Dear Christophe
[in response to your remark, and also in the relation to the upcoming
session]
concerning your remark that it is impossible to identify meaning precisely
ONLY if we confine meaning to the realm of humans, and your suggestion that
in more basic system (e.g. simple living organisms) it could be usably
described. I wonder how do you get around the problem of observer. This
meaning of interaction between elements of a basic living system (or even a
complex chemical system) exists only for us humans. In respect to your
paper: you identify behavioural regularities and constraints, and thus
create a causal link between them. We could look at the living system in
Cartesian manner, claiming that simple mechanical laws underlie what you
called a 'meaningful behaviour': living organisms could be but automata
conditioned to move in the presence of acid. Or, we can say there is an
animating spirit that assigns meaning to the substance of acid as much as
does to the action of an organism: could meaning be 'dissolved' in acid and
'absorbed' by organism placed into acid? Or, we can say that an organism
extracts meaningful information from its interaction with the acid.
Different frames of the observer fill in the observed situation with
different meanings, yet the ultimate essence of meaning still seems to
escape - and this allows for multiple descriptions.
What I claim here is that meanings are intrinsic to the observer (I believe
Maturana and Varela held the same p.o.v.), and they are revealed in the
observation, yet cannot be homomorphically transormed into descriptions of
observation, that use language invariant to all observers (e.g. mathematical
formulas). If meanings are intrinsic, observers could only describe these
observations to themselves, but heterogeneity of observer qualities would
retain them from adequate descriptions to others. Maybe I am wrong though,
and I would appreciate your point on the issue.
Best wishes,
Pavel.
----- Original Message -----
From: "Christophe Menant" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc: <fis@listas.unizar.es>
Sent: Monday, February 20, 2006 2:19 PM
Subject: Fw: [Fis] art and meaning
Dear Pavel,
If we limit the question on "meaning" to "meaning for us humans", I'm
affraid
we are today in the fog of our subjectivity and irrational cognitive
dimensions
as you say. But if we try to address the subject of meaning for simple
living
organisms, we can get some usable answers.
You may remember the case of meaning generation modelized for a system
submitted to a constraint where relations between information and meaning
are
explicited (short paper: http://crmenant.free.fr/ResUK/index.HTM).
The proposed Meaning Generator System is simple and applies easily to
simple
animals. But it becomes more difficult to use when the constraints of the
system
are difficult to identify. This is the case for us humans where free
will, emotions
and consciousness are not well enough understood today.
And regarding art as an mode of human expression, I feel we can consider
it as
being a way to satisfy our anxiety limitation constraint. More on this at
http://www.mdpi.org/fis2005/F.45.paper.pdf
So bottom line, I feel we can say two things:
- Relations between information and meaning are addressable assuming we
can
define the constraints of the system generating the meaningful
information.
- Correctly addressing the notion of meaning for us humans needs a better
understanding of our nature (consciousness, free will, subjectivity,
emotions ..)
in order to get clear enough an understanding of our constraints. And art
is part of
our constraints satisfactions.
All the best
Christophe Menant
From: "Pavel Luksha" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <fis@listas.unizar.es>
Subject: Re: Fw: [Fis] art and meaning
Date: Sun, 19 Feb 2006 16:34:22 +0300
Dear Soeren and Loet,
it stroke my mind that the meaning could be something that avoids being
measured. It is the same problem that we have with science itself: the
more
we try to describe world in rigid terms, the more of the real world slips
through these terms. Since we humans as cognitive subjects have both
verbal
and non-verbal cognition, rational and irrational cognitive dimension, we
only capture part of the picture. New narratives are created, but meaning
of
original narratives, or objects from which they originate, is never fully
explained.
Is this a methodological cul-de-sac?
Pavel
----- Original Message ----- From: "Søren Brier" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Stanley N. Salthe" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; <fis@listas.unizar.es>
Sent: Sunday, February 19, 2006 3:13 PM
Subject: SV: Fw: [Fis] art and meaning
Dear Stan and Gordana
When you talk information here are you thinking of Shannon or Wiener
information? Or some logical measure of structure and organization? Or do
you include meaning?
Luhmann says that a message is consisting of meaning, information and the
form of expression.
It makes sense to me that information is the quantitative and structural
aspect of meaning and intention.
But I see no way of measuring meaning. Luhmann talks of a surplus of
possibilities of choice and action, which, I do not find sufficient for
instance to describe the meaning of a religious og philosophical message
about the meaning of suffering and love.
Søren
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