On 11/7/2019 1:58 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On Fri, Nov 8, 2019 at 8:53 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List
<everything-list@googlegroups.com
<mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> wrote:
On 11/7/2019 1:40 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On Fri, Nov 8, 2019 at 6:35 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List
<everything-list@googlegroups.com
<mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> wrote:
On 11/7/2019 12:21 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
On Wednesday, November 6, 2019 at 7:27:32 PM UTC-6, stathisp
wrote:
On Thu, 7 Nov 2019 at 11:15, Bruce Kellett
<bhkel...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Thu, Nov 7, 2019 at 11:00 AM Stathis Papaioannou
<stat...@gmail.com> wrote:
The universe as a whole is determined in every
detail, and random choice of the observer in
measuring a particle is not really a random choice.
If you believe that, you believe in magic sauce.
It is a consequence of Many Worlds that there is no true
randomness, but only apparent randomness. If Many Worlds
is wrong, then this may also be wrong. Randomness in
choice of measurement is required for the apparent
nonlocal effect when considering entangled particles.
--
Stathis Papaioannou
That's what *Many Worlds* implies.
The mystery is: Why do (according to the science press in
the wake of Sean Carroll's book) so many people think Many
Worlds is a good scientific idea (or the best idea,
according to the author).
Because it treats measurement as just another physical
interaction of quantum systems obeying the same evolution
equations as other interactions.
But you can do that (viz. accept that people, and measuring
instruments, and everything else are basically quantum
mechanical) without adopting the "many worlds" philosophy.
ISTM that creates problem for defining a point where one of the
probabilities becomes actualized. MWI tries to avoid this by
supposing that all probabilities are "actualized" in the sense of
becoming orthogonal subspaces. There are some problems with this
too, but I see the attraction.
You can always find problems with any approach. What I particularly
dislike about MW advocates (like Sean Carroll) is that they are
dishonest about the number of assumptions they have to make to get the
SWE to "fly". Particularly over the preferred basis problem and Born
rule. Zurek comes closer, and he effectively dismisses the "other
branches" as a convenient fiction.
Yeah, I like Omnes' dictum, "It's a probabilistic theory, so it predicts
probabilities. What more do you want?"
But it still leaves that gap between the density matrix becoming
diagonal FAPP and one subspace becoming actual FR (for real), not just
FAPP. If you take a purely epistemic view the gap is just in your
belief changing. But if you keep an ontological view the matrix is only
diagonal in some preferred basis and it's not necessarily even
approximately diagonal in some other basis. It seems the other bases
are an inconvenient fiction. :-) It seems to come down to explaining
that Zurek's quantum Darwinism necessarily picks out the basis in which
our brains will form beliefs and they will agree on that belief as to
what "really happened".
Brent
If these other branches play no effective role in explaining our
experience, then why have them there?
Bruce
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