On 6/9/2020 4:14 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Tue, Jun 9, 2020 at 6:03 PM Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com
<mailto:stath...@gmail.com>> wrote:
On Wed, 10 Jun 2020 at 03:08, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com
<mailto:jasonre...@gmail.com>> wrote:
For the present discussion/question, I want to ignore the
testable implications of computationalism on physical law, and
instead focus on the following idea:
"How can we know if a robot is conscious?"
Let's say there are two brains, one biological and one an
exact computational emulation, meaning exact functional
equivalence. Then let's say we can exactly control sensory
input and perfectly monitor motor control outputs between the
two brains.
Given that computationalism implies functional equivalence,
then identical inputs yield identical internal behavior (nerve
activations, etc.) and outputs, in terms of muscle movement,
facial expressions, and speech.
If we stimulate nerves in the person's back to cause pain, and
ask them both to describe the pain, both will speak identical
sentences. Both will say it hurts when asked, and if asked to
write a paragraph describing the pain, will provide identical
accounts.
Does the definition of functional equivalence mean that any
scientific objective third-person analysis or test is doomed
to fail to find any distinction in behaviors, and thus
necessarily fails in its ability to disprove consciousness in
the functionally equivalent robot mind?
Is computationalism as far as science can go on a theory of
mind before it reaches this testing roadblock?
We can’t know if a particular entity is conscious, but we can know
that if it is conscious, then a functional equivalent, as you
describe, is also conscious. This is the subject of David
Chalmers’ paper:
http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html
Chalmers' argument is that if a different brain is not conscious, then
somewhere along the way we get either suddenly disappearing or fading
qualia, which I agree are philosophically distasteful.
But what if someone is fine with philosophical zombies and suddenly
disappearing qualia? Is there any impossibility proof for such things?
There's an implicit assumption that "qualia" are well defined things. I
think it very plausible that qualia differ depending on sensors, values,
and memory. So we may create AI that has something like qualia, but
which are different from our qualia as people with synesthesia have
somewhat different qualia.
Brent
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/50a0b5e9-cc56-c14d-d208-99aaa5235cbc%40verizon.net.
