On Friday, November 15, 2019 at 1:23:07 AM UTC-7, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, November 14, 2019 at 6:08:16 PM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, November 14, 2019 at 5:03:14 PM UTC-7, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thursday, November 14, 2019 at 5:56:33 PM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Thursday, November 14, 2019 at 4:49:36 PM UTC-7, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Thursday, November 14, 2019 at 4:25:16 PM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The problem with physics is physicists ! Yeah, that's my conclusion 
>>>>>> after many years of studying, arguing and reading. Many, perhaps most, 
>>>>>> attribute ontological character to what is epistemological; namely the 
>>>>>> wf. 
>>>>>> This leads to all kinds of conceptual errors, and ridiculous models and 
>>>>>> conjectures -- such as MW, particles being in two positions at the same 
>>>>>> time, radiioactive sources that are simultanously decayed and undecayed, 
>>>>>> and so forth. The wf gives us information about the state of a system 
>>>>>> and 
>>>>>> nothing more. Sorry to disappoint. AG
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Physics is only models that come and go. One model (an expression in a 
>>>>> language) can be replaced by another if it's useful. Physicists who jump 
>>>>> from a model to an absolute statement about reality are out over their 
>>>>> skis.
>>>>>
>>>>> *How Models Are Used to Represent Reality*
>>>>> Ronald N. Giere
>>>>>
>>>>> https://www.researchgate.net/publication/216300663_How_Models_Are_Used_to_Represent_Reality
>>>>>
>>>>> Most recent philosophical thought about the scientific representation 
>>>>> of the world has focused on dyadic relationships between language-like 
>>>>> entities and the world, particularly the semantic relationships of 
>>>>> reference and truth. Drawing inspiration from diverse sources, I argue 
>>>>> that 
>>>>> we should focus on the pragmatic activity of representing, so that the 
>>>>> basic representational relationship has the form: Scientists use models 
>>>>> to 
>>>>> represent aspects of the world for specific purposes. Leaving aside the 
>>>>> terms "law" and "theory," I distinguish principles, specific conditions, 
>>>>> models, hypotheses, and generalizations. I argue that scientists use 
>>>>> designated similarities between models and aspects of the world to form 
>>>>> both hypotheses and generalizations.
>>>>>
>>>>> @philipthrift. 
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I fundamentally disagree. The premise underlying models is that they 
>>>> progressively approach a "true" discription of the external world. Do you 
>>>> really think the Earth-centered model of the solar system is equally true 
>>>> as our present understanding? AG 
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> One is much better than another* truthiness*-wise. 
>>>
>>> But good luck in life finding the absolute truth! Let us know when you 
>>> find it.
>>>
>>> @philipthrift  
>>>
>>
>> Don't put words in my mouth. All physical models are provisional, but I 
>> don't accept what I consider philosophical BS that you posted here 
>> previously. AG 
>>
>
>
> It's models up and down, as Vic would say.
>
> @philipthrift 
>

Vic was out of central casting -- for the "shut up and calculate" school. 
AG 

>  
>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/5a1a8337-2c37-49b5-82fb-f8880c51045a%40googlegroups.com.

Reply via email to