On Mon, Feb 10, 2025 at 10:52 AM Russell Standish <[email protected]>
wrote:

> On Mon, Feb 10, 2025 at 10:06:12AM +1100, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> > On Mon, Feb 10, 2025 at 9:51 AM Russell Standish <[email protected]>
> wrote:
> >
> >     On Mon, Feb 10, 2025 at 09:25:57AM +1100, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> >     > On Mon, Feb 10, 2025 at 8:49 AM Russell Standish <
> [email protected]>
> >     wrote:
> >     >
> >     >     On Thu, Feb 06, 2025 at 11:38:52AM +1100, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> >     >     >
> >     >     > Many worlds theory does not have any comparable way of
> relating  probabilities
> >     >     > to the properties of the wave function. In fact, if all
> possibilities are
> >     >     > realized on every trial, the majority of observers will get
> results that
> >     >     > contradict the Born probabilities.
> >     >     >
> >     >
> >     >     I'm not sure what you mean by "contradict", but the majority of
> >     >     observers will get results that lie within one standard
> deviation of
> >     >     the expected value (ie mean) according to the distribution of
> Born
> >     >     probabilities. If this is what you mean by "contradict", then
> you are
> >     >     trivially correct, but uninteresting. If you mean the above
> statement
> >     >     is false according to the MWI, then I'd like to know why. It
> sure
> >     >     doesn't seem so to me.
> >     >
> >     >
> >     > It does depend on what value you take for N, the number of trials.
> In the  limit
> >     > of very large N, the law of large numbers does give the result you
> suggest. But
> >     > for intermediate values of N, MWI says that there will always be
> branches for
> >     > which the ratio of successes to N falls outside any reasonable
> error bound on
> >     > the expected Born value.
> >     >
> >     > This problem has been noted by others, and when asked about it,
> Carroll simply
> >     > dismissed the poor suckers that get results that invalidate the
> Born Rule as
> >     > just poor unlucky suckers. Sure, in a single world system, there
> is always a
> >     > small probability that you will get anomalous results. But that is
> always  a
> >     > small probability. Whereas, in MWI, there are always such branches
> with
> >     > anomalous results, even for large N. The difference is important.
> >     >
> >
> >     Yes, but the proportion of "poor unlucky suckers" in the set of all
> >     observers becomes vanishingly small as the number of observers tend
> to
> >     infinity.
> >
> >
> > The number of trials does not have to tend to infinity. That is just the
> > frequentist mistake.
> >
>
> I wasn't talking about the number of trials, but the number of
> observers. That is either astronomically large or an actual infinity.
>

There are only ever 2^N branches under consideration, so only ever 2^N
observers.
Additional branches due to decoherence can be disregarded for these
purposes since
all such observers only duplicate some that have already been counted.

>     As JC says, we don't know if the number of observers is countably
> >     infinite (which would be my guess), uncountably infinite or just
> plain
> >     astronomically large. In any case, the proportion of observers seeing
> >     results outside of one standard deviation is of measure zero for
> >     practical purposes. If that is not the case, please explain.
> >
> >
> > The number of anomalous results in MWI is not of measure zero in any
> realistic
> > case.
> >
>
> I'm trying to see why you say that.
>

Read Kent.

>     > The other point is that the set of branches obtained in Everettian
> many  worlds
> >     > is independent of the amplitudes, or the Born probabilities for
> each outcome,
> >     > so observations on any one branch cannot be used as evidence,
> either for  or
> >     > against the theory.
> >     >
> >
> >     We've had this discussion before. They're not independent, because
> the
> >     preparation of the experiment that defines the Born probabilities
> >     filters the set of allowed branches from which we sample the
> >     measurements.
> >
> >
> > I don't know what this means.
> >
>
> In preparing the experiment, you are already filtering out the
> observers who choose to observe something different. And that
> definitely changes the set of worlds, or branches under
> consideration. So you cannot say (as you did) "the set of branches
> obtained in Everettian many worlds is independent of the
> amplitudes". Whether the set of branches changes in precisely the way
> to recover the Born rule is a different question, of course, and
> obviously rather hard to prove.
>

There is no such selective state preparation. Nobody gets filtered out in
this way. You are just making things up.


>     > See the articles by Adrian Kent and David Albert in "Many Worlds:
> Everett,
> >     > Quantum Theory, and Reality"(OUP, 2010) Edited by Saunders,
> Barrett,  Kent, and
> >     > Wallace.
> >     >
> >
> >     I've already got a copy of Kent's paper in my reading stack.
> Albert's paper
> >     appears to be behind a paywall, alas :(.
> >
> >     In any case, it'll be a while before I get to the paper - just
> >     wondering if you had a 2 minute explanation of the argument. What
> I've
> >     heard so far on this list hasn't been particularly convincing.
> >
> >
> > A quote from Kent (p. 326 of the book)
> > " After N trials, the multiverse contains 2^N branches, corresponding to
> all N
> > possible binary string outcomes. The inhabitants on a string with pN
> zero and
> > (1-p)N one outcomes will, with a degree of confidence that tends towards
> one as
> > N gets large, tend to conclude that the weight p is attached to zero
> outcomes
> > branches and weight (1-p) is attached to one outcome branches. In other
> words,
> > everyone, no matter what outcome string they see, tends towards complete
> > confidence in the belief that the relative frequencies they observe
> represent
> > the weights."
>
> That is true. And the observers observing something like an all zero
> sequence, or alternating 1s and 0s, are living in what we called a
> "wabbity universe" some years ago on this list. Those observers become
> vanishingly small as N→∞ in the space of all observers.
>
> I'm still not convinced there is a problem here...
>

We don't have to take N to infinity to get a problem. The trouble is that
since the set of branches obtained is the same for all values of p (in
Ken't's example),
and the dominant ratio of zeros to ones is 50/50 in every case as N becomes
large, it is always the case that the majority of observers get results
that disagree with the Born rule. In most cases, observers find that QM is
disconfirmed.

Bruce

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