On 24/12/2016, Karl Javorszky <karl.javors...@gmail.com> wrote: > Information and Wittgenstein > > > > We should keep the self-evident in focus and refrain from descending into a > philosophical nihilism. We are, after all, reasonable people, who are able > to use our intelligence while communicating, and usually we understand each > other quite well. The idea, that information is just a mental creation, > evades the point: conceding that information is only a mental image, then > what is that which determines, which amino acid comes to which place and is > apparently contained in the sequence of the DNA triplets? If information is > just an erroneous concept, then what is that what we receive as we ask at > the airport, which gate to go for boarding? > > No, information does exist and we do use it day by day. Shannon has > developed a method of repeatedly bifurcating a portion of N until finding > that n of N that corresponds to the same n of which the sender encoded the > search pattern for the receiver. The task lies not in negating the > existence of the phaenomenon, but in proposing a more elegant and for > biology useful explanation of the phaenomenon. The object of the game is > still the same: identifying an n of N. > > The same situation is here with gravitation. We have a name for it, can > measure it and integrate the concept - more or less seamlessly – into a > general explanation. We just do not know, in an epistemological sense, what > gravitation is. We have to take the normative power of the factual > seriously and admit that we may have problems in the naming of an observed > fact. This does not absolve us from the task of philosophers, that is, to > try to understand and find good explanations for the facts that we perceive > and to our thoughts about the perceptions and the facts. > > Adorno summarised the critique on Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, by saying, that > W. apparently had not read the job description of a philosopher carefully > enough: the task is not to investigate that what can be said exactly about > a subject that is well known to all, but the task is to chisel away the > border separating that what can be only felt and that what can be expressed > understandably. This is the envy speaking of someone who suffered an > Oedipus tragedy. Socrates said that the perpetrator of a crime suffers more > than the victim, and post-war German philosophy understandably had no time > to be interested in rules of exact speech. The grammar of the logical > language, as a subject for serious study, was swept aside by historical > cataclysms, although Wittgenstein begot Frege and Carnap who begot von > Neumann and Boole who begot Shannon and Chomsky. That he in his later life > put aside his epoch-generating work is completely in the consequence of > what he had said. It is not disowning the ladder one has built to climb up > a level of abstraction while doing a cartography of what exact talking > really means, but a wise and truthful modesty of an artist who had > fabricated a tool for a specific project. No self-respecting artist would > want to be remembered for a practical tool he had assembled for a specific > task. Roughly citing, he says so much: those who have understood what is > written here, may throw [this book] away, like one has no need for a ladder > after one has climbed a level. Having found out how the technical people > speak (or should speak), he withdraws from that field, having clarified the > rules of exact thinking, closing the subject in a conclusive fashion for > about 4 generations, and acts in later life as if precognisant of Adorno’s > words. > > Information is a connection of a symbol with a different symbol, if this > state of the world can have a background and alternatives. If something can > be otherwise, then the information is contained in the enumeration of the > cases of being otherwise. > > By the use of computers, we can now create a whole topography and > dramaturgy of exact speech. Had we the creativity of the Greeks, we would > write a comedy, performed in public, by actors and narrators. The title > could be: “All acting dutifully, striving their right place, catharsia are > inevitable”. The best youth of Sparta, Athens etc. would compete for > prominent places in diverse disciplines, but the results are not > satisfactory, as the debate emerges, which of the disciplines are above the > others. The wise people of Attica have come up with a perpetual compromise, > its main points repeatedly summarised by the chorus, ruling that being > constantly underway between both correct positions: p1 in discipline d1 and > position p2 in discipline d2, is the divine sign of a noble character. If > every athlete follows the same rule, imagine the traffic jams on the stage > of the amphitheatre! The Greeks would have built an elaborate system of > philosophy about the predictable collisions among actors representing > athletes who have attended many of the concourses. They could have come up > with specific names for typical