Dear all,
 
Happy the New Year of 2014 and the coming Chinese New Year of the horse (to be 
successful when the horse comes!)
 
I would like to say that John's work on the collection of literature of PI and 
the very idea of Information is really helpful, thanks!
 
Cheers,
Xiaohong
XJTU-ICPI


--------------------------------


 


----- Original Message -----
From: John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za>
To: fis <fis@listas.unizar.es>
Subject: Re: [Fis] Information, signals and data.
Date: 2014-01-14 13:58

Dear FIS members,

Information has various scientific usages, and it is important for people to be 
clear which one they mean. None of the meanings is canonical, but they can be 
put in relation to each other, as I do in Kinds of Information in Scientific 
Use. 2011. cognition, communication, co-operation. Vol 9, No 2. Another good 
source dealing with relations of different concepts of information is Luciano 
Floridi's elementary book, Information – A Very Short Introduction (Oxford 
University Press, 2010). Also The Philosophy of Information (Oxford University 
Press, 2011). I recommend these to people on the FIS list to those who cannot 
get their minds around the idea that the information concept has a wide range 
of diverse uses that are nonetheless related to each other. Floridi is 
especially good on the issues of signals versus data versus interpreted 
information. All are information in the most general sense on his account.

On the issue of the first use of information theory, I note that Shannon, C.E. 
(1948), "A Mathematical Theory of Communication", Bell System Technical 
Journal, 27, pp. 379–423 & 623–656, July & October, 1948. uses 'information' 
extensively as what is communicated, so the title could have easily been A 
mathematical theory of communication of information. The article is widely 
regarded as the foundation of information theory. However Hartely's 1928 paper, 
"Transmission of Information", Bell System Technical Journal, July 1928 is much 
earlier. Szillard made the connection between information and physics in his L. 
Szilárd (1929) "Über die Entropieverminderung in einem thermodynamischen System 
bei Eingriffen intelligenter Wesen" (On the reduction of entropy in a 
thermodynamic system by the intervention of intelligent beings), Zeitschrift 
für Physik, 53 : 840-856. Available on-line in English at: Aurellen.org (see 
also Leon Brillouin, Science and Information Theory, Mineola, N.Y.: Dover, 
[1956, 1962] 2004. ISBN 0-486-43918-6).

It is unclear to me who introduced the actual term 'information theory', but it 
was in common use after 1948. The following might be instructive: 
http://web.mit.edu/6.933/www/Fall2001/Shannon2.pdf 

Cheers,
John

At 05:42 AM 2014-01-13, Xueshan wrote:


Dear Rafael,

I am sure you were right in "what is communicated between a
sender and a receiver is NOT information but a MESSAGE", I
can provide you more supports from Biology. Between two
nerve cells, between gland cell and target cell, it is
MESSENGERS but not others which carry MESSAGE from sender to
receiver, this is the situation in first messenger theory.

In second messenger theory, not message or information, they
call it SIGNAL. In computer science, DATA some time was
adopted, such as Data Structure, Data Bank, Data Mining. No
matter what happens, all message, signal etc. should
recognize as a special usage of information. This is an
interesting history in past related information
explorations. But in modern science, such in semiochemistry,
when talk about the effects of pheromones, allomones,
kairomones, attractants, repellents, most Chemists like to
use information rather then signal (or message). First and
last, shall we consider  INFORMATION as genus and MESSAGE,
news, knowledge, etc. as its differentia?

By the way, who knows who are the first people who called
Shannon's "Mathematical Theory of Communication" as
"Information Theory"? What time? Where?

