It's probably not a bad thing provided that robust checks and balances exist as well as adequate oversight. Furthermore, it's substantially better than a more "blanket" solution like key escrow, where the gov't holds the keys to all legally available encryption.
- Garrett ----- Original Message ----- From: "Ali, Saqib" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: <[email protected]> Sent: Wednesday, October 03, 2007 11:01 AM Subject: Re: [FDE] FDE Digest, Vol 13, Issue 2 > But is granting this power to law enforcement really that bad? > Especially in the light of the recent Duncan III case [1]? Duncan is > a sex offender, pedophile and a murderer who encrypted all the > information about his victims on his laptop. If the US had similar > laws in place, Duncan could have be forced to hand over the decryption > keys back in 2005. And this would have brought some closure to > families of his victims. > > 1) http://crime.about.com/b/a/257572.htm > > saqib > > > On 10/2/07, Albert <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >> List >> >> with reservations: I A N A L ! >> >> The country which invented the "right to silence" in 1898 has been >> curtailing it for some time - a few references below. >> >> Whether this law falls under the competence and thus can be challenged as >> an >> infringement of the basic legal rights of citizens at the "supreme court" >> of >> the EU - the European court of justice - and/or whether UK courts will >> uphold or reverse it remains to be seen. >> >> Albert >> some references: >> >> Cape, Ed., The Right To Silence : New Developments In England And Wales , >> The 12th >> Commonwealth Law Conference papers, Kuala Lumpur. >> >> www.afp.gov.au/about/publications/platypus_magazine/march_2000/silence.html >> >> The Eleventh Report, supra N.19. See O'reilly, G. W., "Criminal Law: >> England >> Limits The >> Right To Silence And Moves Towards An Inquisitorial System Of Justice" >> [1994] 85 Journal of >> Criminal Law & Criminology 402 >> >> http://mpk.rmp.gov.my/jurnal/2004b/righttosilence.pdf >> >> "EFFECT OF THE CURTAILMENT >> Crime statistics in UK showed that the new provisions curtailing the >> right >> to >> silence have not produced any discernable increase in charges and >> convictions of criminals.Singapore's figures also suggested that the >> amendments per se have not been perceived by potential offenders as >> sufficiently increasing their risk of detection to deter them from crime. >> There >> was no visible decrease in the crime rate after the amendments were >> introduced in 1977. Generally, the new provisions have also not >> significantly changed the way accused persons respond to police >> questioning. Vast majority of suspects when given the right to remain >> silent >> did not exercise that right when questioned by the police. >> >> However Buckle et al. (2000) reported that the provisions have had >> a marked positive impact on the efficiencies of the investigation and >> prosecution process. As a result of greater openness between police and >> legal advisers about the evidence, police questioning has become more >> productive. Suspects in turn have provided greater scope for the >> investigation of accounts following their disclosures of defence. And >> where >> silence augmented the other available evidence, prosecutors were >> rewarded with greater certainty of convictions. While the overall rate of >> conviction has not increased, the hope was that the provisions would make >> it easier to secure "appropriate" convictions and the conviction of >> professional criminals" >> >> 2007/10/2, [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: >> > Send FDE mailing list submissions to >> > [email protected] >> > >> > To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit >> > http://www.xml-dev.com/mailman/listinfo/fde >> > or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to >> > [EMAIL PROTECTED] >> > >> > You can reach the person managing the list at >> > [EMAIL PROTECTED] >> > >> > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific >> > than "Re: Contents of FDE digest..." >> > >> > >> > Today's Topics: >> > >> > 1. Re: Contested UK encryption disclosure law takes effect >> > (John Washburn) >> > 2. Re: Tor is an Anonymizer NOT a VPN (Dave Jevans) >> > >> > >> > >> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- >> > >> > Message: 1 >> > Date: Mon, 1 Oct 2007 17:00:06 -0500 >> > From: "John Washburn" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> >> > Subject: Re: [FDE] Contested UK encryption disclosure law takes effect >> > To: <[email protected]> >> > Message-ID: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> >> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" >> > >> > Would this be prevented in the USA because of the fourth and fifth >> > amendments of the current US Constitution? >> > >> > My theory (untested in the courts) is that providing decryption keys >> > would >> > be providing testimony. This is because the government is asking you >> > to >> say >> > something, write something, or otherwise communicate information to the >> > investigators. Forcing testimony you consider self-incriminating is >> > prohibited by the fifth amendment. >> > >> > The analogy is my shed in the back yard which is locked by a >> > combination >> > lock and the police have presented me with a valid, judge-signed search >> > warrant. I am under no obligation to unlock the shed nor can I be >> compelled >> > to recite the lock combination. If the police want to search fine, >> > they >> can >> > get out the bolt cutters and search the shed named in the warrant. >> > >> > This is analogous to when the search warrant calls for the seizure of >> > my >> > hard disk and the data therein. I am under no obligation to decrypt >> > the >> > data nor am I under any obligation to recite the description key. Let >> > the >> > police use the access technology and programs (electronic version of >> > bolt >> > cutters) on the market to access the hard disk named in the warrant. >> > >> > But, as I said earlier this theory is untested by the 9 demi-gods in >> > black >> > dresses, so relying on the protection that their interpretation of the >> fifth >> > amendment is substantially similar to mine is a dicey proposition at >> > best. >> > >> > BTW, did you notice in the article that Blackberry seems to be the only >> > internet PDA device which routinely encrypts your email traffic while >> > the >> > message is en route? Does the section 49 directives only target >> Blackberry >> > because the other PDA software (e.g. iPhone, eMailMan, etc.) send your >> email >> > traffic in the clear so all the police need to do is go to your ISP for >> the >> > emails of interest? >> > >> > -----Original Message----- >> > From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] >> > On >> > Behalf Of Saqib Ali >> > Sent: Monday, October 01, 2007 12:58 PM >> > To: [email protected] >> > Subject: [FDE] Contested UK encryption disclosure law takes effect >> > >> > British law enforcement gained new powers on Monday to compel >> > individuals >> > and businesses to decrypt data wanted by authorities for >> > investigations. >> > ...... >> > Failure to comply could mean a prison sentence of up to two years for >> cases >> > not involving national security or five years for those that do. >> > >> > Read the entire story at: >> > >> http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/10/01/AR2007100100 >> > 511.html >> > _______________________________________________ >> > FDE mailing list >> > [email protected] >> > http://www.xml-dev.com/mailman/listinfo/fde >> > >> > >> > >> > ------------------------------ >> > >> > Message: 2 >> > Date: Mon, 1 Oct 2007 14:52:26 -0700 >> > From: Dave Jevans < [EMAIL PROTECTED]> >> > Subject: Re: [FDE] Tor is an Anonymizer NOT a VPN >> > To: Patrick Cahalan <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, [email protected] >> > Message-ID: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> >> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed" >> > >> > Exit-node authentication would be needed to keep the rabble out of >> > your network! :-) >> > >> > At 11:03 AM -0700 9/25/07, Patrick Cahalan wrote: >> > >>Theoretically you could create an end-to-end encrypted tunnel using >> > >>tor by running an exit node inside your network and selecting your >> > >>exit node to be that node. >> > > >> > >And thus no longer be anonymous... and let random other Tor users exit >> > >traffic inside your network? >> > > >> > >I guess you could theoretically do this, but by gum I can't imagine >> > >why >> > >you would want to :) > _______________________________________________ > FDE mailing list > [email protected] > http://www.xml-dev.com/mailman/listinfo/fde > _______________________________________________ FDE mailing list [email protected] http://www.xml-dev.com/mailman/listinfo/fde