results and would have named the > agglomerations “elements” and “isotopes” that differ among each other on > how many of the actors are glued together for lack of space to pass > through, where too many paths cross, and on the form of the squeeze they > constitute. They would no doubt have categorised and sub-classified and > tabulated the inevitable melee that comes from having competing > requirements to serve, a subject not far from their preoccupations with > logic and predictable, consistent, rule observing behaviour by all, that by > its very nature creates cooperation and conflict, destruction and growth. > > As long as the background and the alternatives to the statements, that > describe what is the case, are conceptually discouraged or disallowed, it > appears not very easy to use the term “information” in a consistent > fashion. Information describes that what is not the case. (The DNA > eliminates all the alternatives to that specific amino acid on that > specific place; we have received information by knowing all those gates > where we will not board the plane.) > > > > Thank you for this enjoyable year. > > Karl > > > > 2016-12-24 2:39 GMT+01:00 Louis H Kauffman <kauff...@uic.edu>: > >> Dear Steve, >> You write >> "But in later years he eventually recognized that the possibility of >> relating propositions in language to facts concerning the world could not >> in itself be proved. Without proof, the house of cards collapses. Once >> the >> validity of using language to describe the world ini a rigorous and >> unambiguous way is questioned, not much is left.” >> >> I do not think that the issue of proof was foremost for Wittgenstein. >> Rather, he later understood that a pure mirroring of language and world >> was >> untenable and worked directly with language and its use to show how >> complex >> was the actuality. The result is that one can still read the Tractatus >> meaningfully, knowing that it states and discusses an ideal of (formal) >> language and a view of the world so created that is necessarily limited. >> Indeed the later Wittgenstein and the Tractatus come together at the >> point >> of the Tractatus showing how meagre is that ‘that can be said’ from its >> mirrored and logical point of view. >> The Tractatus indicates its own incompleteness, and in do doing >> invalidates its use by the logical positivists as a model for the >> performance of science. It was in this background that (through Goedel) >> the >> Incompleteness Theorem arose in the midst of the Vienna Circle. And here >> we >> are in a world generated by formal computer languages, facing the >> uncertainties of models that are sensitive enough (as in economics and >> social science) to cross the boundary and affect what is to be modeled. >> Best, >> Lou Kauffman >> >> On Dec 23, 2016, at 11:27 AM, steven bindeman <bindem...@verizon.net> >> wrote: >> >> I would like to contribute to the current ongoing discussion regarding >> the >> relation between information and meaning. I agree with Dai Griffiths and >> others that the term information is a problematic construction. Since it >> is >> often used as an example of fitting the details of a specific worldly >> situation into a linguistic form that can be processed by a computer, >> this >> fact in itself introduces various distortions from the reality that is >> being represented. The degree of distortion might even be an example of >> the degree of uncertainty. >> >> I believe that reference to the early work of Wittgenstein might be of >> use >> in this context, especially since his work in his Tractatus text on >> problems related to logical atomism influenced the design of the von >> Neumann computer, led to the creation of the Vienna Circle group and >> later >> inspired the philosophical movement of logical positivism. Alan Turing >> was >> also one of his students. >> >> In this early work Wittgenstein had believed that a formal theory of >> language could be developed, capable of showing how propositions can >> succeed in representing real states of affairs and in serving the >> purposes >> of real life. He believed that language is like a picture which is laid >> against reality like a measuring rod and reaches right out to it. But in >> later years he eventually recognized that the possibility of relating >> propositions in language to facts concerning the world could not in >> itself >> be proved. Without proof, the house of cards collapses. Once the validity >> of using language to describe the world ini a rigorous and unambiguous >> way >> is questioned, not much is left. Although propositions are indeed capable >> of modeling and describing the world with a rigor not unlike that of >> mathematical representations of physical phenomena, they cannot >> themselves >> describe how they represent this world without becoming self-referential. >> Propositions are consequently essentially meaningless, since their >> meaning >> consists precisely in their ability to connect with the world outside of >> language. A perfect language mirrors a perfect