At 08:00 AM 6/7/2006, you wrote:
Dear colleagues,
let me add another aficionado naive speculation on the matters below :
We might regard every locus of space-time as having the capacity to
instantiate the whole laws of nature, in relation to any existential
perturbation by what we call matter, energy, etc. If there is an
"information processing capacity" strictly by adjacency, in which
informational perturbations --physical "state" information-- are
passed or reconstructed only from locus to locus, then the
entanglement phenomenon represents a serious violation of that
scheme. Either a non-markovian nature of the locus processes
themselves (sort of memories in the perturbation trails of entangled
events) or communication through a new meta-realm upon the previous
laws have to be invoked. In the second case, interpreted within a
market scheme, all laws of nature would represent mouth-to-moth
direct communication between adjacent marketing individuals, while
in entanglement an uncanny transmission mechanism has to intervene:
phone, radio, etc. (but maybe not acting both bidirectionally and
simultaneously), so that the entangled parties may adjust to each
other. For the non-technical view, a sense of wholeness, of global
"entity", has to be added to interpretations of space-time...
Seems right to me. It also allows application of some (minimalist)
views of causation to the QM world. Much of this is in our
forthcoming book (All things must go: Information theoretic ontic
structural realism, Oxford UP probably 2007), Ross, Ladyman,
Spurrett, Collier. We look at open and closed block universes, among
other things. I will be publishing more in my book with Cliff Hooker,
Dynamical Realism: Reduction in Complex Systems [working title]
probably MIT Press, 2008. The basic idea of dynamical realism is that
if it isn't dynamical, or doesn't have a dynamical explanation, it
has no consequences, and can be safely ignored. It turns out that
many philosophical conundrums turn on the postulation of
non-dynamical entities, or else fail to fill in the dynamical details
and are ambiguous in a way that is puzzling unless you realize that
something is missing. An example is Max Black's question of whether
there could be a world in which there are exactly two otherwise
identical metal balls 500 metres diameter and two kilometres apart.
The problem is dynamically underdetermined, though on the old thing
ontology it seems to make sense.
Cheers,
John
----------
Professor John Collier [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Philosophy and Ethics, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban 4041 South Africa
T: +27 (31) 260 3248 / 260 2292 F: +27 (31) 260 3031
http://www.nu.ac.za/undphil/collier/index.html
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