2000-03-29-17:31:18 [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
> He wants to upgrade the external systems (one ftp and three http)
> and use a storage-area network (SAN) for the data storage. My
> instincts say this is way too complex for the external systems. I
> also don't like the idea of one 'owned' system gaining access to
> the other three systems data.
My instinct would be to guess that the SAN itself isn't gonna offer
helpful isolation security; SAN folk are so grateful they've managed
to make the things work at all, they haven't started thinking about
security yet:-).
But that's not necessarily a desperate problem. All you're talking
about doing is wiring an application server on a private net
behind the front-line servers, and people do that all the time
with open protocols. As long as all the front-line servers are
firewall-grade hardened, it isn't too awful.
It in principle means that compromise of any one front-line server
may make the rest a bit more vulnerable, but SANs are sufficiently
arcane that even if one of them is compromised, there's a good
chance the intruder wouldn't even notice the SAN, or if they did
wouldn't fgigure out how to override its configuration. Using
weirdo proprietary protocols does buy a modicum of security through
obscurity (although as always you pay a premium for such protocols
everywhere else).
-Bennett, rude critic of SANs in all applications:-)
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