Dear Arturo,
There were some reports in clinical psychology, about 30 years
ago, that relate to the question whether a machine can pretend
to be a therapist. That was the time as computers could newly
be used in an interactive fashion, and the Rogers techniques
were a current discovery.
(Rogers developed a dialogue method where one does not address
the contents of what the patient says, but rather the emotional
aspects of the message, assumed to be at work in the patient.)
They then said, that in some cases it was indistinguishable,
whether a human or a machine provides the answer to a patient's
elucidations.
Progress since then has surely made possible to create machines
that are indistinguishable in interaction to humans. Indeed,
what is called "expert systems ", are widely used in many
fields. If the interaction is rational, that is: formally
equivalent to a logical discussion modi Wittgenstein, the
difference in: "who arrived at this answer, machinery or a
human", becomes irrelevant.
Artistry, intuition, creativity are presently seen as not
possible to translate into Wittgenstein sentences. Maybe the
inner instincts are not yet well understood. But!: there are
some who are busily undermining the current fundamentals of
rational thinking. So there is hope that we shall live to
experience the ultimate disillusionment, namely that humans
are a combinatorial tautology.
Accordingly, may I respectfully express opposing views to what
you state: that machines and humans are of incompatible builds.
There are hints that as far as rational capabilities go, the
same principles apply. There is a rest, you say, which is not
of this kind. The counter argument says that irrational
processes do not take place in organisms, therefore what you
refer to belongs to the main process, maybe like waste belongs
to the organism's principle. This view draws a picture of a
functional biotope, in which the waste of one kind of organism
is raw material for a different kind.
Karl
<tozziart...@libero.it <mailto:tozziart...@libero.it>> schrieb
am Do., 10. Mai 2018 15:24:
Dear Bruno,
You state:
"IF indexical digital mechanism is correct in the cognitive
science,
THEN “physical” has to be defined entirely in arithmetical
term, i.e. “physical” becomes a mathematical notion.
...Indexical digital mechanism is the hypothesis that there
is a level of description of the brain/body such that I
would survive, or “not feel any change” if my brain/body is
replaced by a digital machine emulating the brain/body at
that level of description".
The problem of your account is the following:
You say "IF" and "indexical digital mechanism is the
HYPOTHESIS".
Therefore, you are talking of an HYPOTHESIS: it is not
empirically tested and it is not empirically testable. You
are starting with a sort of postulate: I, and other people,
do not agree with it. The current neuroscience does not
state that our brain/body is (or can be replaced by) a
digital machine.
In other words, your "IF" stands for something that
possibly does not exist in our real world. Here your
entire building falls down.
--
Inviato da Libero Mail per Android
giovedì, 10 maggio 2018, 02:46PM +02:00 da Bruno Marchal
marc...@ulb.ac.be <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>:
(This mail has been sent previously , but without
success. I resend it, with minor changes). Problems due
to different accounts. It was my first comment to Mark
Burgin new thread “Is information physical?”.
Dear Mark, Dear Colleagues,
Apology for not answering the mails in the
chronological orders, as my new computer classifies
them in some mysterious way!
This is my first post of the week. I might answer
comment, if any, at the end of the week.
On 25 Apr 2018, at 03:47, Burgin, Mark
<mbur...@math.ucla.edu <mailto:mbur...@math.ucla.edu>>
wrote:
Dear Colleagues,
I would like to suggest the new topic for discussion
Is information physical?
That is an important topic indeed, very close to what I
am working on.
My result here is that
*_
_*
*_IF_* indexical digital mechanism is correct in the
cognitive science,
*_
_*
*_THEN_* “physical” has to be defined entirely in
arithmetical term, i.e. “physical” becomes a
mathematical notion.
The proof is constructive. It shows exactly how to
derive physics from Arithmetic (the reality, not the
theory. I use “reality” instead of “model" (logician’s
term, because physicists use “model" for “theory").
Indexical digital mechanism is the hypothesis that
there is a level of description of the brain/body such
that I would survive, or “not feel any change” if my
brain/body is replaced by a digital machine emulating
the brain/body at that level of description.
Not only information is not physical, but matter, time,
space, and all physical objects become part of the
universal machine phenomenology. Physics is reduced to
arithmetic, or, equivalently, to any Turing-complete
machinery. Amazingly Arithmetic (even the tiny
semi-computable part of arithmetic) is Turing complete
(Turing Universal).
The basic idea is that:
1) no universal machine can distinguish if she is
executed by an arithmetical reality or by a physical
reality. And,
2) all universal machines are executed in arithmetic,
and they are necessarily undetermined on the set of of
all its continuations emulated in arithmetic.
That reduces physics to a statistics on all
computations relative to my actual state, and see from
some first person points of view (something I can
describe more precisely in some future post perhaps).
Put in that way, the proof is not constructive, as, if
we are machine, we cannot know which machine we are.
