But they shouldn't be scanning the system in the first place. It's
not like they were walking down the street and saw some guys wallet
sitting on the street. They have to first actively scan for the
system.
--
Kevin - [EMAIL PROTECTED]
-- Original message --
> If you want to really think about a "real-world" example of a honey pot
> as it is often configured, it would be like:
> You're a stereo shop and you set up a fake store front a few doors
> down. On your real store-front, you have bars and obvious electronic
> surveilance and lots of warning signs. On the fake store front, you
> have no signs, and you leave the door locked with a cheap lock and no
> deadbolt, but you have hidden cameras everywhere to take the person's
> picture. When they leave with stereos that are actually empty shells of
> broken equipment you didn't throw out, you go back in and lift finger
> prints to give to the police.
> Honey pots often "entice" a cracker to try and break into your system
> because it looks easy.
> Darich Runyan wrote:
>> No lawyer here either; however, there has been some case law in the US
>> that determined that corporations had the right to monitor the traffic
>> on their private networks. If the honeypot is on a corporate network,
>> then I would think that you could monitor whatever happens on it.
> --
> Michael T. Babcock (PGP: 0xBE6C1895)
> http://www.fibrespeed.net/~mbabcock/
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