Cari Tutti, l'8 febbraio Vi ho inviato un messaggio il cui contenuto, senza alcuna presunzione, può essere utile per dirimere le questioni onto-epistemo-logiche che sono sorte. Allora lo trasmetto nuovamente. Caro Terry estensibile a tutti, è sempre un piacere leggerTi e capirTi. La general theory of information è preceduta da un sistema (o semiotica) di significazione e seguita da un sistema (o semiotica ) di comunicazione. Tranne che quando si ha un processo comunicativo come il passaggio di un Segnale (che non significa necessariamente 'un segno') da una Fonte, attraverso un Trasmettitore, lungo un Canale, a un Destinatario. In un processo tra macchina e macchina il segnale non ha alcun potere 'significante'. In tal caso non si ha significazione anche se si può dire che si ha passaggio di informazione. Quando il destinatario è un essere umano (e non è necessario che la fonte sia anch'essa un essere umano) si è in presenza di un processo di significazione. Un sistema di significazione è una costruzione semiotica autonoma, indipendente da ogni possibile atto di comunicazione che l'attualizzi. Invece ogni processo di comunicazione tra esseri umani -- o tra ogni tipo di apparato o struttura 'intelligente, sia meccanico che biologico, -- presuppone un sistema di significazione come propria o specifica condizione. In conclusione, è possibile avere una semiotica della significazione indipendente da una semiotica della comunicazione; ma è impossibile stabilire una semiotica della comunicazione indipendente da una semiotica della significazione. Ho appreso molto da Umberto Eco a cui ho dedicato il capitolo 10. Umberto Eco e il processo di re-interpretazione e re-incantamento della scienza economica (pp. 175-217) di "Valore e valutazioni. La scienza dell'economia o l'economia della scienza" (FrancoAngeli, Milano, 1997). Nello mio stesso libro si trovano: - il capitolo 15. Semiotica economico-estimativa (pp. 327-361) che si colloca nel quadro di una teoria globale di tutti i sistemi di significazione e i processi di comunicazione; - il sottoparagrafo 5.3.3 La psicologia genetica di Jean Piaget e la neurobiologia di Humberto Maturana e Francesco Varela. una nuova epistemologia sperimentale della qualità e dell'unicità (pp. 120-130). Chiedo scusa a Tutti se Vi ho stancati o se ancora una volta il mio scrivere in lingua italiana Vi crea qualche problema. Penso che il dono che mi fate è, a proposito della QUALITA' e dell'UNICITA', molto più grande del (per)dono che Vi chiedo. Grazie. Un saluto affettuoso. Francesco
2018-02-21 11:03 GMT+01:00 Xueshan Yan <y...@pku.edu.cn>: > Dear colleagues, > > > > In the first half of this month, we have a heated discussion about the > relationship among Information, Language, and Communication started by > Sung. I am simply summing up part of the different opinions as follows: > > > > *Sung: Without a language, no communication would be possible. Encoding, > decoding, information (flow) are essential for communication*. > > Part of the related different opinions: > > Terry: (In this way), one must use the term "language" in a highly > metaphoric sense. Communications take place in the following situations, > are there languages? Such as scent, music, sexual display of some animals, > smile, frown, pattern of colors of a flower that attracts bees, dog's bark, > walk of a depressed person, hiccup after eating. There is a serious problem > with using language as the model for analyzing other species’ communication > in hindsight.…… It is an understandable anthropocentric bias. > > Javier: *Not every* communication process involves coding/decoding and > meaning. so they could not be simply paralleled to language. For instance, > there is no coding/decoding process when I communicate to my dog. It does > not understand my speaking, and I do not understand its barking. Yet still > both of us interact. I would not define communication as information > transfer. There is no information "traveling" from one place to another, > from sender to receiver. The system itself becomes the medium of > information production and processing. > > Xueshan and Stan: The hierarchy idea is not only suitable for different > species which communication take places between them, from elementary > particle(?), molecule(?) to cell, brain(human, other animals), plant(?), > even other different planets(?). It is also suitable for different > information carrier. Stan think the carriers can be layered as {language > {signal {information}}}, Xueshan think they can be layered as {substrate > {signal {information}}}, here we simply consider sign, signal, symbol, > token, marker and so forth as the same. > > Gordana: It might be possible to develop a general theory of language …… > with different levels of cognition which communicate and process > information in order to survive. As in biology there are different kinds of > organisms there are also different kinds of “languages”. There are small > languages communicated in relatively simple ways between