But Gödel’s incompleteness can be used to recover this
constructively for a simpler machine than us, like
Peano arithmetic. This way of proceeding enforces the
distinction between first and third person views (and
six others!).
I have derived already many feature of quantum
mechanics from this (including the possibility of
quantum computer) a long time ago. I was about sure
this would refute Mechanism, until I learned about
quantum mechanics, which verifies all the most
startling predictions of Indexical Mechanism, unless we
add the controversial wave collapse reduction principle.
The curious “many-worlds” becomes the obvious (in
arithmetic) many computations (up to some equivalence
quotient). The weird indeterminacy becomes the simpler
amoeba like duplication. The non-cloning of matter
becomes obvious: as any piece of matter is the result
of the first person indeterminacy (the first person
view of the amoeba undergoing a duplication, …) on
infinitely many computations. This entails also that
neither matter appearance nor consciousness are Turing
emulable per se, as the whole arithmetical
reality—which is a highly non computable notion as we
know since Gödel—plays a key role. Note this makes
Digital Physics leaning to inconsistency, as it implies
indexical computationalism which implies the negation
of Digital Physics (unless my “body” is the entire
physical universe, which I rather doubt).
My opinion is presented below:
Why some people erroneously think that information is
physical
The main reason to think that information is physical
is the strong belief of many people, especially,
scientists that there is only physical reality, which
is studied by science. At the same time, people
encounter something that they call information.
When people receive a letter, they comprehend that it
is information because with the letter they receive
information. The letter is physical, i.e., a physical
object. As a result, people start thinking that
information is physical. When people receive an
e-mail, they comprehend that it is information because
with the e-mail they receive information. The e-mail
comes to the computer in the form of electromagnetic
waves, which are physical. As a result, people start
thinking even more that information is physical.
However, letters, electromagnetic waves and actually
all physical objects are only carriers or containers
of information.
To understand this better, let us consider a textbook.
Is possible to say that this book is knowledge? Any
reasonable person will tell that the textbook contains
knowledge but is not knowledge itself. In the same
way, the textbook contains information but is not
information itself. The same is true for letters,
e-mails, electromagnetic waves and other physical
objects because all of them only contain information
but are not information. For instance, as we know,
different letters can contain the same information.
Even if we make an identical copy of a letter or any
other text, then the letter and its copy will be
different physical objects (physical things) but they
will contain the same information.
Information belongs to a different (non-physical)
world of knowledge, data and similar essences. In
spite of this, information can act on physical objects
(physical bodies) and this action also misleads people
who think that information is physical.
OK. The reason is that we can hardly imagine how
immaterial or non physical objects can alter the
physical realm. It is the usual problem faced by
dualist ontologies. With Indexical computationalism we
recover many dualities, but they belong to the
phenomenologies.
One more misleading property of information is that
people can measure it. This brings an erroneous
assumption that it is possible to measure only
physical essences. Naturally, this brings people to
the erroneous conclusion that information is physical.
However, measuring information is essentially
different than measuring physical quantities, i.e.,
weight. There are no “scales” that measure
information. Only human intellect can do this.
OK. I think all intellect can do that, not just he
human one.
Now, the reason why people believe in the physical is
always a form of the “knocking table” argument. They
knocks on the table and say “you will not tell me that
this table is unreal”.
I have got so many people giving me that argument, that
I have made dreams in which I made that argument, or
even where I was convinced by that argument … until I
wake up.
When we do metaphysics with the scientific method, this
“dream argument” illustrates that seeing, measuring, …
cannot prove anything ontological. A subjective
experience proves only the phenomenological existence
of consciousness, and nothing more. It shows that
although there are plenty of strong evidences for a
material reality, there are no evidences (yet) for a
primitive or primary matter (and that is why, I think,
Aristotle assumes it quasi explicitly, against Plato,
and plausibly against Pythagorus).
Mechanism forces a coming back to Plato, where the
worlds of ideas is the world of programs, or
information, or even just numbers, since very
elementary arithmetic (PA without induction, + the
predecessor axiom) is already Turing complete (it
contains what I have named a Universal Dovetailer: a
program which generates *and* executes all programs).
So I agree with you: information is not physical. I
claim that if we assume Mechanism (Indexical
computationalism) matter itself is also not *primarily*
physical: it is all in the “head of the universal
machine/number” (so to speak).
And this provides a test for primary matter: it is
enough to find if there is a discrepancy between the
physics that we infer from the observation, and the
physics that we extract from “the head” of the machine.
This took me more than 30 years of work, but the
results obtained up to now is that there is no
discrepancies. I have compared the quantum logic
imposed by incompleteness (formally) on the
semi-computable (partial recursive, sigma_1)
propositions, with most quantum logics given by
physicists, and it fits rather well.
Best regards,
Bruno
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