On Mon, 15 Nov 1999 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> If the netowkr architecture was done correctly and the underlying
> operating system was hardened to only allow that particular application's
> protocol to be the only service enabled then it would be very hard to
> actually get in.. Marcus's assumption is that every firewall admin or
> firewall admin wannabe misconfigures their firewall on a general basis.
Your assumptions don't hold true for ActiveX-enabled Web browsers on
Windows9x, lusers executing greeting cards, Excel/Word macro viruses,
e-mail viruses... Marcus' statement holds true for that set of things as
well as externally originated traffic.
> So I would take his statement with a grain of salt and state that if a
> security network architecture is setup securely and applications that
> possible are vulnerable are placed strategically things will not get
> broken into as fast as he claims..
The point that the firewall's protection mechanism is based on what's
blocked, not what's passed is still valid. Incomming traffic doesn't
have to be externally initiated, it can be DNS, HTTP, SMTP...
Paul
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Paul D. Robertson "My statements in this message are personal opinions
[EMAIL PROTECTED] which may have no basis whatsoever in fact."
PSB#9280
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