simple agents > (like cells) and big languages used by complex agents like humans. > > > > (In all the above discussions, we all omitted the Sung’s deep layer > analysis of cell language and category theory). > > > > Others: > > Arturo: I suggest to fully REMOVE from the TRUE scientific adventures the > terms: "symbol", "signal", "marker", "information". > > Howard: Information is anything a receiver can interpret. Information is > in the eye of the beholder. > > Javier: Information and meaning are not the same. > > Christophe: I take communications as related to meaning generation. > > Mayank: Can we not make conceptual leap from networks, information, > communication, and language to sound? > > Koichiro: Focusing upon languaging comes to shed light on the > communication in time between whatever parties. > > > > Best wishes, > > Xueshan > > > > *From:* Stanley N Salthe [mailto:ssal...@binghamton.edu] > *Sent:* Wednesday, February 14, 2018 11:44 PM > *To:* y...@pku.edu.cn > *Subject:* Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based > on the cateogry theory > > Xueshan -- My {language {signal {information}}} is meant apply only to a > system that has language. That is, my assertion would be that no > information can be gained in such a system that has not passed through a > linguistic filter. The idea is that in such a system language dominates > everything. Perhaps this has not been definitively demonstrated as yet. I > suppose it would depend upon, for example, whether or not we consider our > bodily reaction to, for example, having just burned our finger to have been > ‘informationally mediated. If not (which seems possible to me) then my > supposition might be OK. But if we think that neuron communications mediate > information, then I am wrong. > > > > STAN > > > > On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 6:31 AM, Xueshan Yan <y...@pku.edu.cn> wrote: > > Dear Javier and Dear Stan, > > > > Javier: > > 1. I very much agree with you as follows: > > “I think that only signals can be transmitted, not information. > Information can only be gained by an observer (a self-referential system) > that draws a distinction.” > > A Chinese scholar Dongsheng Miao’s argument is: There is no information > can exists without carrier, i.e. No naked can exists. > > I think both of you two are expressing a principle of information science. > > > > 2. According to Linguistics, the relationship between language and > communication is: > > Language is a tool of communication about information. > > Of course, this is only limited to the human atmosphere. So I think that > all (Human) Semiotics ((Human) Linguistics), (Human) Communication Study > should be the subdisciplines of Human Informatics. > > > > ========================================================== > > Dear Xueshan, > > Thanks for sharing your interesting remarks and references. I think no one > really wants to deny the crucial role the language metaphor has played in > the thinking of communication and information models. But I believe the > crucial point is to distinguish between language and communication. > Language is for us humans the main communication medium, though not the > only one. We tend to describe other communication media in society and > nature by mapping the language-like characteristics they have. This has > been useful and sucessful so far. But pushing the language metaphor too far > is showing its analytical limits. I think we need to think of a > transdisciplinary theory of communication media. On the other hand, I agree > with you that we need to check the uses of the concepts of signal and > information. I think that only signals can be transmitted, not information. > Information can only be gained by an observer (a self-referential system) > that draws a distinction. > > Best, > > Javier > > ============================================== > > Stan: > > According to Peirce, language is only one of the systematic signs. Here we > consider sign, signal, symbol as the same thing. So, more precisely in my > opinion: > > {signal {information}}, or {substrate {signal {information}}} > > But not > > {language {signal {information}}} > > If you remember, in our previous discussions, I much appreciate the > > The hierarchy idea is very important to our study which is initially > introduced by Pedro, Nikhil and you. > > =============================================================== > > Xueshan -- I think one can condense some of your insights hierarchically, > as: > > In a system having language, information seemingly may be obtained in > other ways as well. It would be a conceptually broader category. Thus > (using the compositional hierarchy): > > [information [language [signal]]] > > Meaning that, when a system has language, all information will be > understood or construed by way of linguistic constructs. > > (Here I am using ‘signal’ as being more specific than Peirce’s ‘sign’, > where: > > [sign [information [...]]] ) > > Then, more dynamically (using the subsumptive hierarchy): > > {language {signal {information}}} > > Information in a languaged system is derived by way linguistic formations, > so that, even though it is an extremely broad category, information > (informing) only emerges by way of linguistically informed transformations. > > STAN > > > > Best wishes to all, > > Xueshan > > =============================================================== > > El feb 10, 2018 5:23 AM, "Xueshan Yan" <y...