Best wishes,

Xueshan
20:45, January 13, 2014
Peking University 

> -----Original Message-----
> From: fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es 
> [ mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] On Behalf Of 
> fis-requ...@listas.unizar.es
> Sent: Monday, January 13, 2014 6:45 PM
> To: fis@listas.unizar.es
> Subject: fis Digest, Vol 579, Issue 18
> 
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> Today's Topics:
> 
>    1. Re: Fw:  Responses (Rafael Capurro)
> 
> 
>
------------------------------------------------------------
----------
> 
> Message: 1
> Date: Sat, 11 Jan 2014 11:30:20 +0100
> From: Rafael Capurro <raf...@capurro.de>
> Subject: Re: [Fis] Fw:  Responses
> To: Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic
<gordana.dodig-crnko...@mdh.se>,         Hans von
>       Baeyer <henrikrit...@gmail.com>,         Joseph
Brenner
>        <joe.bren...@bluewin.ch>, fis <fis@listas.unizar.es>
> Message-ID: <52d11d3c.3040...@capurro.de>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
> 
> Dear Gordana,
> 
> what is communicated between a sender and a receiver is
NOT 
> information but a MESSAGE
> And: the title of Shannon's paper is NOT theory of 
> information but theory of communication There are too many

> misunderstandings in this discussion best Rafael
> >
> > Dear Hans, Joseph, Loet, All
> >
> >
> > Loet: It seems to me that there is at least one 
> alternative: Shannon's 
> > mathematical theory of information. Information is then
defined as 
> > content-free.
> >
> > Gordana: There is a link between Shannon information and

> information 
> > for an agent (meaningful, semantic information).//
> >
> > What we call "context-free" is actually "fixed context".
In 
> Shannon's 
> > case, information is that which is communicated between
a 
> sender and a 
> > receiver. That means we can look at the world as a
complex 
> system of 
> > agents within agents communicating Shannon information.
This can be 
> > useful even in understanding of cognitive agents, if we
define 
> > cognition broadly and accept that bacteria and any other
kind of 
> > living being cognize -- that is use information that
makes 
> sense for 
> > them (has meaning first to survive in a direct
individual 
> contact with 
> > the environment, then through social cognition (for 
> bacteria it is a 
> > colony which enables an individual organism to "know"
about much 
> > bigger space and much longer time than one individual
would 
> be able to
> > -- this is based in molecular language). There are
striking 
> > similarities in information management principles of
bacterial 
> > colonies and our brains (which of course are much more 
> complex than a 
> > bacterial colony) but now we are talking about basic
principles.
> >
> > //
> >
> > Thus Shannon information can be used to understand
mechanisms of 
> > cognition as a process of life itself (Maturana) and
meaning for an 
> > agent.
> >
> > //
> >
> > Loet: Thermodynamic entropy (physics) is the special
case that H is 
> > multiplied by the Boltzmann constant and thus one
obtains the 
> > dimensionality of S. (S = kB * H).
> >
> > Gordana: (Ben-Naim, 2008)argues for the revision of the
above, in 
> > order to get it into better agreement with understanding
of 
> entropy as 
> > a lack of information.
> >
> >
http://www.worldscientific.com/worldscibooks/10.1142/6469
> >
> > Loet: Information theory, however, can also be used in 
> other contexts 
> > such as economics (Theil, 1972). It does not have a
realistic 
> > interpretation such as in your argument.
> >
> > Gordana: Yes, in economics one cannot talk about
realism, 
> as it is a 
> > high level of organization of information. Computer 
> analogy: hardware 
> > is something where we can talk about some kind of
realism 
> in a sense 
> > of instrumental interpretation of elementary
interactions with the 
> > physical world. One can use a metaphor of virtual
machine that Paul 
> > Smolensky (Smolensky, 1986)and Aaron Sloman (Sloman,
1996)are using.
> > Virtual machine, even though it runs on a physical
hardware 
> is virtual 
> > in a sense that it is representation of representation.
But on the 
> > bottom of this hierarchy of realism there is a physical 
> world. And if 
> > anything is real in any sense then it must be this
physical 
> layer of 
> > information.
> >
> > Loet: From such a more differentiated perspective,
concepts (e.g.,
> > "electrons") do not "exist", but are meaningful and
codified within 
> > theories. There can be sufficient evidence (in physical 
> theorizing) to 
> > assume (for the time being) that the external referents
(electrons) 
> > exist.
> >
> > Gordana: Electrons exist in the sense of instrumentalist