world, but since the >> latter is nothing more than a chimera so is the former. >> >> Here are some quotes (taken out of their original contexts) from >> Wittgenstein’s Tractatus that I believe are relevant to the discussion on >> information and meaning: >> >> The facts in logical space are the world. What is the case — a fact— is >> the existence of states of affairs. A state of affairs (a state of >> things) >> is a combination of objects (things). It is essential to things that they >> should be possible constituents of states of affairs. If I know an object >> I >> also know all its possible occurrences in states of affairs. Objects >> contain the possibility of all situations. The configuration of objects >> produces states of affairs. The totality of existing states of affairs is >> the world. The existence and non-existence of states of affairs is >> reality. >> States of affairs are independent of one another. A picture is a model >> of >> reality. A picture is a fact. Logical pictures can depict the world. A >> picture depicts reality by representing a possibility of existence and >> non-existence of states of affairs. Situations can be described but not >> given names. (Names are like points; propositions like arrows — they have >> sense.) Only propositions have sense; only in the nexus of a proposition >> does a name have meaning. >> >> Finally, with regards to the problems about information, I would add that >> Alfred Korzybski (and later Marshall McLuhan) once wrote that “the map is >> not the territory.” The map is merely a picture of something that it >> represents. Increasing the amount of information may reduce the >> granularity >> of the picture, but it remains a picture. This means that accumulation >> greater and greater amounts of information can never completely replace >> or >> represent the infinite complexity of any real-lilfe situation — and this >> is >> an insight that Wittgenstein realized only in his later philosophical >> work. >> >> Steve Bindeman >> >> >> On Dec 22, 2016, at 7:37 AM, fis-requ...@listas.unizar.es wrote: >> >> Send Fis mailing list submissions to >> fis@listas.unizar.es >> >> To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit >> http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis >> or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to >> fis-requ...@listas.unizar.es >> >> You can reach the person managing the list at >> fis-ow...@listas.unizar.es >> >> When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific >> than "Re: Contents of Fis digest..." >> >> >> Today's Topics: >> >> 1. Re: What is information? and What is life? (Dai Griffiths) >> >> >> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- >> >> Message: 1 >> Date: Wed, 21 Dec 2016 12:44:59 +0000 >> From: Dai Griffiths <dai.griffith...@gmail.com> >> To: fis@listas.unizar.es >> Subject: Re: [Fis] What is information? and What is life? >> Message-ID: <dbbfa511-b4e1-79b5-f800-bad1c231b...@gmail.com> >> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"; Format="flowed" >> >> Information is not ?something out there? which ?exists? otherwise >> >> than as our construct. >> >> I agree with this. And I wonder to what extent our problems in >> discussing information come from our desire to shoe-horn many different >> phenomena into the same construct. It would be possible to disaggregate >> the construct. It be possible to discuss the topics which we address on >> this list without using the word 'information'. We could discuss >> redundancy, variety, constraint, meaning, structural coupling, >> coordination, expectation, language, etc. >> >> In what ways would our explanations be weakened? >> >> In what ways might we gain in clarity? >> >> If we were to go down this road, we would face the danger that our >> discussions might become (even more) remote from everyday human >> experience. But many scientific discussions are remote from everyday >> human experience. >> >> Dai >> >> On 20/12/16 08:26, Loet Leydesdorff wrote: >> >> >> Dear colleagues, >> >> A distribution contains uncertainty that can be measured in terms of >> bits of information. >> >> Alternatively: the expected information content /H /of a probability >> distribution is . >> >> /H/is further defined as probabilistic entropy using Gibb?s >> formulation of the entropy . >> >> This definition of information is an operational definition. In my >> opinion, we do not need an essentialistic definition by answering the >> question of ?what is information?? As the discussion on this list >> demonstrates, one does not easily agree on an essential answer; one >> can answer the question ?how is information defined?? Information is >> not ?something out there? which ?exists? otherwise than as our construct. >> >> Using essentialistic definitions, the discussion tends not to move >> forward. For example, Stuart Kauffman?s and Bob Logan?s (2007) >> definition of information ?as natural selection assembling the very >> constraints on the release of energy that then constitutes work and >> the propagation of organization.? I asked several times what this >> means and how one can measure this information. Hitherto, I only >> obtained the answer that colleagues who disagree with me will be >> cited. JAnother answer was that ?counting? may lead to populism. J >> >> Best, >> >> Loet >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> >> Loet Leydesdorff >> >> Professor, University of Amsterdam >> Amsterdam School of Communication Research (ASCoR) >> >> l...