Opinion - News Analysis     

Faith in oil growth could bring economy crashing 
   
  George Monbiot           Our future prosperity has been hardwired to rising 
use of transport fuels, without a thought for the supply drying up.            
MOTORISED TRANSPORT is a form of time travel. We mine the compressed time of 
other eras — the infinitesimal rain of plankton on the ocean floor, the 
settlement of trees in anoxic swamps — and use it to accelerate through our 
own. Every tank of fuel contains thousands of years of accretions. Our future 
depends on the expectation that the past will never be exhausted.      The 
energy white (policy) paper the U.K. Government published last week talks of 
new taxes, new markets, new research, new incentives. Anyone reading the 
chapter on transport would be forgiven for believing that the Government has 
the problem under control: as a result of its measures, we are likely to see a 
great reduction in our use of geological time.      Buried in another chapter, 
however, there is a remarkable admission: "The majority (66 per
 cent) of U.K. oil demand is derived from demand for transport fuels which is 
expected to increase modestly over the medium term." To increase? If the 
government is implementing all the exciting measures the transport chapter 
contains, how on earth could our use of fuel increase?      You won't find the 
answer in the white paper. It mysteriously forgets to mention that the 
Government intends to build another 2,500 miles of trunk roads and to double 
the capacity of our airports by 2030. Partly to permit this growth in 
transport, another white paper, also published last week, proposes a massive 
deregulation of planning law. There is no discussion in either paper of the 
implications of these programmes for energy use or climate change. There are 
plainly two governments of the U.K., one determined to reduce our consumption 
of fossil fuel, the other determined to raise it.      What happens beyond the 
medium term is anyone's guess. But it should be pretty obvious that more roads
 and more airports will mean that our rising use of transport fuel becomes 
hardwired — the future health of the economy will depend on it. So the 
government must have examined this question. If our economic lives depend on 
continued growth in the consumption of transport fuels, it must first have 
determined that such growth is possible. Mustn't it?      Last week I phoned 
four of the government departments concerned in the hope of finding this 
assessment. But it does not exist. The white paper and the civil servants I 
spoke to referred me to a book published by the International Energy Agency, 
set up by the Organisation fro Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
after the 1974 oil crisis. This in itself is odd. On every other issue that 
might affect the U.K.'s security or economic growth, the Government conducts 
its own assessments. But in this case it relies exclusively on one external 
source. This reliance seems even odder when you read the IEA's book and discover
 that it's as polemical as my columns.      Before it presents any evidence, 
the book dismisses people who have questioned future oil supplies as 
"doomsayers." It announces that it has "long maintained that none of this [the 
possibility that oil supplies might be reaching a peak] is a cause for 
concern." Though it expects the global demand for oil to rise by 70 per cent 
between now and 2030, and though it anticipates that output from the world's 
existing oilfields will decline by about 5 per cent a year, it is confident 
that new supplies will make up the difference.      It bases this assessment on 
the finding that "the level of remaining reserves of oil has been remarkably 
constant historically, in spite of the volumes extracted each successive year." 
As the IEA must know as well as anyone else, this is partly because the level 
has been forged by members of the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC), the oil producers' cartel. The quota assigned to a
 member of OPEC reflects the size of its reserves. All members have a powerful 
interest in exaggerating their reserves in order to boost their quotas. The IEA 
admits in another report that Saudi Arabia has posted a constant level of 
reserves (260 billion barrels) over the past 15 years, despite the fact that it 
has produced over 100 billion barrels in the same period. Where has the magic 
oil come from?      But it is the OPEC on which the IEA's optimism relies. The 
growth in global demand will be met, it says, by a 150 per cent increase in oil 
production from the Middle East by 2030. What if this oil doesn't materialise? 
It is a question the IEA raises then rapidly drops. "Because of the 
uncertainties over the respective amounts of resources and reserves, it is 
difficult to predict the moment of peak oil, when production might be expected 
to start to decline. Estimates range from today to 2050 or beyond." Isn't that 
reassuring?      Peak oil is not like climate change.
 There is no consensus among scientists about when it is likely to happen. I 
cannot state with confidence that the IEA's assessment is wrong. But a report 
published in February by the U.S. Department of Energy shows how dangerous it 
is to rely on a single source. "Almost all forecasts are based on differing, 
often dramatically differing geological assumptions ... Because of the large 
uncertainties, it is difficult to define an overriding geological basis for 
accepting or rejecting any of the forecasts."      The report then publishes a 
long list of estimates by senior figures in and around the oil industry of a 
possible date for peak oil.      They vary greatly, but many are clustered 
between 2010 and 2020. Another report, also commissioned by the U.S. Department 
of Energy, shows that "without timely mitigation, the economic, social, and 
political costs will be unprecedented." The disasters invoked by the peaking of 
global oil supplies can be avoided only with a "crash
 programme" beginning 20 years before it occurs.      Non-conventional oil      
  The IEA believes that this crisis will be averted by opening new fields and 
using non-conventional oil. But these cause environmental disasters of their 
own. Around half the new discoveries the agency expects during the next 25 
years will take place in the Arctic or in the very deep sea, between 2,000 and 
4,000 metres. In either case, a major oil spill, in such slow and fragile 
ecosystems, would be catastrophic. Mining non-conventional oil, such as the tar 
sands in Canada, produces far more carbon dioxide than drilling for ordinary 
petroleum. It also uses and pollutes great volumes of fresh water and wrecks 
thousands of acres of pristine land. "In the long-term future," the IEA says, 
"non-conventional, heavy oils may well become the norm rather than the 
exception." If our future growth relies on these resources, we commit ourselves 
to ever-growing environmental impacts.      We don't need to
 invoke peak oil to produce an argument for cutting our use of transport fuel. 
But you might have imagined that the government would have shown just a little 
curiosity about whether or not its transport programme will bring the economy 
crashing down.      - Guardian Newspapers Limited 2007
   

       
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