> epistemology. 
> > That is why we have a requirement for reproducibility of

> experiments. 
> > In the following sense:
> >
> > /"/The world in some very real sense is a construct and
creation of 
> > thinking beings simply because its properties are so 
> severely tied to 
> > the particular questions we ask of it./But on the other
hand, the 
> > world is not completely unreal as a result of this; we
generally 
> > cannot control the outcomes of our measurements."/
(Fuchs, 2011: 
> > p.151)
> >
> > Loet: The logic is not in reality, but in the argument,
and 
> one cannot 
> > jump to the (ontic) conclusion of existence.
> >
> > Gordana: In the above sense, on the bottom, there is
logic 
> in reality. 
> > Argument is that which virtual machine of our mind
produces 
> by running 
> > on the physical machine of the brain.
> >
> >
> > Hans: Gordana -- I am out of my depth in a discussion of

> > phenomena/noumena/Ding-an-sich. But when I agree that
the 
> Higgs exists 
> > out there in the world, I am sure it's not an object
like a marble, 
> > but a symbol for a collection of experiences that many
people have 
> > had, and have discussed, and codified, so that if they 
> perform another 
> > experiment where it might play a role, they can be
prepared with 
> > betting odds for what they might experience next.
> >
> > Joseph (New): - - That it is a collection of experiences
does not 
> > exclude that it is an object, or better process, of a
kind 
> other than 
> > a 'marble'. As such, in discussing it, we can go beyond

> binary game 
> > metaphors.
> >
> > Gordana (New): As this has important relevance for
understanding of 
> > information as a phenomenon in the physical world
(Landauer, 1996)I 
> > would like to return to my (epistemological) question.
Regarding 
> > marble, Bateson reflects over Kant:
> >
> > "Kant argued long ago that this piece of chalk contains
a million 
> > potential facts (Tatsachen) but that only a very few of 
> these become 
> > truly facts by affecting the behavior of entities
capable of 
> > responding to facts. For Kant's Tatsachen, /I would
substitute 
> > differences and point out that the number of potential 
> differences in 
> > this chalk is infinite but that very few of them become
effective 
> > differences (i.e., items of information) in the mental 
> process of any 
> > larger entity. Information consist of differences that
make a 
> > difference./" (Bateson, 1979: 110) (Emphasis added)
> >
> > Epistemologically, marble is not different from a piece
of 
> chalk or a 
> > quantum mechanical object, and I like your
characterization of a 
> > notion of Higgs boson as:
> >
> > /"a symbol for a collection of experiences that many
people 
> have had, 
> > and have discussed, and codified, so that if they
perform another 
> > experiment where it might play a role"/
> >
> > That is epistemological instrumentalism, which from the
cognitive 
> > point of view is a very natural position.
> >
> > I believe that QBism methodologically can be related to 
> Rössler's idea 
> > of observer-dependency of physics (Rössler, 1998).
> >
> > Also, it seems to me that epistemology of QBit can be 
> supported by the 
> > Third order cybernetics (an on-going project aiming at 
> understanding 
> > of an observer in the context of shared,
inter-subjective 
> knowledge).
> >
> > There is no need to give up reality on the fundamental
level of 
> > experimental results in physics. We cannot say that we
know what an 
> > electron really is. History of science teaches us that
we 
> constantly 
> > learn more, and understand broader context so we revise
and improve 
> > our ideas about nature. If we accept that a /notion/ of
a physical 
> > object is
> >
> > /
> > /
> >
> > /"a symbol for a collection of experiences that many
people 
> have had, 
> > and have discussed, and codified, so that if they
perform another 
> > experiment where it might play a role"/
> >
> > /
> > /
> >
> > then what seems to me necessary is to reconstruct the 
> observer, from 
> > physics up. QBit makes a step in that direction, as far
as 
> I can tell.
> >
> > With best regards,
> >
> > Gordana
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > References:
> >
> > Bateson, G. (1979). /Mind and Nature: A Necessary
Unity/. London: 
> > Wildwood House.
> >
> > Ben-Naim, A. (2008). /A farewell to entropy: statistical

