> On 20 May 2020, at 23:24, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
> <everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 5/20/2020 5:24 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 18 May 2020, at 21:35, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>>> <everything-list@googlegroups.com 
>>> <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 5/18/2020 3:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>> 
>>>>> On 18 May 2020, at 00:45, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>>>>> <everything-list@googlegroups.com 
>>>>> <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> wrote:
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> On 5/17/2020 6:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>> the appearance of matter as they are explained by the mechanist 
>>>>>> consciousness flux in arithmetic (itself explained by G and G* and their 
>>>>>> difference).
>>>>> 
>>>>> You frequently say this,
>>>> 
>>>> Yes, it is the PhD content. 
>>>> 1) UDA = the constructive reduction of the mind-body problem to the 
>>>> necessity of deriving he physical laws from arithmetic. 
>>>> 2) AUDA = the derivation itself.
>>>> 
>>>>> but I have not seen this explanation except in vague hand waving.
>>>> 
>>>> Hand waving?
>>>> 
>>>> Your remark does look like hand waving, I would say.
>>>> 
>>>> Come on Brent, I am the guy who gives 8 precise mathematical theories, 
>>>> three of them being concerned with the appearance of matter in arithmetic, 
>>>> and so are testable, and indeed confirmed by all experiences until now.
>>> 
>>> They do not show the appearance of matter, the persistence of objects, the 
>>> shared reality.  You merely assume that they must...since otherwise your 
>>> theory doesn't work.
>> 
>> UDA explains that there is no other choice. It exposes the problem.
> 
> No, it simply asserts the problem follows from some axioms.

That is right, but the problem is solved constructively, so we can test the 
solution. And indeed, thanks to QM-without-collapse, we can say that Mechanism 
is vindicated by Nature.

Also, the axioms belongs to all theories rich enough to be Turing universal, 
which is already the case for the ultra-finitist presentation of arithmetic. 
(Nelson’s ultrafinitism starts from Robinson Arithmetic).

The physicalist solution seems to be obliged to put the first person, qualia, 
consciousness, under the rug, as it just cannot work without postulating a 
non-mechanist theory of mind, which still do not exist, unless speculation that 
gravity is consciousness and responsible for some wave packet reduction 
(Penrose).

Once you grasp that all computations are realised when we accept simple truth 
like the existence or inexsitence  of the solution of polynomial Diophantine 
equations, there is no more experimental evidence that a physical universe 
exists in any ontological sense, and doubly so, when the many-worlds aspect of 
nature confirms so well the many computations which provably are realised in a 
very tiny part of the arithmetical reality. 

The physicalist can still be right, so let us pursue the testing.That’s all. To 
make an ontological commitment at the start, is just non serious theology.

Bruno



> 
> Brent
> 
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