Your response presents strong points but contains some redundancies and overlapping arguments. Here's a revised version with greater focus, while maintaining the original’s precision and accuracy: ------------------------------
Bruce, let’s directly address the epistemic interpretation of the wavefunction. While this view neatly avoids ontological commitments and sidesteps issues like FTL action, it doesn’t fully account for experimentally observed phenomena such as violations of Bell’s inequalities. These correlations are not just statistical artifacts of knowledge updates; they point to an underlying structure that resists dismissal as mere epistemic bookkeeping. The wavefunction’s role in consistently modeling entanglement and its statistical implications suggests questioning the existence of a deeper reality, challenging the sufficiency of an epistemic-only framework. Your dismissal of the many-worlds interpretation (MWI) as "otiose" seems to rest on the assumption that collapse problems vanish within an epistemic interpretation. However, this presumes that the wavefunction need not be universal, a presumption computationalism challenges by treating the wavefunction as a measure over all computations. These computations are integral to the self-referential experiences of observers supported by them. MWI coherently explains quantum phenomena without relying on ad hoc collapse mechanisms, aligning seamlessly with observation and the mathematical structure of quantum theory. While you assert that "science trumps speculative philosophy," computationalism reframes this dichotomy. The scientific method remains central but is contextualized as a study of observable phenomena emerging from the constraints of self-referentially correct systems. Computationalism is firmly grounded in formal structures such as arithmetic, computer science, mathematical self-reference, and modal logics, all of which have demonstrable explanatory power in areas like quantum mechanics with lots of open problems. Everett’s MWI aligns naturally with these foundations, dispensing with external collapse mechanisms and treating the universal wavefunction as the generator of first-person phenomenological experiences. Solomonoff-Levi induction, while dismissed by some as speculative, provides a rigorous framework for algorithmic modeling of phenomena. Extending this into computational metaphysics reveals reality as fundamentally mathematical, with physicality arising as a projection supported by universal computation. Ignoring this recursive and hierarchical view of knowledge—where phenomenological "worlds" emerge from simpler computational interactions—has potential to limit our grasp of the conjunction between physics and consciousness. At least, that’s how it seems to me. Critiques suggesting that computationalism or MWI are disconnected from quantum mechanics misrepresent their relevance. Computationalism doesn’t dismiss quantum mechanics; it reinterprets it as a statistical and phenomenological consequence of universal computation. The many-worlds framework naturally incorporates first-person indeterminacy and avoids introducing unexplained collapse phenomena. By adhering to mathematical completeness and Occam’s razor, MWI addresses the same quantum phenomena while offering a broader explanatory scope. While physicalism and phenomenology contribute valuable insights, they often fail to account for the structures underpinning experience. Now, regarding your can of beans: it’s undeniably nutritious, and its taste surely arises from... well, something. Skipping over such questions feels like an oddly flavorless game. The divide between science and metaphysics, much like the divide between bland food and flavorful cuisine, could be artificial. Computationalism bridges this gap by situating observable physicality upon a logically consistent, mathematical foundation that respects both third-person objectivity and first-person experiential realities. If you prefer your meals devoid of taste, no one will stop you—but to others, it’s hardly an inspiring feast. For example, how would we ever explain why the cheap can imparts the same metallic tang in all those Everett branches and why fresha could be betta in the meta? Maybe the real mystery here is why we keep coming back to the same beans—and not a single collapse has spilled them yet. Just a matter of taste. On Monday, November 18, 2024 at 2:39:40 AM UTC+1 Bruce Kellett wrote: > On Mon, Nov 18, 2024 at 12:16 PM Russell Standish <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> On Mon, Nov 18, 2024 at 11:48:28AM +1100, Bruce Kellett wrote: >> > On Mon, Nov 18, 2024 at 11:35 AM Russell Standish < >> [email protected]> >> > wrote: >> > >> > On Mon, Nov 18, 2024 at 11:14:16AM +1100, Bruce Kellett wrote: >> > > >> > > But there are no branches to be "equally real". You are fond of >> calling >> > sound >> > > arguments "non sequitur". >> > >> > If the arguments were sound, I would not call them non-sequitur. >> There >> > is the possibility I missed something you consider obvious, but in >> > that case, I just ask you to dig deeper to join the dots. >> > >> > >> > The epistemic interpretation says that the wave function is merely a >> summary of >> > our knowledge of the physical situation. And it gives the probabilities >> for >> > various future outcomes. There are no "branches", so there is nothing >> to be >> > "equally real". >> > >> >> There is observational evidence for at least one branch. To say an >> epistemic interpretion implies there are no branches is a >> misinterpretation of epistemic interpretation, if not a complete >> strawman. >> > > Possibly the trouble here is that your argument really has nothing to do > with quantum mechanics. So arguments about interpretations of quantum > mechanics, and the difference between Everett and the epistemic > interpretation, are beside the point as far as you are concerned. > > > > Your claim that all branches are equally real is >> > > indeed a non sequitur, in that it does not follow from anything >> at all. >> > >> > Indeed. As is that there is only a single reality. But one is >> simpler than >> > the other. A lot of people get Occam's razor wrong here. >> > >> > >> > There is only one reality, and a set of probabilities for future >> outcomes. The >> > simplest solution is that the so-called "other worlds" do not exist. >> They are >> > just a figment of your imagination. I know that your starting point is >> that >> > "everything exists" is simpler than any other proposition. But if you >> do not >> > start from there, you can see that this position is indeed otiose. >> > >> >> But I do start from there. Because it is a consequence of Solomonoff-Levi >> induction, sometimes known as Occam's razor theorem. >> > > Any so-called theorem depends on its assumptions. And Solomonoff induction > may not amount to a hill of beans. > > I know that your position stems from many years of discussions on the > "everything" list, but I have never bought into the idea that everything is > simpler than the scientific approach based on the phenomenology of the > world around us. Science trumps speculative philosophy every time, and this > thread started as a discussion of interpretations of quantum mechanics. So > arguments from quantum mechanics are relevant, and not "non sequiturs" as > you so frequently claim. > > Bruce > > In order to get to your "There is only one reality", you _have_ to add >> a mysterious something, call it what you will. My assertion is that >> that "something" is probably a figment of imagination. Nobody in 20 >> odd years of arguing about this has been able to point their finger at >> anything that will do the job. The closest I've seen is an appeal to >> Goedel incompleteness, that (if believed) would privilege the integers >> as something more real than anything else, but that seems to lead to >> an even deeper multiverse than the MWI. >> > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/13de80c3-82ed-41e5-91c8-2bb9c174451dn%40googlegroups.com.