> > thermodynamics based on information/. Singapore-New 
> Jersey-London-Hong
> > Kong: World Scientific.
> >
> > Fuchs, C. A. (2011). /Coming of Age With Quantum 
> Information: Notes on 
> > a Paulian Idea/. Cambridge Univ. Press.
> >
> > Landauer, R. (1996). The Physical Nature of Information.
/Physics 
> > Letter A/, /217/, 188.
> >
> > Rössler, O. (1998). /Endophysics: the world as an
interface/. 
> > Singapore-New Jersey-London-Hong Kong: World Scientific.
> >
> > Sloman, A. (1996). Beyond Turing Equivalence. In A.
Clark & 
> P. J. R. 
> > Millican (Eds.), /Machines and Thought: The Legacy of
Alan 
> Turing (vol 
> > I)/ (pp. 179--219). OUP (The Clarendon Press).
> >
> > Smolensky, P. (1986). Information processing in
dynamical systems: 
> > Foundations of harmony theory. In D. E. Rumelhart, J. L.

> McClelland, & 
> > PDP Research Group (Eds.), /Parallel distributed
processing:
> > Explorations in the microstructure of cognition/ (pp.
194--281). 
> > Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
> >
> >
> > From: Joseph Brenner <joe.bren...@bluewin.ch 
> > < mailto:joe.bren...@bluewin.ch>>
> > Reply-To: Joseph Brenner <joe.bren...@bluewin.ch 
> > < mailto:joe.bren...@bluewin.ch>>
> > Date: Saturday, January 11, 2014 9:16 AM
> > To: Hans von Baeyer <henrikrit...@gmail.com 
> > < mailto:henrikrit...@gmail.com>>, fis
<fis@listas.unizar.es 
> > < mailto:fis@listas.unizar.es>>
> > Subject: [Fis] Fw: Responses
> >
> > Gordana -- I am out of my depth in a discussion of 
> > phenomena/noumena/Dinge-an-sich. But when I agree that
the Higgs 
> > exists out there in the world, I am sure it's not an
object like a 
> > marble, but a symbol for a collection of experiences
that 
> many people 
> > have had, and have discussed, and codified, so that if
they perform 
> > another experiment where it might play a role, they can
be prepared 
> > with betting odds for what they might experience next.
> > Joseph (New) - - That it is a collection of experiences
does not 
> > exclude that it is an object, or better process, of a
kind 
> other than 
> > a 'marble'. As such, in discussing it, we can go beyond

> binary game 
> > metaphors.
> >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > fis mailing list
> > fis@listas.unizar.es
> > https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
> 
> 
> --
> Prof.em. Dr. Rafael Capurro
> Hochschule der Medien (HdM), Stuttgart, Germany Capurro
Fiek 
> Foundation for Information Ethics 
> ( http://www.capurro-fiek-foundation.org)
> Distinguished Researcher at the African Centre of
Excellence 
> for Information Ethics (ACEIE), Department of Information 
> Science, University of Pretoria, South Africa.
> Distinguished Researcher in Information Ethics, School of 
> Information Studies, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee,
USA 
> President, International Center for Information Ethics
(ICIE) 
> (http://icie.zkm.de) Editor in Chief, International Review
of 
> Information Ethics (IRIE) ( http://www.i-r-i-e.net) Postal 
> Address: Redtenbacherstr. 9, 76133 Karlsruhe, Germany
> E-Mail: raf...@capurro.de
> Voice: + 49 - 721 - 98 22 9 - 22 (Fax: -21)
> Homepage: www.capurro.de
> 
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Professor John Collier                                     colli...@ukzn.ac.za
Philosophy and Ethics, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban 4041 South Africa
T: +27 (31) 260 3248 / 260 2292       F: +27 (31) 260 3031
Http://web.ncf.ca/collier
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