@pku.edu.cn> escribió: > > Dear Colleagues, > > I have read the article "The languages of bacteria" which Gordana > recommended, and has gained a lot of inspiration from it. In combination > with Sung's comparative linguistics exploration on cell language and human > language, I have the following learning feelings to share with everyone: > > In this article, the author recognized that bacteria have evolved multiple > languages for communicating within and between species. Intra- and > interspecies cell-cell communication allows bacteria to coordinate various > biological activities in order to behave like multicellular organisms. Such > as AI-2, it is a general language that bacteria use for intergenera > signaling. > > I found an interesting phenomenon in this paper: the author use the > concept *information* 3 times but the concept *signal* (signal or > signaling) 55 times, so we have to review the history and application of “ > information” and “signal” in biology and biochemistry, it is helpful for > us to understand the relationship between language, signal, and information. > > The origin of the concept of signal (main the signal transduction) can be > traced back to the end of the 1970s. But until 1980, biochemist and > endocrinologist Martin Rodbell published an article titled: “The Role of > Hormone Receptors and GTP-Regulatory Proteins in Membrane Transduction" in > *Nature, > *in this paper he used the "signal transduction" first time. Since then, > the research on signal transduction is popular in biology and biochemistry. > > As for any information transmission system, if we pay more attention to > its transmission carrier instead of its transmission content, we are used > to employing "signal transmission" instead of "signal transduction". From > the tradition of the early use of information concept, the signal > transduction study of cells is only equivalent to the level of > telecommunications before 1948. Outwardly, before the advent of Shannon's > information theory, the central issue of telecommunications is "signal" > rather than "information". After that, the central issue of > telecommunications is "information" rather than "signal". > > According to the application history of information concept, nearly all > the essential problems behind the concepts of communication, messenger, > signal and so on may be information problems. Just as the language problem > what we are discussing here, our ultimate goal is to analyze the > information. > > > > For the same reason, I recommend another two papers: > > 1. Do Plants Think? (June 5, 2012, *Scientific American*) > > (http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/do-plants-think- > daniel-chamovitz/#rd?sukey=fc78a68049a14bb24ce82efd8ef931 > e64057ce6142b1f2f7b919612d2b3f42c07f559f5be33be0881613ccfbf5b43c4b) > > 2. Plants Can Think, Feel and Learn (December 3, 2014, *New Scientist*) > > (http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg22429980-400-root- > intelligence-plants-can-think-feel-and-learn) > > From which we can judge whether or not a plants informatics can exists. > > > > Best wishes, > > Xueshan > > > > *From:* fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] > *On Behalf Of *Sungchul Ji > *Sent:* Thursday, February 8, 2018 9:10 PM > *To:* Francesco Rizzo <13francesco.ri...@gmail.com>; Terrence W. DEACON < > dea...@berkeley.edu> > *Cc:* Fis, <fis@listas.unizar.es> > *Subject:* Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based > on the cateogry theory > > > > Hi Terry, and FISers, > > > > Can it be that "language metaphor" is akin to a (theoretical) knife that, > in the hands of a surgeon, can save lives but, in a wrong hand, can kill? > > > > All the best. > > > > Sung > ------------------------------ > > *From:* Francesco Rizzo <13francesco.ri...