@leydesdorff.net <mailto:l...@leydesdorff.net>; >> http://www.leydesdorff.net/ >> Associate Faculty, SPRU, <http://www.sussex.ac.uk/spru/>University of >> Sussex; >> >> Guest Professor Zhejiang Univ. <http://www.zju.edu.cn/english/>, >> Hangzhou; Visiting Professor, ISTIC, >> <http://www.istic.ac.cn/Eng/brief_en.html>Beijing; >> >> Visiting Professor, Birkbeck <http://www.bbk.ac.uk/>, University of >> London; >> >> http://scholar.google.com/citations?user=ych9gNYAAAAJ&hl=en >> >> *From:*Dick Stoute [mailto:dick.sto...@gmail.com] >> *Sent:* Monday, December 19, 2016 12:48 PM >> *To:* l...@leydesdorff.net >> *Cc:* James Peters; u...@umces.edu; Alex Hankey; FIS Webinar >> *Subject:* Re: [Fis] What is information? and What is life? >> >> List, >> >> Please allow me to respond to Loet about the definition of information >> stated below. >> >> 1. the definition of information as uncertainty is counter-intuitive >> ("bizarre"); (p. 27) >> >> I agree. I struggled with this definition for a long time before >> realising that Shannon was really discussing "amount of information" >> or the number of bits needed to convey a message. He was looking for >> a formula that would provide an accurate estimate of the number of >> bits needed to convey a message and realised that the amount of >> information (number of bits) needed to convey a message was dependent >> on the "amount" of uncertainty that had to be eliminated and so he >> equated these. >> >> It makes sense to do this, but we must distinguish between "amount of >> information" and "information". For example, we can measure amount of >> water in liters, but this does not tell us what water is and likewise >> the measure we use for "amount of information" does not tell us what >> information is. We can, for example equate the amount of water needed >> to fill a container with the volume of the container, but we should >> not think that water is therefore identical to an empty volume. >> Similarly we should not think that information is identical to >> uncertainty. >> >> By equating the number of bits needed to convey a message with the >> "amount of uncertainty" that has to be eliminated Shannon, in effect, >> equated opposites so that he could get an estimate of the number of >> bits needed to eliminate the uncertainty. We should not therefore >> consider that this equation establishes what information is. >> >> Dick >> >> On 18 December 2016 at 15:05, Loet Leydesdorff <l...@leydesdorff.net >> <mailto:l...@leydesdorff.net>> wrote: >> >> Dear James and colleagues, >> >> Weaver (1949) made two major remarks about his coauthor (Shannon)'s >> contribution: >> >> 1. the definition of information as uncertainty is counter-intuitive >> ("bizarre"); (p. 27) >> >> 2. "In particular, information must not be confused with meaning." (p. 8) >> >> The definition of information as relevant for a system of reference >> confuses information with "meaningful information" and thus sacrifices >> the surplus value of Shannon's counter-intuitive definition. >> >> information observer >> >> that integrates interactive processes such as >> >> physical interactions such photons stimulating the retina of the eye, >> human-machine interactions (this is the level that Shannon lives on), >> biological interaction such body temperature relative to touch ice or >> heat source, social interaction such as this forum started by Pedro, >> economic interaction such as the stock market, ... [Lerner, page 1]. >> >> We are in need of a theory of meaning. Otherwise, one cannot measure >> meaningful information. In a previous series of communications we >> discussed redundancy from this perspective. >> >> Lerner introduces mathematical expectation E[Sap] (difference between >> of a priory entropy [sic] and a posteriori entropy), which is >> distinguished from the notion of relative information Iap (Learner, >> page 7). >> >> ) expresses in bits of information the information generated when the >> a priori distribution is turned into the a posteriori one . This >> follows within the Shannon framework without needing an observer. I >> use this equation, for example, in my 1995-book /The Challenge of >> Scientometrics/ (Chapters 8 and 9), with a reference to Theil (1972). >> The relative information is defined as the /H///H/(max). >> >> I agree that the intuitive notion of information is derived from the >> Latin ?in-formare? (Varela, 1979). But most of us do no longer use >> ?force? and ?mass? in the intuitive (Aristotelian) sense. JThe >> proliferation of the meanings of information if confused with >> ?meaningful information? is indicative for an ?index sui et falsi?, in >> my opinion. The repetitive discussion lames the progression at this >> list. It is ?like asking whether a glass is half empty or half full? >> (Hayles, 1990, p. 59). >> >> This act of forming forming an information process results in the >> construction of an observer that is the owner [holder] of information. >> >> The system of reference is then no longer the message, but the >> observer who provides meaning to the information (uncertainty). I >> agree that this is a selection process, but the variation first has to >> be specified independently (before it can be selected. >> >> And Lerner introduces the threshold between objective and subjective >> observes (page 27). This leads to a consideration selection and >> cooperation that includes entanglement. >> >> I don?t see a direct relation between information and entanglement. An >> observer can be entangled. >> >> Best, >> >> Loet >> >> PS. Pedro: Let me assume that this is my second posting in the week >> which ends tonight. L. >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Fis mailing list >> Fis@listas.unizar.es <mailto:Fis@listas.unizar.es> >> http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis >> >> >> >> -- >> >> >> 4 Austin Dr. Prior Park St. James, Barbados BB23004 >> Tel: 246-421-8855 >> Cell: 246-243-5938 >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Fis mailing list >> Fis@listas.unizar.es >> http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis >> >> >> -- >> ----------------------------------------- >> >> Professor David (Dai) Griffiths >> Professor of Education >> School of Education and Psychology >> The University of Bolton >> Deane Road >> Bolton, BL3 5AB >> >> Office: T3 02 >> http://www.bolton.ac.uk/IEC >> >> SKYPE: daigriffiths >> UK Mobile +44 (0)7491151559 <+44%207491%20151559> >> Spanish Mobile: + 34 687955912 <+34%20687%2095%2059%2012> >> Work: + 44 (0)7826917705 <+44%207826%20917705> >> (Please don't leave voicemail) >> email: >> d.e.griffi...@bolton.ac.uk >> dai.griffith...@gmail.com >> >> -------------- next part -------------- >> An HTML attachment was scrubbed... >> URL: <http://listas.unizar.es/pipermail/fis/attachments/ >> 20161221/39481ed0/attachment.html> >> -------------- next part -------------- >> A non-text attachment was scrubbed... >> Name: not available >> Type: image/png >> Size: 497 bytes >> Desc: not available >> URL: <http://listas.unizar.es/pipermail/fis/attachments/ >> 20161221/39481ed0/attachment.png> >> -------------- next part -------------- >> A non-text attachment was scrubbed... >> Name: not available >> Type: image/png >> Size: 829 bytes >> Desc: not available >> URL: <http://listas.unizar.es/pipermail/fis/attachments/ >> 20161221/39481ed0/attachment-0001.png> >> -------------- next part -------------- >> A non-text attachment was scrubbed... >> Name: not available >> Type: image/png >> Size: 560 bytes >> Desc: not available >> URL: <http://listas.unizar.es/pipermail/fis/attachments/ >> 20161221/39481ed0/attachment-0002.png> >> -------------- next part -------------- >> A non-text attachment was scrubbed... >> Name: not available >> Type: image/png >> Size: 975 bytes >> Desc: not available >> URL: <http://listas.unizar.es/pipermail/fis/attachments/ >> 20161221/39481ed0/attachment-0003.png> >> -------------- next part -------------- >> A non-text attachment was scrubbed... >> Name: not available >> Type: image/png >> Size: 497 bytes >> Desc: not available >> URL: <http://listas.unizar.es/pipermail/fis/attachments/ >> 20161221/39481ed0/attachment-0004.png> >> -------------- next part -------------- >> A non-text attachment was scrubbed... >> Name: not available >> Type: image/png >> Size: 495 bytes >> Desc: not available >> URL: <http://listas.unizar.es/pipermail/fis/attachments/ >> 20161221/39481ed0/attachment-0005.png> >> >> ------------------------------ >> >> Subject: Digest Footer >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Fis mailing list >> Fis@listas.unizar.es >> http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis >> >> >> ------------------------------ >> >> End of Fis Digest, Vol 33, Issue 41 >> *********************************** >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Fis mailing list >> Fis@listas.unizar.es >> http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Fis mailing list >> Fis@listas.unizar.es >> http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis >> >> >
-- Alex Hankey M.A. (Cantab.) PhD (M.I.T.) Distinguished Professor of Yoga and Physical Science, SVYASA, Eknath Bhavan, 19 Gavipuram Circle Bangalore 560019, Karnataka, India Mobile (Intn'l): +44 7710 534195 Mobile (India) +91 900 800 8789 ____________________________________________________________ 2015 JPBMB Special Issue on Integral Biomathics: Life Sciences, Mathematics and Phenomenological Philosophy <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/00796107/119/3> _______________________________________________ Fis mailing list Fis@listas.unizar.es http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
