outside of > the simulation observing it, but by the definition of the multiverse there is > nobody and nothing outside of it to observe a universe splitting. And that's > pretty special. > > And for another thing in the Many Worlds case, after the universe splits, if > I asked you today what the correct answer you should have given yesterday was: > > 1) It would be obvious who the question was directed to. > 2) It would be obvious what would have been the correct answer. > > Neither of these things is true for Bruno's "question". > > > Perhaps you can explain why one leads to apparent randomness but the other > > does not lead to randomness > > One leads to apparent randomness, but Bruno's "question" does not lead to > randomness or non-randomness, it leads to gibberish. > > > Is anything I said about Carroll wrong? > > Yes obviously, you said he would agree with Bruno. > > > What do you hope I will learn from reading Caroll's book? > > You might learn what Many Worlds is saying, and just as important what it is > not saying. > > John K Clark > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv2Dy3CGLB%3DaC5iu%3D_5NQOkVsYyffvUuqEG59mmS4gK3hQ%40mail.gmail.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv2Dy3CGLB%3DaC5iu%3D_5NQOkVsYyffvUuqEG59mmS4gK3hQ%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/58EA56BD-34A3-47D6-B3ED-0F5AB82C3283%40ulb.ac.be.