@gmail.com> > *Sent:* Thursday, February 8, 2018 2:56:11 AM > *To:* Terrence W. DEACON > *Cc:* Fis,; Sungchul Ji > *Subject:* Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based > on the cateogry theory > > > > Caro Terry estensibile a tutti, > > è sempre un piacere leggerTi e capirTi. La general theory of information > è preceduta da un sistema (o semiotica) di significazione e seguita da un > sistema (o semiotica ) di comunicazione. Tranne che quando si ha un > processo comunicativo come il passaggio di un Segnale (che non significa > necessariamente 'un segno') da una Fonte, attraverso un Trasmettitore, > lungo un Canale, a un Destinatario. In un processo tra macchina e macchina > il segnale non ha alcun potere 'significante'. In tal caso non si ha > significazione anche se si può dire che si ha passaggio di informazione. > Quando il destinatario è un essere umano (e non è necessario che la fonte > sia anch'essa un essere umano) si è in presenza di un processo di > significazione. Un sistema di significazione è una costruzione semiotica > autonoma, indipendente da ogni possibile atto di comunicazione che > l'attualizzi. Invece ogni processo di comunicazione tra esseri umani -- o > tra ogni tipo di apparato o struttura 'intelligente, sia meccanico che > biologico, -- presuppone un sistema di significazione come propria o > specifica condizione. In conclusione, è possibile avere una semiotica della > significazione indipendente da una semiotica della comunicazione; ma è > impossibile stabilire una semiotica della comunicazione indipendente da una > semiotica della significazione. > > Ho appreso molto da Umberto Eco a cui ho dedicato il capitolo 10. Umberto > Eco e il processo di re-interpretazione e re-incantamento della scienza > economica (pp. 175-217) di "Valore e valutazioni. La scienza dell'economia > o l'economia della scienza" (FrancoAngeli, Milano, 1997). Nello mio stesso > libro si trovano: > > - il capitolo 15. Semiotica economico-estimativa (pp. 327-361) che si > colloca nel quadro di una teoria globale di tutti i sistemi di > significazione e i processi di comunicazione; > > - il sottoparagrafo 5.3.3 La psicologia genetica di Jean Piaget e la > neurobiologia di Humberto Maturana e Francesco Varela. una nuova > epistemologia sperimentale della qualità e dell'unicità (pp. 120-130). > > Chiedo scusa a Tutti se Vi ho stancati o se ancora una volta il mio > scrivere in lingua italiana Vi crea qualche problema. Penso che il dono che > mi fate è, a proposito della QUALITA' e dell'UNICITA', molto più grande > del (per)dono che Vi chiedo. Grazie. > > Un saluto affettuoso. > > Francecso > > > > > > 2018-02-07 23:02 GMT+01:00 Terrence W. DEACON <dea...@berkeley.edu>: > > Dear FISers, > > > > In previous posts I have disparaged using language as the base model for > building a general theory of information. > > Though I realize that this may seem almost heretical, it is not a claim > that all those who use linguistic analogies are wrong, only that it can be > causally misleading. > > I came to this view decades back in my research into the neurology and > evolution of the human language capacity. > > And it became an orgnizing theme in my 1997 book The Symbolic Species. > > Early in the book I describe what I (and now other evolutionary > biologists) have come to refer to as a "porcupine fallacy" in evolutionary > thinking. > > Though I use it to critique a misleading evolutionary taxonomizing > tendency, I think it also applies to biosemiotic and information theoretic > thinking as well. > > So to exemplify my reasoning (with apologies for quoting myself) I append > the following excerpt from the book. > > > > "But there is a serious problem with using language as the model for > analyzing other > > species’ communication in hindsight. It leads us to treat every other form > of communication as > > exceptions to a rule based on the one most exceptional and divergent case. > No analytic method > > could be more perverse. Social communication has been around for as long > as animals have > > interacted and reproduced sexually. Vocal communication has been around at > least as long as frogs > > have croaked out their mating calls in the night air. Linguistic > communication was an afterthought, > > so to speak, a very recent and very idiosyncratic deviation from an > ancient and well-established > > mode of communicating. It cannot possibly provide an appropriate model > against which to assess > > other forms of communication. It is the rare exception, not the rule, and > a quite anomalous > > exception at that. It is a bit like categorizing birds’ wings with respect > to the extent they possess or > > lack the characteristics of penguins’ wings, or like analyzing the types > of hair on different mammals > > with respect to their degree of resemblance to porcupine quills. It is an > understandable > > anthropocentric bias—perhaps if we were penguins or porcupines we might > see more typical wings > > and hair as primitive stages compared to our own more advanced > adaptations—but it does more to > > obfuscate than clarify. Language is a derived characteristic and so should > be analyzed as an > > exception to a more general rule, not vice versa." > > > > Of course there will be analogies to linguistic forms. > > This is inevitable, since language emerged from and is supported by a vast > nonlinguistic semiotic infrastructure. > > So of course it will inherit much from less elaborated more fundamental > precursors. > > And our familiarity with language will naturally lead us to draw insight > from this more familiar realm. > > I just worry that it provides an elaborate procrustean model that assumes > what it endeavors to explain. > > > > Regards to all, Terry > > > > > > > > On Wed, Feb 7, 2018 at 11:04 AM, Jose Javier Blanco Rivero < > javierwe...