What I told about the sequence number stuff was partially true

read these 3 links and you will get a bit more info about it

http://www.camtp.uni-mb.si/books/Internet-Book/TCP_ISN.html
http://www.camtp.uni-mb.si/books/Internet-Book/TCP_SEQPrediction.html
http://www.networkcomputing.com/unixworld/security/001.txt.html

So...    there is a possibility to inject fake packets on established
connections
through a firewall 1 firewall. But then it depends on the machine at the end
of the connection if it accepts 2 ISN numbers that he doesnt know of
because in each TCP connection the return or the source is a new ISN
number..

So you need to guess the new source ISN number to be able to hijack
the connection. And if you have a machine that does more random ISN
number generation it will be a bit hard to hijack a connection.

It means that the source IP address will give a new ISN each time he
sends a packet to the destination IP address. The destination will reply
the packet with its own NEW ISN in the source and as destination the
previous ISN (from the source) with +1.

So there was a little BS on my part about the ISN stuff

Regards,


Brenno

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Hiemstra, Brenno 
> Sent: vrijdag 1 februari 2002 16:59
> To:   '[EMAIL PROTECTED]'; [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Subject:      RE: Statefull failover in High Availabilty /clustering
> firewalls
> 
> Erik,
> 
> <..snip..>
>       If you have a firewall product that tracks continuous session
>       information like Sequence numbers, on a heavily loaded FW doesn't
> the
>       synchronization of the session table to the standby machine cause
>       considerable performance issues? 
> <..snip..>
> 
> First...   If you have a heavily loaded firewall its time to upgrade or
> do some bandwidth management on your network to make the firewall 
> less heavy loaded.
> 
> <..snip..>
>       That is, tracking every state of every
>       packet for 200,000 sessions and pushing it to a standby machine and
>       expecting it flawlessly transition during a failover seems a bit
>       overwhelming for a FW to handle.
> <..snip..>
> 
> Firewall 1 doesnt sync state with every packet...   You set up a tcp (or
> udp)
> connection from one point to the other. This connection (source
> ip + source port <-> destination ip + destination port) is entered 
> into the "state tabel" of firewall...   all the packets in "this"
> connection
> doesnt need to be keep stated because its already in the "state table"
> and doesnt need to be synchronised with the other member.
> 
> The firewall needs to see that there is a FIN or RST packet that ends
> the session and the session is then out of the "state table" of firewall
> 1.
> This is then also synchronised with the other cluster members.
> 
> Basically what needs to be synchronised is new established connections
> and ended synchronisations...   current synchronisations are still there
> so they dont need to be removed from the "state table".
> 
> <..snip..>
>       Also, if the HA solution does keep state, but not of the sequence
>       numbers, isn't the risk of session hijacking greater?
> <..snip..>
> 
> If a firewall keeps state on sequence numbers you can still hijack
> a connection. Most of the established connections the sequence
> number will be +1 of the previous sessions (if I have understand this
> correctly). So, in theory, you can hijack every session 
> 
> The point is when you want to hijack a starting session you need 
> to guess the beginning sequence number...   Thats why you need
> fully random sequence numbers in your OS  to prevent sequence
> numbers guessing and therefor also session hijacking
> 
> But this is what I think about it...   maybe someone can shed a light
> on the whole session hijacking and sequence numbers subject.
> 
> <..snip..>
>       Are there any FWs out there that can keep session and track Sequence
> and
>       securely transition?
> <..snip..>
> 
> As far as I know, IPFilter, PF and netfilter / iptables can handle the
> sequence number tracking. I know that Checkpoint firewall 1 doesnt
> keep state on sequence numbers. So in theory you could inject,
> on established connections, fake ACK packets with a totally different
> sequence number and have it accepted by the firewall. Of course the 
> source IP address + port and destination IP address+ port need to be 
> in the "state table" of FW1.
> 
> I hope you now know a little bit more...   Pretty interesting subject
> if you think about it....
> 
> And I hope I am not talking BS either   :o)
> 
> Regards,
> 
> 
> Brenno
> 
> 
_______________________________________________
Firewalls mailing list
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
http://lists.gnac.net/mailman/listinfo/firewalls

Reply via email to