It should be noted that a "Root of Trust for Measurement" (RTM), as
defined in the TCG's TPM specs, in conjunction with the Platform
Configuration Registers (PCRs) of a TPM, can be used to mitigate the
threat of booting an alternate OS from a different boot device such as a
USB stick. If configured, the process measures the system BIOS, master
boot record (MBR), OS Loader, etc. to make sure that nothing has changed,
and halts the boot process if anything has changed.
As Dmitry indicated, booting up an alternate OS using a different boot
device is something that the actual SED can't protect against... no more
than it can protect against a virus infection in the OS. You need a
separate, complementing solution like the ones Dmitry mentioned or the
TPM/RTM. The SED is a very important piece of an overall security
solution, but on its own doesn't make your system 100% secure. You'll
still need your firewall, virus scanner, and even a way to ensure
alternate operating systems can't be loaded (if that's a concern in your
threat model).
Best regards,
Darren Lasko
Principal Engineer
Advanced Development Group, Storage Products
Fujitsu Computer Products of America
Dmitry Obukhov <[email protected]>
Sent by: [email protected]
07/15/2009 02:53 PM
Please respond to
[email protected]
To
[email protected]
cc
Subject
Re: [FDE] Q concerning hardware-based encryption/security
Hi Garrett,
The described attack is not in the SED threat model. As Lark said, we are
focusing on data-at-rest. Basically, you described hi-jack attack, when
powered-on computer is stolen. You will need one more element in the
system, proximity sensor, to mitigate this attack. There are plenty of
sensors on the market:
For example:
http://www.officedepot.com/a/products/823445/Tripp-Lite-Wireless-USB-Proximity-Lock/?cm_mmc=Mercent-_-Google-_-Security_Tools_and_Cleaning-_-823445&mr:trackingCode=0DD648A0-CD65-DE11-B7F3-0019B9C043EB&mr:referralID=NA
If you have built-in Bluetooth, you can use software solution like this
one: http://www.bluetoothpassport.com/
or even freeware open source:
http://members.lycos.co.uk/wuul/bluelock/readme.html
You may need to change sensor software configuration to hibernate instead
of sleep or starting screensaver. In combination with hardware disk
encryption it will give you good protection against hijack and even
against followed cold boot attack on hi-jacked machine.
Dmitry
From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] On
Behalf Of Garrett M. Groff
Sent: Wednesday, July 08, 2009 11:30 AM
To: [email protected]
Subject: Re: [FDE] Q concerning hardware-based encryption/security
Thanks for the info, Lark.
So the attack vector is reduced to:
1. the machine is on* (like if the user locks his screen & walks away for
a moment), and then
2. someone steals the laptop (leaving it on), and then
3. restarts the machine using a boot disc or bootable USB stick.
Begging the question: Are there ways of mitigating that avenue of attack
beyond just changing the boot sequence in the BIOS & password-protecting
the BIOS setup?
* I understand many other vulnerabilities exist on running operating
systems, such as buffer overflow attacks on system services via the
network, but I find that avenue of attack less likely than simply using a
boot disc (as described above), esp as self-encrypting drives become more
widespread.
----- Original Message -----
From: Lark Allen
To: [email protected]
Sent: Wednesday, July 08, 2009 11:42 AM
Subject: Re: [FDE] Q concerning hardware-based encryption/security
Garrett,
The alternate boot threat you describe cannot be executed against the
Seagate Momentus FDE drives. Whenever power is removed from the drive,
either at full system shutdown, or when the system goes into hibernation,
the drive locks and all user data, including the hibernation file is
encrypted and unavailable. When the system is powered up the FDE drive is
locked. If an alternate system is booted, the drive will only appear to
have a 128MB available, which is the protected read-only partition on the
drive which stores the shadow master boot record which is used to provide
the pre-boot authentication for unlocking the drive by an authorized user.
Once the drive is unlocked, then the normal boot process or return from
hibernation will execute. There is no possibility for alternate boot
scenarios which will be able to find the drive in an unlocked state.
The Wave Embassy software you mentioned for managing the setup and
security settings for the Seagate FDE drive, forces Windows to use
hibernate mode, even if standby mode is selected by the user. In Dell
systems, Seagate, Wave, and Dell worked together to create a solution for
secure standby mode, so for Dell systems both hibernate and standby modes
are supported with full security.
Lark Allen
Wave Systems Corp.
From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] On
Behalf Of Garrett M. Groff
Sent: Monday, July 06, 2009 11:23 AM
To: [email protected]
Subject: [FDE] Q concerning hardware-based encryption/security
I have a concern about self-encrypting drives, specifically Seagate
Momentus FDE. While the idea looks quite brilliant, my understanding is
that the user is only prompted for credentials when booting from a cold
machine (one that has been shut down completely). If that's correct, then
that presents the following vector of attack:
Bad Guy catches machine in standby (or hibernate?) mode. Bad Guy wakes
machine & then restarts it, booting to a USB stick (or CD) rather than the
HDD. Since HDD is already authenticated, Bad Guy mounts file system &
reads (or writes!) data directly off of HDD.