@gmail.com> wrote: > > In principle I agree with Terry. I have been thinking of this, though I am > still not able to make a sound formulation of the idea. Still I am afraid > that if I miss the chance to make at least a brief formulation of it I will > lose the opportunity to make a brainstorming with you. So, here it comes: > > I have been thinking that a proper way to distinguish the contexts in > which the concept of information acquires a fixed meaning or the many > contexts on which information can be somehow observed, is to make use of > the distinction between medium and form as developed by N. Luhmann, D. > Baecker and E. Esposito. I have already expressed my opinion in this group > that what information is depends on the system we are talking about. But > the concept of medium is more especific since a complex system ussualy has > many sources and types of information. > So the authors just mentioned, a medium can be broadly defined as a set of > loosely coupled elements. No matter what they are. While a Form is a > temporary fixed coupling of a limited configuration of those elements. > Accordingly, we can be talking about DNA sequences which are selected by > RNA to form proteins or to codify a especific instruction to a determinate > cell. We can think of atoms forming a specific kind of matter and a > specific kind of molecular structure. We can also think of a vocabulary or > a set of linguistic conventions making possible a meaningful utterance or > discourse. > The idea is that the medium conditions what can be treated as information. > Or even better, each type of medium produces information of its own kind. > According to this point of view, information cannot be transmitted. It can > only be produced and "interpreted" out of the specific difference that a > medium begets between itself and the forms that take shape from it. A > medium can only be a source of noise to other mediums. Still, media can > couple among them. This means that media can selforganize in a synergetic > manner, where they depend on each others outputs or complexity reductions. > And this also mean that they do this by translating noise into information. > For instance, language is coupled to writing, and language and writing to > print. Still oral communication is noisy to written communication. Let us > say that the gestures, emotions, entonations, that we make when talking > cannot be copied as such into writing. In a similar way, all the social > practices and habits made by handwriting were distorted by the introduction > of print. From a technical point of view you can codify the same message > orally, by writing and by print. Still information and meaning are not the > same. You can tell your girlfriend you love her. That interaction face to > face where the lovers look into each others eye, where they can see if the > other is nervous, is trembling or whatever. Meaning (declaring love and > what that implies: marriage, children, and so on) and information (he is > being sincere, she can see it in his eye; he brought her to a special > place, so he planned it, and so on) take a very singular and untranslatable > configuration. If you write a letter you just can say "I love you". You > shall write a poem or a love letter. Your beloved would read it alone in > her room and she would have to imagine everything you say. And imagination > makes information and meaning to articulate quite differently as in oral > communication. It is not the same if you buy a love card in the kiosk and > send it to her. Maybe you compensate the simplicity of your message by > adding some chocolates and flowers. Again, information (jumm, lets see what > he bought her) and meaning are not the same. I use examples of social > sciences because that is my research field, although I have the intuition > that it could also work for natural sciences. > > Best, > > JJ > > El feb 7, 2018 10:47 AM, "Sungchul Ji" <s...@pharmacy.rutgers.edu> escribió > : > > Hi FISers, > > > > On 10/8/2017, Terry wrote: > > > > " So basically, I am advocating an effort to broaden our discussions and > recognize that the term information applies in diverse ways to many > different contexts. And because of this it is important to indicate the > framing, whether physical, formal, biological, phenomenological, > linguistic, etc. > > . . . . . . The classic syntax-semantics-pragmatics distinction introduced > by Charles Morris has often been cited in this respect, though it too is in > my opinion too limited to the linguistic paradigm, and may be misleading > when applied more broadly. I have suggested a parallel, less linguistic > (and nested in Stan's subsumption sense) way of making the division: i.e. > into intrinsic, referential, and normative analyses/properties of > information." > > > > I agree with Terry's concern about the often overused linguistic metaphor > in defining "information". Although the linguistic metaphor has its > limitations (as all metaphors do), it nevertheless offers a unique > advantage as well, for example, its well-established categories of > functions (see the last column in *Table 1*.) > > > > The main purpose of this post is to suggest that all the varied theories > of information discussed on this list may be viewed as belonging to the > same category of ITR (Irreducible Triadic Relation) diagrammatically > represented as the 3-node closed network in the first column of *Table 1*. > > > > *Table 1.