> On 6 Oct 2019, at 22:18, Alan Grayson <agrayson2...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > > On Thursday, October 3, 2019 at 6:14:22 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 3 Oct 2019, at 12:12, Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com <javascript:>> >> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Thursday, October 3, 2019 at 3:39:26 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 1 Oct 2019, at 20:29, John Clark <johnk...@gmail.com <>> wrote: >>> >>> How Many Universes Are There? <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XglOw2_lozc> >>> >> >> >> 0. >> >> Bruno >> >> You've turned Tegmark upside down, > > That looks intersting, but I don’t know. Maybe you can elaborate. I published > my material well before Tegmark, and start from a very different problem (the > mind-body problem). > When Tegmark send me his Mathematical Hypothesis paper, I suggest him to use > the Mechanist hypothesis explicitly to clarify possible ambiguities. What is > common is the Mathematicalism, but Tegmark still miss the psychologicalism, > or the theologicalism needed to get physics from arithmetic (and arithmetical > self-reference). > > From what I've read from secondary sources, Tegmark believes that every > mathematical equation has ontological status wrt SOME universe. So according > to this pov, there are universes where gravity acts as an inverse cube, and > all higher powers of inverse radius. You, OTOH, seem to affirm the view that > there is only one "physical" universe, having no ontological status -- like > the Matrix in the movie with that name. But quite aside from the ambiguity of > what "ontological status" means, I don't see how you can deny those > multitudes of other universes which surely seem "computable". AG
Not really, because the physical appearances, when we assume mechanism, have to emerge for all computations, that is why the physical laws have to be unique. Than entails also that the physical reality is NOT emulable by a Turing machine. In arithmetic, the emergence process is related to the first person, that no machine can define explicitly, as no machine can know which machine she is, nor which computations support her. If “I” am a machine, more exactly, if my local body is Turing emulable, then my consciousness and the material reality are not, although it can be approximated by computation, and digital physics (false metaphysically) remains quite interesting in physical local applications. I think that Tegmark has evolved a little bit by not taking all mathematical equations, but only the computable one (missing the important universal one which are only partial computable. > > > >> on his head. But the same core fallacy remains. AG > > Which one? > > The idea that "computable" implies ontological status, or even a perfect > simulation of one, such as in the movie The Matrix. AG You need only to believe that we can infer Ex(x+3=5) from 2+3=5. There is no metaphysics in the arithmetical assumption, only in the "yes doctor”. That is metaphysical, even theological. Then the reasoning shows that the physical reality has no ontological status: that simply does not exist (when we assume that the brain is Turing emulable). > > I say 0 universe since my birth, not because it would be incompatible with > Mechanism (which it is), but because I have never seen any evidence for an > ontologically real universe. > > What evidence could possibly exist as "evidence" for an ontologically real > evidence? Any evidence is dream-able, But we can have indirect evidences, like Mechanism implies apparent indeterminacy, apparent non locality, and apparent non closing of matter, and that has been verified from QM, a theory whose evidences are the many experiences in physics. > And if Mechanism just means the brain and nervous system can be replaced with > computer chips, I don't see any connection between this hypothesis and the > whether the externally appearing universe is "real". AG Have you study the 8 steps of the UDA? That is the explanation for the 15 years old. Ask any question, and if you want we can do the steps one by one. (See for example my shirt presentation here: http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html Now, the step 7 requires knowing that the notion of computation is a purely arithmetical notion, at the semantic level (which is important because we have both that arithmetic contains all the description of computation, but that is different from the fact that the arithmetic truth (a non syntactical concept) realise those computations. Bruno > > I have no doubt that long and deep histories exists, but this requires only > assumption in arithmetic. > > Keep in mind that I give a theory (indeed a very simple one: Kxy = x, and > Sxyz = xz(yz). All the rest are definitions and theorem (made in that theory). > > Well just to be sure, you need some inference rule, so the entire theory is: > > RULES > > 1) If x = y and x = z, then y = z > 2) If x = y then xz = yz > 3) If x = y then zx = zy > > AXIOMS > > 4) Kxy = x > 5) Sxyz = xz(yz) > > (See the combinators thread for an explicit proof that this is Turing > universal). > > To be sure, I can use much more complicated theory, like the complete first > order predicate calculus + the axioms: > > 1) 0 ≠ s(x) > 2) x ≠ y -> s(x) ≠ s(y) > 3) x ≠ 0 -> Ey(x = s(y)) > 4) x+0 = x > 5) x+s(y) = s(x+y) > 6) x*0=0 > 7) x*s(y)=(x*y)+x > > … which as the same time is the one taught informally in high school. > > Bruno > > >> >> >> >> >>> John K Clark >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to everyth...@googlegroups.com <>. >>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv2d2PjP2Gna-4Ocksxjq4G2oRAjRrDEL6gmjn-Lc1xtpA%40mail.gmail.com >>> >>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv2d2PjP2Gna-4Ocksxjq4G2oRAjRrDEL6gmjn-Lc1xtpA%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everyth...@googlegroups.com <javascript:>. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/d9166511-2575-40ab-bc65-7f0b4d82db1a%40googlegroups.com >> >> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/d9166511-2575-40ab-bc65-7f0b4d82db1a%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/9988bdc5-4a3d-4573-9cbf-df1a51d9c4fb%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/9988bdc5-4a3d-4573-9cbf-df1a51d9c4fb%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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