Can someone provide technical information that confirms or denies this
potential attack vector? I'm specifically looking at Seagate's Momentus
FDE drive w/ Wave's Embassy Suite, though other vendors would logically
suffer the same vulnerability.
Thanks.
_______________________________________________
FDE mailing list
[email protected]
http://www.xml-dev.com/mailman/listinfo/fde
_______________________________________________
FDE mailing list
[email protected]
http://www.xml-dev.com/mailman/listinfo/fde
----- Original Message -----
From: Lark Allen
To: [email protected]
Sent: Wednesday, July 08, 2009 11:42 AM
Subject: Re: [FDE] Q concerning hardware-based encryption/security
Garrett,
The alternate boot threat you describe cannot be executed against the
Seagate Momentus FDE drives. Whenever power is removed from the drive,
either at full system shutdown, or when the system goes into hibernation,
the drive locks and all user data, including the hibernation file is
encrypted and unavailable. When the system is powered up the FDE drive is
locked. If an alternate system is booted, the drive will only appear to
have a 128MB available, which is the protected read-only partition on the
drive which stores the shadow master boot record which is used to provide
the pre-boot authentication for unlocking the drive by an authorized user.
Once the drive is unlocked, then the normal boot process or return from
hibernation will execute. There is no possibility for alternate boot
scenarios which will be able to find the drive in an unlocked state.
The Wave Embassy software you mentioned for managing the setup and
security settings for the Seagate FDE drive, forces Windows to use
hibernate mode, even if standby mode is selected by the user. In Dell
systems, Seagate, Wave, and Dell worked together to create a solution for
secure standby mode, so for Dell systems both hibernate and standby modes
are supported with full security.
Lark Allen
Wave Systems Corp.
From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] On
Behalf Of Garrett M. Groff
Sent: Monday, July 06, 2009 11:23 AM
To: [email protected]
Subject: [FDE] Q concerning hardware-based encryption/security
I have a concern about self-encrypting drives, specifically Seagate
Momentus FDE. While the idea looks quite brilliant, my understanding is
that the user is only prompted for credentials when booting from a cold
machine (one that has been shut down completely). If that's correct, then
that presents the following vector of attack:
Bad Guy catches machine in standby (or hibernate?) mode. Bad Guy wakes
machine & then restarts it, booting to a USB stick (or CD) rather than the
HDD. Since HDD is already authenticated, Bad Guy mounts file system &
reads (or writes!) data directly off of HDD.
Can someone provide technical information that confirms or denies this
potential attack vector? I'm specifically looking at Seagate's Momentus
FDE drive w/ Wave's Embassy Suite, though other vendors would logically
suffer the same vulnerability.
Thanks.
_______________________________________________
FDE mailing list
[email protected]
http://www.xml-dev.com/mailman/listinfo/fde
----- Original Message -----
From: Lark Allen
To: [email protected]
Sent: Wednesday, July 08, 2009 11:42 AM
Subject: Re: [FDE] Q concerning hardware-based encryption/security
Garrett,
The alternate boot threat you describe cannot be executed against the
Seagate Momentus FDE drives. Whenever power is removed from the drive,
either at full system shutdown, or when the system goes into hibernation,
the drive locks and all user data, including the hibernation file is
encrypted and unavailable. When the system is powered up the FDE drive is
locked. If an alternate system is booted, the drive will only appear to
have a 128MB available, which is the protected read-only partition on the
drive which stores the shadow master boot record which is used to provide
the pre-boot authentication for unlocking the drive by an authorized user.
Once the drive is unlocked, then the normal boot process or return from
hibernation will execute. There is no possibility for alternate boot
scenarios which will be able to find the drive in an unlocked state.
The Wave Embassy software you mentioned for managing the setup and
security settings for the Seagate FDE drive, forces Windows to use
hibernate mode, even if standby mode is selected by the user. In Dell
systems, Seagate, Wave, and Dell worked together to create a solution for
secure standby mode, so for Dell systems both hibernate and standby modes
are supported with full security.
Lark Allen
Wave Systems Corp.
From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] On
Behalf Of Garrett M. Groff
Sent: Monday, July 06, 2009 11:23 AM
To: [email protected]
Subject: [FDE] Q concerning hardware-based encryption/security
I have a concern about self-encrypting drives, specifically Seagate
Momentus FDE. While the idea looks quite brilliant, my understanding is
that the user is only prompted for credentials when booting from a cold
machine (one that has been shut down completely). If that's correct, then
that presents the following vector of attack:
Bad Guy catches machine in standby (or hibernate?) mode. Bad Guy wakes
machine & then restarts it, booting to a USB stick (or CD) rather than the
HDD. Since HDD is already authenticated, Bad Guy mounts file system &
reads (or writes!) data directly off of HDD.
Can someone provide technical information that confirms or denies this
potential attack vector? I'm specifically looking at Seagate's Momentus
FDE drive w/ Wave's Embassy Suite, though other vendors would logically
suffer the same vulnerability.
Thanks.
_______________________________________________
FDE mailing list
[email protected]
http://www.xml-dev.com/mailman/listinfo/fde
_______________________________________________
FDE mailing list
[email protected]
http://www.xml-dev.com/mailman/listinfo/fde
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