* The postulated universality of ITR (Irreducible Triadic > Relation) as manifested in information theory, semiotics, cell language > theory, and linguistics. > > *Category Theory* > > > * f g* > > > > > * A -----> B ------> > C | ^ | | > |______________|* > * h* > > > > *ITR (Irreducible Triadic Relation**)* > > *Deacon’s theory of information* > > *Shannon’s* > > *Theory of* > > *information* > > *Peirce’s theory of signs* > > *Cell language theory* > > > *Human language(Function)* > > A > > *Intrinsic *information > > Source > > Object > > Nucleotides*/ > Amion acids > > Letters > (Building blocks) > > B > > *Referential *information > > Message > > Sign > > Proteins > > Words > (Denotation) > > C > > *Normative *information > > Receiver > > Interpretant > > Metabolomes > (Totality of cell metabolism) > > Systems of words > (Decision making & Reasoning) > > f > > ? > > Encoding > > Sign production > > Physical laws > > Second articulation > > g > > ? > > Decoding > > Sign interpretation > > Evoutionary selection > > First and Third articulation > > h > > ? > > Information flow > > Information flow > > Inheritance > > Grounding/ > > Habit > > *Scale* > > *Micro-Macro?* > > *Macro* > > *Macro* > > *Micro* > > *Macro* > > > > *There may be more than one genetic alphabet of 4 nucleotides. According > to the "multiple genetic alphabet hypothesis', there are n genetic > alphabets, each consisting of 4^n letters, each of which in turn > consisting of n nucleotides. In this view, the classical genetic > alphabet is just one example of the n alphabets, i.e., the one with n = 1. > When n = 3, for example, we have the so-called 3rd-order genetic alphabet > with 4^3 = 64 letters each consisting of 3 nucleotides, resulting in the > familiar codon table. Thus, the 64 genetic codons are not words as widely > thought (including myself until recently) but letters! It then follows > that proteins are words and metabolic pathways are sentences. Finally, > the transient network of metbolic pathways (referred to as > "hyperstructures" by V. Norris in 1999 and as "hypermetabolic pathways" by > me more recently) correspond to texts essential to represent > arguement/reasoning/computing. What is most exciting is the recent > discovery in my lab at Rutgers that the so-called "Planck-Shannon plots" of > mRNA levels in living cells can identify function-dependent "hypermetabolic > pathways" underlying breast cancer before and after drug > treatment (manuscript under review). > > > > Any comments, questions, or suggestions would be welcome. > > > > Sung > > > > > _______________________________________________ > Fis mailing list > Fis@listas.unizar.es > http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis > <https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Flistas.unizar.es%2Fcgi-bin%2Fmailman%2Flistinfo%2Ffis&data=02%7C01%7Csji%40pharmacy.rutgers.edu%7Cca4905ddbcb943df537b08d56ec96c4c%7C927347c284584fde99b9ca9ba94d96e0%7C1%7C0%7C636536733755726637&sdata=ir%2FcgnTkNiV8YXWkbn3T4FULEtrqVHFhg%2FFFVuDc9IA%3D&reserved=0> > > > _______________________________________________ > Fis mailing list > Fis@listas.unizar.es > http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis > <https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Flistas.unizar.es%2Fcgi-bin%2Fmailman%2Flistinfo%2Ffis&data=02%7C01%7Csji%40pharmacy.rutgers.edu%7Cca4905ddbcb943df537b08d56ec96c4c%7C927347c284584fde99b9ca9ba94d96e0%7C1%7C0%7C636536733755726637&sdata=ir%2FcgnTkNiV8YXWkbn3T4FULEtrqVHFhg%2FFFVuDc9IA%3D&reserved=0> > > > > > > -- > > Professor Terrence W. Deacon > University of California, Berkeley > > > _______________________________________________ > Fis mailing list > Fis@listas.unizar.es > http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis > <https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Flistas.unizar.es%2Fcgi-bin%2Fmailman%2Flistinfo%2Ffis&data=02%7C01%7Csji%40pharmacy.rutgers.edu%7Cca4905ddbcb943df537b08d56ec96c4c%7C927347c284584fde99b9ca9ba94d96e0%7C1%7C0%7C636536733755726637&sdata=ir%2FcgnTkNiV8YXWkbn3T4FULEtrqVHFhg%2FFFVuDc9IA%3D&reserved=0> > > > > > _______________________________________________ > Fis mailing list > Fis@listas.unizar.es > http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis > > > > _______________________________________________ > Fis mailing list > Fis@listas.unizar.es > http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis > >
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